It has been supposed that medical practitioners may avail themselves of the privilege enjoyed by legal advisers,[[232]] and that they are not bound to divulge the secrets of their patients, reposed in them in the course of professional confidence;[[233]] undoubtedly this confidence ought not to be violated on any ordinary occasion, but when the ends of justice absolutely require the disclosure, there is no doubt that the medical witness is not only bound, but compellable to give evidence; ever bearing in mind that the examination should not be carried further than may be relevant to the point in question; of this the Court will judge, and protect the witness accordingly. In the celebrated trial of the Duchess of Kingston, before the House of Peers, (11 Harg. St. Tri. 243) this point of medical liability was raised by Mr. Cæsar Hawkins, and determined by Lord Mansfield in the following words: “I suppose Mr. Hawkins means to demur to the question upon the ground, that it came to his knowledge some way from his being employed as a surgeon for one or both parties; and I take for granted, if Mr. Hawkins understands that it is your Lordships opinion that he has no privilege on that account to excuse himself from giving the answer, that then, under the authority of your Lordships judgment, he will submit to answer it: therefore to save your Lordships the trouble of an adjournment, if no Lord differs in opinion, but thinks that a Surgeon has no privilege to avoid giving evidence in a Court of Justice, but bound by the law of the land to do it; if any of your Lordships think he has such a privilege it will be a matter to be debated elsewhere, but if all your Lordships acquiesce, Mr. Hawkins will understand that it is your judgment and opinion, that a Surgeon has no privilege, where it is a material question, in a civil or criminal cause, to know whether parties were married, or whether a child was born, to say that his introduction to the parties was in the course of his profession, and in that way he came to the knowledge of it. I take it for granted, that if Mr. Hawkins understands that, it is a satisfaction to him, and a clear justification to all the world. If a Surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be guilty of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion; but, to give that information in a Court of Justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.” The examination consequently proceeded.
The observations of Mr. Haslam, in his work on Medical Jurisprudence as it relates to Insanity, (London 1817) are so pertinent to our present subject that we shall give them in his own words: “The important duty which the medical practitioner has to perform, when he delivers his testimony before a Court of Justice, should be closely defined, conscientiously felt, and thoroughly understood,—his opinion ought to be conveyed in a perspicuous manner; he should be solemnly impressed that he speaks upon oath, the most sacred pledge before God between man and man—and that the life of a human being depends upon the clearness and truth of his deposition: he is not to palm on the Court the trash of medical hypothesis as the apology for crime; neither should the lunatic receive his cure at the gallows by the infirmity of his evidence; but above all, his opinion should be so thoroughly understood by himself, so founded by experience and fortified by reason, that it may resist the blandishments of eloquence and the subtil underminings of cross examination. The Physician should not come into Court merely to give his opinion—he should be able to explain it, and able to afford the reasons which influenced his decision—without such elucidation opinion becomes a bare dictum.”
“It is to be regretted that on many occasions, where several medical practitioners have deposed, there has been a direct opposition of opinion:—this difference has sometimes prevailed respecting insanity, but more frequently in cases of poison. It is not intended to account for this contrariety of evidence; much will depend on the sagacity of the Counsel to institute the proper enquiries, and still more will be incumbent on the medical evidence, in order to explain and establish his testimony.
“The lawyer’s object is the interest of his employer, and for the fulfilment of his duty he is frequently compelled to resort to a severity of investigation which perplexes the theories, but more frequently kindles the irritable feelings of the medical practitioner. This distrust on the part of the lawyer, however unpalatable, is fully justified, most witnesses going into Court with the preconcerted intention of proving to a certain extent:—and those most conversant in the history of human testimony, have been extremely scrupulous of admitting it as uniform truth until it has been carefully sifted. Guarded with these precautions, and armed with professional experience, the medical practitioner may approach the tribunal of justice with confidence and advantage to the cause of Truth. However dexterous he may shew himself in fencing with the advocate, he should be aware that his evidence ought to impress the judge and be convincing to the jury.” Their belief must be “the test by which his scientific opinion is to be established. That which may be deemed by the medical evidence clear and unequivocal, may not hit the sense of the gentlemen of the long robe, nor carry conviction to the jury.”
There is a natural propensity in human nature, from which the most honorable minds are not free, to view all questions through the medium of some preconceived opinion; in law and politics it is every day evident, in physic and in science it is too often apparent. Hence our law has wisely contrived its modes of vivâ voce examination, in which the judge, the jury, and the counsel, on both sides, are equally empowered to sift the truth, and thus counteract the leaning which any witness may be supposed to have towards the party producing him: a foreign writer of celebrity objects to this method, and prefers the mode adopted generally on the continent of requiring written reports or depositions; we leave our readers to conclude how liable such documents are, especially with a people of lively imagination, to become controversial pamphlets, straining on either side for victory, and not for truth.
As to the mode in which a medical witness should deliver his evidence, very different advice appears to have been given by different authorities; while some impatient of delay, and dreading the arts of examination, recommend their pupils or readers to open at once all the stores of their reasoning and information; others, fearing the effect which cross-examination may have on nervous or embarrassed witnesses, advise that no more shall be disclosed than categorically meets the question of the counsel; and to this we incline, with this difference, that, as we should deem too costive a retention of the truth as blamable as the flow of garrulity with which we have sometimes seen a court overwhelmed, we recommend the witness to steer a middle course, first answering patiently, distinctly, and tersely, the questions put by the Counsel on both sides, the Court and the jury; and if none of these elicit the whole truth, and any material point remains to be disclosed, the presiding judge will always admit and gratefully receive the additions or explanations which may be necessary to the ends of justice.
The witness is next to consider, what is and what is not evidence: we cannot follow this subject in all its bearings, nor indeed is it here necessary, a few points must however be remembered; and first of notes; these if taken upon the spot or immediately after a transaction, may be used by the witness to refresh his memory; and as to dates, numbers, or quantities, it is generally expedient to have them; the notes should be original, not copies; if there be any point in them which the witness does not recollect except that he finds it there, such point is not evidence, for the notes are only to assist recollection not to convey information.
The witness must relate only that which he himself has seen or observed; that which he has heard from others is not evidence as coming from him; except indeed where some expressions or declarations of the parties concerned have become a part of the res gesta. but the declarations of a dying man are evidence when related by a third person on oath, though the party making them was not sworn, for the law presumes that the solemnity of the occasion may dispense with the form, and that a man, trembling on the brink of eternity, will never risk salvation by falsehood. To give this weight to a declaration, it is necessary that the party should believe himself to be dying; Mr. Justice Bailey, is reported to have said, that the party must be satisfied that recovery was impossible: we think the reporter must have been mistaken; for such a rule would exclude all such declarations; hope is the latest faculty of the human mind. “I am better,” has not unfrequently been the last articulation of expiring nature.
How far and in what cases opinion is evidence, is next to be considered; in ordinary matters where, from a statement of facts, the jury, in the exercise of sound and ordinary understanding, are capable of arriving at a just conclusion, the opinion of a witness is neither requisite or admissible; but in matters of science it is otherwise, provided that he backs his opinion by such reason as may be satisfactory to the understanding of his hearers; and this is the principal qualification of a medical witness, that he make himself intelligible to ordinary comprehensions.
No man is bound to give any evidence by which he may render himself liable to any criminal prosecution. At the Old Bailey Sessions, in June, 1821, Mr. George Patmore was tried for the murder of John Scott, in a duel. Mr. Pettigrew, (a surgeon,) was the first witness called.