The disagreement among students of monopoly relates to the fundamental question of permitting or not permitting these combinations to exist. According to the first theory, of which Mr. Justice Brandeis is the most distinguished exponent, no new industrial monopolies should be permitted, and those that we have should be dissolved. The basis of this theory is the assumption that all the economies and all the productive efficiency found in monopolistic concerns can be developed and maintained in smaller business organisations, and that the method of prevention and dissolution is the simplest means of protecting the public against the danger of extortionate monopoly prices. Attention has been called in a preceding paragraph to the impossibility of determining whether the great monopolistic combinations have on the average shown themselves to be more efficient than concerns subject to active and adequate competition. It is significant, however, that in the discussion of this subject which took place at the twenty-sixth annual meeting of the American Economic Association, at Minneapolis in 1913, the economists who participated were practically unanimous in holding that the superior efficiency of the trusts had not been demonstrated, but was a matter of serious doubt, and that the burden of proof of their alleged superiority had been definitely shifted upon those who maintained the affirmative.[183] Probably the great majority of the whole body of American economists would share these conclusions.

On the other hand, the opponents of prevention and dissolution, of whom Mr. George W. Perkins is probably the most conspicuous, point to the obvious economies of large-scale over small-scale production, and contend that these are sufficient reason for permitting and even encouraging the great combinations. The power to oppress competitors by unjust methods of business, and the public by extortionate prices, should be kept under rigid control by supervision, and government regulation of maximum prices. But the arguments advanced in favour of this position are never conclusive. Most of its advocates fail to realise, or at least to take adequately into account, the difference between large-scale production and production by a monopoly. While the large plant and the large business organisation have in many lines of manufacture and trade a considerable advantage over the small plant and the small organisation, there is not a scintilla of evidence to show that the efficiency of magnitude increases indefinitely with magnitude. There is no proof that the maximum efficiency is reached only with the maximum size of the business unit. On the contrary, all the evidence that we have points to the conclusion that in every field of industrial and commercial enterprise, all the economies of magnitude and of combination are obtained long before the concern becomes a monopoly. There is not an industry of any importance in the United States in which all the advantages of bigness and concentration cannot be made operative in concerns that control as low as twenty-five per cent. of the total product. The highest economy and efficiency can be obtained without monopoly.

Indeed, this is admitted by the more reasonable advocates of the regulation and price-fixing policy. While maintaining that "concentration must go far in order to give the maximum of efficiency," President Van Hise does not hold "that it should go to the extent that the element of monopoly enters"; and he would have the law "declare restraint of trade unreasonable that gets to monopoly," and fix the definite per cent. of business control which constitutes a monopoly.[184] We are justified, therefore, in concluding that the theory of prevention and dissolution (provided that the competing units are not made so small as to destroy the certain economies of magnitude) rather than the theory of permission and regulation, indicates the sound economic and social policy of dealing with monopolies.

Legalised Price Agreements

President Van Hise advocates the regulation policy in a modified form. In substance his view is that, while no corporation should be permitted to control the greater part of any product, monopolistic price-agreements should be sanctioned and regulated by law. No amount of restrictive legislation, he maintains, can secure universal competition in the matter of prices. Experience shows that the destructive results of cut-throat competition compel the more powerful competitors to make price agreements in some lines of business.[185] For example; all the retail grocers in a city are often found selling certain staples at a uniform price for long periods of time. Agreements of this sort should, in the opinion of President Van Hise, be formally permitted by law, with the proviso that a government commission should fix the maximum and possibly the minimum limits. And he contends that the task of fixing fair maximum and minimum prices would be much less difficult than is commonly supposed, and that it would be much simpler and easier than the task of regulating railway freight rates.

Whatever may be the merits of this plan, it is not likely to be embodied in legislation in the near future. So far as we can see now, the American people are committed to the policy of endeavouring to restore genuine competition by prohibiting those predatory practices to which the great monopolies mainly owe their existence. The attempt will be made to give competition a fair opportunity to prevent both monopolistic control of products and monopolistic fixing of prices. Competition has not enjoyed any such opportunity during the last quarter of a century. If this attempt should fail after a thorough trial, the time will be at hand for the regulation of prices by the government. Until that time has arrived (let us hope that it never will arrive) the State will not, and should not, embark upon such a large and difficult experiment.


CHAPTER XIX
THE MORAL ASPECT OF STOCK WATERING

In the last chapter we saw that a monopoly has no right to gains in excess of the competitive rate of interest on its capital, except in so far as these have been derived from superior efficiency. Now superior efficiency is clearly present whenever the monopolistic concern obtains surplus gains by selling its product at competitive prices, or at the prices that would have prevailed under competition. Evidently the surplus in such a case is due to the greater productivity of the monopoly as compared with the average productivity of competitive concerns. When, however, the monopoly charges prices above the competitive level, its surplus gains cannot all be attributed to unusual efficiency. A part if not all of them are the result simply of the power to take; consequently they are immoral.