Surplus and Excessive Profits
Several of the great industrial combinations of the United States have obtained profits which are commonly stigmatised as "excessive." For example, the Standard Oil Company paid, from 1882 to 1906, an average annual dividend of 24.15 per cent. on the capital stock, and had profits in addition at the rate of about 8 per cent. annually;[165] from 1904 to 1908 the American Tobacco Company averaged 19 per cent. on its actual investment;[166] and the United States Steel Corporation obtained an average annual return of 12 per cent. on its investment from 1901 to 1910.[167] A complete list of the American monopolies that have reaped more than the competitive rate of return on their capital would undoubtedly be a very long one.
Is it possible to justify such returns? Has a monopoly a right to take surplus gains? Let us suppose a concern which is getting 15 per cent. on its investment. Inasmuch as the risks are smaller than in competitive enterprises, six per cent. is an ample allowance for interest. Of the remaining 9 per cent., 4 per cent., we shall assume, is derived from economies of production as compared with the great majority of competitive concerns. This portion of the surplus, being the reward of superior efficiency, may be retained by the owners of the monopoly quite as justly as similar gains are taken by the exceptionally efficient corporation in conditions of competition. The objection that the monopoly ought to share these gains with the public, since it limits individual opportunity in a socially undesirable way, has some merit, but it can scarcely be urged on grounds of strict justice. At most it points only to an obligation in equity.
By what canon of distribution can the retention of the other 5 per cent. of surplus gain be justified? Not by the titles of needs and efforts, for these have already been satisfied through the salaries paid to those stockholders who perform labour in the management of the concern. These titles afford no basis for any other claim than that which proceeds from labour. They cannot be made to justify claims made on behalf of capital. Not by the title of productivity, for this has already been remunerated in the 4 per cent. just considered. Not as interest on capital, for ample allowance has already been made under this head in the original 6 per cent. As we have seen in an earlier chapter, the only reasons that give ethical support to interest on capital are the sacrifice that is involved in some kinds of saving, the possibility that interest is necessary in order to induce the provision of sufficient capital, the certainty that the State would be unable to enforce the abolition of interest, and some presumptive considerations. Since all of these reasons and ends are satisfied by the competitive rate of interest, none of them will justify the exaction of more than the competitive rate. It is not possible to justify a higher rate on either social or individual grounds. Therefore, the only basis that is left upon which to defend the retention of the five per cent. surplus that we are discussing, is the power of appropriation. The monopoly possesses the economic strength to take this five per cent. because it is able to impose higher than competitive prices upon the consumer. Obviously such power has no greater ethical sanction or validity than the pistol of the highwayman. In both cases the gains are the product of extortion.
The conclusion that men have no right to more than the competitive rate of interest, as interest, on their capital, and that a monopoly has consequently no right to those surplus gains that are not produced by superior efficiency, is confirmed by public opinion and by the decisions of the courts. The monopolistic practice of taking more than the usual rate of returns on capital merely because there exists the power to take it, is universally condemned as inequitable. In fixing the charges of public service corporations, the courts with practical unanimity allow only the rate of return that is obtainable in competitive conditions of investment.
The statement that the monopoly may retain those surplus gains which are derived from superior efficiency assumes, of course, that fair wages have been paid to employés, and fair prices to the sellers of materials, and that fair methods have been used toward competitors. In so far as any of these conditions is not met, the monopolistic concern has no right to surplus gains of any sort. All three of the claims just mentioned are morally stronger than the claim to superior rewards because of superior efficiency.
The Question of Monopolistic Efficiency
So much for the moral principle. What proportion of the surplus gains of monopoly are due to extortionate prices rather than to economies in production, cannot be known even approximately. According to Justice Brandeis, who is one of the most competent authorities in this field, only a very small part of these gains are derived from superior efficiency.[168] Professor E. S. Meade writes: "During a decade [1902-1912] of unparalleled industrial development, the trusts, starting with every advantage of large capital, well-equipped plants, financial connections, and skilled superintendence, have not succeeded."[169] On the other hand, President Van Hise thinks that, "the weight of argument is strongly in favour of the increased efficiency of large combinations of industry on the average."[170] The difference of opinion existing among students of this subject is due to lack of adequate data, particularly to the absence of such uniform and comprehensive systems of accounting as would be required to provide a basis for reliable general conclusions. Opposing particular statements may be equally true, because based upon different instances; but general statements are little better than guesses.
Let us approach the question from another side, that of prices. Whenever the charges imposed by monopolistic concerns upon their products are higher than those that would have prevailed under competition, the surplus gains are obviously to that extent not due to superior efficiency. They have their source in the arbitrarily made prices. The Final Report of the United States Industrial Commission, which was made at the beginning of the year 1902, declared that, "in most cases the combination has exerted an appreciable power over prices, and in practically all cases it has increased the margin between raw materials and finished products."[171] Since the cost of production had decreased during the preceding decade, this increase in the margin, and the ensuing increased profits, necessarily involved an increase in prices to the consumer. Taking the period of 1897-1910, and comparing the movement of prices between eighteen important trust-controlled products, and the same number of important commodities not produced by monopolistic concerns, Professor Meade concluded that the former were sold at a "much lower" relative level than the latter.[172] His computations were based upon figures compiled by the Bureau of Labour. According to the Commissioner of Corporations, the Standard Oil Company "has taken advantage of its monopoly power to extort prices much higher than would have existed under free competition."[173] The same authority shows that the American Tobacco Company used its power to obtain considerably more than competitive prices on some of its products.[174] Excessive prices, as measured by the standards of competition, were also established by the United States Steel Corporation, the American Sugar Refining Company, and the combinations in meat packing and in lumber.[175]
A safe statement would probably be that the greater part of the surplus gains of the most conspicuous American monopolies have been due to excessive prices rather than to economies of production.