The first is exemplified in the right to live. The object of this right, life itself, is intrinsically good, good for its own sake, an end in itself. It is the end to which even civil society is a means. Since life is good intrinsically, the right to life is also valid intrinsically, and not because of consequences. Since there is no conceivable equivalent for life in the case of any individual in any contingency, the right to life is immediate and direct in all possible circumstances.
Among the natural rights of the second class, the most prominent are the right to marry, to enjoy personal freedom, and to own consumption-goods, such as food and clothing. The objects of these rights are not ends in themselves, but means to human welfare. Confining our attention to marriage, we see that membership in the conjugal union is an indispensable means to reasonable life and self development in the majority of persons. The only conceivable substitutes are free love and celibacy. Of these the first is inadequate for any person, and the second is adequate only for a minority. Marriage is, therefore, directly and per se necessary for the majority of individuals; for the majority it is an individual necessity. If the State were to abolish marriage it would deprive the majority of an indispensable means of right and reasonable life. Consequently the majority have a direct natural right to the legal power of marrying.
In the case of the minority who do not need to marry, who can live as well or better as celibates, the legal opportunity of marriage is evidently not directly necessary. But it is necessary indirectly, inasmuch as the power of choice between marriage and celibacy is an individual necessity. No argument is required to show that the State could not decide this matter consistently with individual welfare or social peace. Whence it follows that even the minority who do not wish or do not need to marry, have a natural right to embrace or reject the conjugal condition. In their case the right to marry is indirect, but none the less inviolable.[34]
Private ownership of land belongs in a third class of natural rights. Inasmuch as it is not an intrinsic good, but merely a means to human welfare, it differs from life and resembles marriage. On the other hand, it is unlike marriage in that it is not directly necessary for any individual whatever.[35] The alternative to marriage, namely, celibacy, would not even under the best social administration enable the majority to lead right and reasonable lives. The alternative to private landownership (and to private ownership of capital as well), namely, some form of employment as wage receiver, salary receiver, or fee receiver enables the individual to attain all the vital ends of private ownership: food, clothing, shelter, security of livelihood and residence, and the means of mental, moral, and spiritual development. None of these vital ends or needs is essentially dependent upon private ownership of land; for millions of persons satisfy them every day without becoming landowners. Nor are they exceptions, as those who can get along without marriage are exceptions. The persons who live reasonable lives without owning land are average persons. What they do any other person could do if placed in the same circumstances. Therefore, private landownership is not directly necessary for the welfare of any individual.
Private Landownership Indirectly Necessary for Individual Welfare
In our present industrial civilisation, however, private landownership is indirectly necessary for the welfare of the individual. It is said to be indirectly necessary because it is necessary as a social institution, rather than as something immediately connected with individual needs as such. It is not, indeed, so necessary that society would promptly go to pieces under any other form of land tenure. As we have seen in the last chapter, it is necessary in the sense that it is capable of promoting the welfare of the average person, of the majority of persons, to a much greater degree than State ownership. It is necessary for the same reason and in the same way as a civil police force. As the State is obliged to maintain a police force, so it is obliged to maintain a system of private landownership. As the citizen has a right to police protection, so he has a right to the social and economic advantages which are connected with the system of private ownership of land. These rights are natural, derived from the needs of the individual in society, not dependent upon the good pleasure of the city or the State. They are individual rights to the presence and benefits of these social institutions.
But man's rights in the matter of land tenure are more extensive than his rights with regard to a police force. They are not restricted to the presence and functioning of a social institution. Every citizen has a natural right to police protection, but no citizen has a natural right to become a policeman. The welfare of the citizen is sufficiently looked after when the members of the police are selected by the authorities of the city. On the contrary, his welfare would not be adequately safeguarded if the State were to decide who might and who might not become landowners. In the first place, the ideal condition is that in which all persons can easily become actual owners. In the second place, the mere legal opportunity of becoming owners is a considerable stimulus to the energy and ambition of all persons, even of those who are never able to convert it into an economic opportunity. Therefore, only a very powerful reason of social utility would justify the State in excluding any person or any class from the legal power to own land. No such reason exists; and there are many reasons why the State should not attempt anything of the sort. As a consequence of these facts, every person, whether an actual owner or not, has a natural right to acquire property in land. This right is evidently a necessary condition of a fair and efficient system of private ownership, which is in turn a necessary condition of individual welfare. The right of private landownership is, therefore, an indirect right; but it is quite as valid and quite as certain as any other natural right.
Now this right is certainly valid as against complete Socialism, which includes State management and use, as well as State ownership. Is it valid against the Single Tax system, or against such modified forms of Socialism as would allow the individual to rent and use the land as an independent cultivator with security of tenure? Would the introduction of some such scheme in a country in which only a small minority of the population were actual owners, constitute a violation of individual rights? While we cannot with any feeling of certainty return an affirmative answer to these questions, we can confidently affirm that reform within the lines of private ownership would in the long run be more effective, and, therefore, that the right of private ownership is probably valid even against these modified forms of common ownership.[36]