Even in the case of economically free goods, the original title of ownership is occupancy. Henry George declares that the traveller who has filled his vessels at a free-for-all spring owns the water when he has carried it into a desert, by the title of labour.[19] Nevertheless, in its original place this water belonged either to the community or to nobody. In the former supposition it can become the property of the traveller only through an explicit or implicit gift from the community; and it is this contract, not labour, that constitutes his title to the water. If we assume that the spring was ownerless, we see that the labour of carrying a portion of it into the desert still lacks the qualifications of a title; for the abstracted water must have belonged to him before he began the journey. It must have been his from the moment that he separated it from the spring. Otherwise he had no right to take it away. His labour of transporting it gave him a right to the utility thus added to the water, but not a right to the water when it first found a local habitation in his vessels. Nor was the labour of transferring it from the spring into his vessels the true title; for labour alone cannot create a right to the material upon which it is exerted, as we see in the case of stolen objects. If it be contended that labour together with the natural right to use the ownerless goods of nature have all the elements of a valid title, the assertion must be rejected as unprecise and inadequate. The right to use ownerless goods is a general and abstract right that requires to become specific and concrete through some title. In the case of water it is a right to water in general, to some water, but not a right to a definite portion of the water in this particular spring. The required and sufficient title here is that of apprehension, occupation, the act of separating a portion from the natural reservoir. Therefore, it is first occupancy as exemplified in mere seizure of an ownerless good, not labour in the sense of productive activity, nor labour in the sense of painful exertion, that constitutes the precise title whereby the man acquires a right to the water that he has put into his cup or barrel. Mere seizure is a sufficient title in all such cases as that which we are now considering, simply because it is a reasonable method of determining and specifying ownership. There is no need whatever of having recourse to the concept of labour to justify this kind of property right. In the present case, indeed, the acts of apprehension and of productive labour (the labour of dipping the water into a vessel is productive inasmuch as the water is more useful there than in the spring) are the same physically, but they are distinct logically and ethically. One is mere occupation, while the other is production; and ownership of a thing must precede, in morals if not in time, the expenditure upon it of productive labour.
"The theory which bases the right of property on labour really depends in the ultimate resort on the right of possession and the fact that it is socially expedient, and is therefore upheld by the laws of society. Grotius, discussing this in the old Roman days, pointed out that since nothing can be made except out of pre-existing matter, acquisition by means of labour depends, ultimately, on possession by means of occupation."[20]
Since man's right to his faculties does not of itself give him a right to exercise them upon material objects, productive labour cannot of itself give him a right to the product therefrom created, nor constitute the original title of ownership. Since labour is not the original title to property, it is not the only possible title to property in land. Hence the fact that labour does not produce land, has no bearing on the question of private landownership.
In passing it may be observed that Henry George implicitly admitted that the argument from the labour title was not of itself sufficient to disprove the right of private property in land. Considering the objection, "if private property in land be not just, then private property in the products of land is not just, as the material of these products is taken from the land," he replied that the latter form of ownership "is in reality a mere right of temporary possession," since the raw material in the products sooner or later returns to the "reservoirs provided for all ... and thus the ownership of them by one works no injury to others."[21] But private ownership of land, he continued, shuts out others from the very reservoirs. Here we have a complete abandonment of the principle which underlies the labour argument. Instead of trying to show from the nature of the situation that there is a logical difference between the two kinds of ownership, he shifts his ground to a consideration of consequences. He makes the title of social utility instead of the title of labour the distinguishing and decisive consideration. As we shall see later, he is wrong even on this ground; for the fundamental justification of private landownership is precisely the fact that it is the system of land tenure most conducive to human welfare. At present we merely call attention to the breakdown in his own hands of the labour argument.
To sum up the entire discussion on the original title of ownership: Henry George's attack upon first occupancy is futile because based upon an exaggerated conception of the scope of private landownership, and upon a false assumption concerning the responsibility of that title for the historical evils of the system. His attempt to substitute labour as the original title is likewise unsuccessful, since labour can give a right only to the utility added to natural materials, not to the materials themselves. Ownership of the latter reaches back finally to occupation. Whence it follows that the title to an artificial thing, such as a hat or coat, water taken from a spring, a fish drawn from the sea, is a joint or two-fold title; namely, occupation and labour. Where the product embodies scarce and economically valuable raw material, occupation is usually prior to labour in time; in all cases it is prior to labour logically and ethically. Since labour is not the original title, its absence in the case of land does not leave that form of property unjustified. The title of first occupancy remains. In a word, the one original title of all property, natural and artificial, is first occupancy.
The other arguments of Henry George against private landownership are based upon the assumed right of all mankind to land and land values, and on the contention that this right is violated by the present system of tenure.
The Right of All Men to the Bounty of the Earth
"The equal right of all men to the use of land is as clear as their equal right to breathe the air—it is a right proclaimed by the fact of their existence. For we cannot suppose that some men have a right to be in the world, and others no right.
"If we are here by the equal permission of the Creator, we are all here with an equal title to the enjoyment of his bounty—with an equal right to the use of all that nature so impartially offers.... There is in nature no such thing as a fee simple in land. There is on earth no power which can rightfully make a grant of exclusive ownership of land. If all existing men were to grant away their equal rights, they could not grant away the rights of those who follow them. For what are we but tenants for a day? Have we made the earth that we should determine the rights of those who after us shall tenant it in their turn?"[22]
The right to use the goods of nature for the support of life is certainly a fundamental natural right; and it is substantially equal in all persons. It arises, on the one hand, from man's intrinsic worth, his essential needs, and his final destiny; and, on the other hand, from the fact that nature's bounty has been placed by God at the disposal of all His children indiscriminately. But this is a general and abstract right. What does it imply specifically and in the concrete? In the first place, it includes the actual and continuous use of some land; for a man cannot support life unless he is permitted to occupy some portion of the earth for the purposes of working, and eating, and sleeping. Secondly, it means that in time of extreme need, and when more orderly methods are not available, a man has the right to seize sufficient goods, natural or produced, public or private, to support life. So much is admitted and taught by all Catholic authorities, and probably by all other authorities. Furthermore, the abstract right in question seems very clearly to include the concrete right to obtain on reasonable conditions at least the requisites of a decent livelihood; for example, by direct access to a piece of land, or in return for a reasonable amount of useful labour. All of these particular rights are equally valid in all persons.