"What are the uses of decisions of Courts? They have two uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First, they decide upon the question before the Court. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a Slave. Nobody resists that. Not only that, but they say to everybody else, that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands, are as he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person, it will be so decided again, unless the Court decides in another way—unless the Court overrules its decision.—Well, we mean to do what we can to have the Court decide the other way. That is one thing we mean to try to do.
"The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision is a degree of sacredness that has never before been thrown around any other decision. I have never heard of such a thing. Why, decisions apparently contrary to that decision, or that good lawyers thought were contrary to that decision, have been made by that very Court before. It is the first of its kind; it is an astonisher in legal history. It is a new wonder of the world. It is based upon falsehood in the main as to the facts—allegations of facts upon which it stands are not facts at all in many instances; and no decision made on any question—the first instance of a decision made under so many unfavorable circumstances—thus placed, has ever been held by the profession as law, and it has always needed confirmation before the lawyers regarded it as settled law. But Judge Douglas will have it that all hands must take this extraordinary decision, made under these extraordinary circumstances, and give their vote in Congress in accordance with it, yield to it and obey it in every possible sense.
"Circumstances alter cases. Do not gentlemen remember the case of that same Supreme Court, some twenty-five or thirty years ago, deciding that a National Bank was Constitutional? * * * The Bank charter ran out, and a recharter was granted by Congress. That re-charter was laid before General Jackson. It was urged upon him, when he denied the Constitutionality of the Bank, that the Supreme Court had decided that it was Constitutional; and General Jackson then said that the Supreme Court had no right to lay down a rule to govern a co-ordinate branch of the Government, the members of which had sworn to support the Constitution—that each member had sworn to support that Constitution as he understood it. I will venture here to say, that I have heard Judge Douglas say that he approved of General Jackson for that act. What has now become of all his tirade about 'resistance to the Supreme Court?'"
After adverting to Judge Douglas's warfare on "the leaders" of the Republican party, and his desire to have "it understood that the mass of the Republican party are really his friends," Mr. Lincoln said: "If you indorse him, you tell him you do not care whether Slavery be voted up or down, and he will close, or try to close, your mouths with his declaration repeated by the day, the week, the month, and the year. Is that what you mean? * * * Now I could ask the Republican party, after all the hard names that Judge Douglas has called them by, all his repeated charges of their inclination to marry with and hug negroes—all his declarations of Black Republicanism—by the way, we are improving, the black has got rubbed off—but with all that, if he be indorsed by Republican votes, where do you stand? Plainly, you stand ready saddled, bridled, and harnessed, and waiting to be driven over to the Slavery-extension camp of the Nation—just ready to be driven over, tied together in a lot—to be driven over, every man with a rope around his neck, that halter being held by Judge Douglas. That is the question. If Republican men have been in earnest in what they have done, I think that they has better not do it. * * *
"We were often—more than once at least—in the course of Judge Douglas's speech last night, reminded that this Government was made for White men—that he believed it was made for White men. Well, that is putting it in a shape in which no one wants to deny it; but the Judge then goes into his passion for drawing inferences that are not warranted. I protest, now and forever, against that counterfeit logic which presumes that because I do not want a Negro woman for a Slave I do necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I need not have her for either; but, as God has made us separate, we can leave one another alone, and do one another much good thereby. There are White men enough to marry all the White women, and enough Black men to marry all the Black women, and in God's name let them be so married. The Judge regales us with the terrible enormities that take place by the mixture of races; that the inferior race bears the superior down. Why, Judge, if we do not let them get together in the Territories, they won't mix there.
" * * * Those arguments that are made, that the inferior race are to be treated with as much allowance as they are capable of enjoying; that as much is to be done for them as their condition will allow—what are these arguments? They are the arguments that Kings have made for enslaving the People in all ages of the World. You will find that all the arguments in favor of king-craft were of this class; they always bestrode the necks of the People, not that they wanted to do it, but because the People were better off for being ridden! That is their argument, and this argument of the Judge is the same old Serpent that says: you work, and I eat; you toil, and I will enjoy the fruits of it.
"Turn it whatever way you will—whether it come from the mouth of a King, an excuse for enslaving the People of his Country, or from the mouth of men of one race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race, it is all the same old Serpent; and I hold, if that course of argumentation that is made for the purpose of convincing the public mind that we should not care about this, should be granted, it does not stop with the Negro.
"I should like to know, taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making exceptions to it, where will it stop? If one man says it does not mean a Negro, why not say it does not mean some other man? If that Declaration is not the truth, let us get the Statute Book, in which we find it, and tear it out! Who is so bold as to do it? If it is not true, let us tear it out!" [Cries of "No, no.">[ "Let us stick to it then; let us stand firmly by it, then. * * *
" * * * The Saviour, I suppose, did not expect that any human creature could be perfect as the Father in Heaven; but He said, 'As your Father in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect.' He set that up as a standard, and he who did most toward reaching that standard, attained the highest degree of moral perfection. So I say, in relation to the principle that all men are created equal—let it be as nearly reached as we can. If we cannot give Freedom to every creature, let us do nothing that will impose Slavery upon any other creature. Let us then turn this Government back into the channel in which the framers of the Constitution originally placed it. Let us stand firmly by each other. * * * Let us discard all this quibbling * * * and unite as one People throughout this Land, until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal."
At Bloomington, July 16th (Mr. Lincoln being present), Judge Douglas made another great speech of vindication and attack. After sketching the history of the Kansas-Nebraska struggle, from the introduction by himself of the Nebraska Bill in the United States Senate, in 1854, down to the passage of the "English" Bill—which prescribed substantially that if the people of Kansas would come in as a Slave-holding State, they should be admitted with but 35,000 inhabitants; but if they would come in as a Free State, they must have 93,420 inhabitants; which unfair restriction was opposed by Judge Douglas, but to which after it became law he "bowed in deference," because whatever decision the people of Kansas might make on the coming third of August would be "final and conclusive of the whole question"—he proceeded to compliment the Republicans in Congress, for supporting the Crittenden-Montgomery Bill—for coming "to the Douglas platform, abandoning their own, believing (in the language of the New York Tribune), that under the peculiar circumstances they would in that mode best subserve the interests of the Country;" and then again attacked Mr. Lincoln for his "unholy and unnatural alliance" with the Lecompton-Democrats to defeat him, because of which, said he: "You will find he does not say a word against the Lecompton Constitution or its supporters. He is as silent as the grave upon that subject. Behold Mr. Lincoln courting Lecompton votes, in order that he may go to the Senate as the representative of Republican principles! You know that the alliance exists. I think you will find that it will ooze out before the contest is over." Then with many handsome compliments to the personal character of Mr. Lincoln, and declaring that the question for decision was "whether his principles are more in accordance with the genius of our free institutions, the peace and harmony of the Republic" than those advocated by himself, Judge Douglas proceeded to discuss what he described as "the two points at issue between Mr. Lincoln and myself."