98 nakit. “Without defensive armour,” as in Bk. VII. 330. The two previous lines mean that the Scottish horsemen did not have to stop a stroke or hold against a blow; i.e., the archers offered no resistance. Bruce’s intention, we may gather from lines 58-60, was so to harass the archers on the flank as to occupy them with their own defence and restrain their shooting. The attack, however, was so successfully pushed home that the archers were wholly scattered.
104 thair awne folk had no space. We gather that the archers had taken up a position on the right front of the main body, where they blocked the advance of the horsemen directly behind. These received the flying archers with blows, and pushed forward to take their place. The Lanercost chronicler says the battle began with a skirmish between the opposing archers, and that the Scots archers were driven back. This, again, suggests that the archers were somewhere in front. Mr. Oman follows Baker in placing them behind the first line. See note on 51.
132 on a syde. See above on 68.
162 All four the battelis. The Vita Edw. Sec. (p. 203) and the Chron. de Lanercost (p. 225) divide the Scots into three battles (turmas, acies), the usual medieval arrangement. The latter also gives Robert the rear division, as here.
175 in ane schiltrum all. Gray says that the “battles” of the English were crowded close together (entassez estoint), and could not repeat their attacks upon the Scots (remuerent devers eaux), as their horses were impaled by the pikes (p. 142). In the Lanercost chronicle we read that the English behind (sequentes) “were not able to reach the Scots because of the interposition of the first line, nor in any way to help themselves” (p. 224). The English, indeed, were too many to be manœuvred according to the simple tactics of the day, and were, in addition, crowded on too narrow a front. There was no generalship. These were Bruce’s chief advantages. He was protected by the hill and wood behind from being surrounded (cf. note on Bk. XI. 300). Besides, his rapid and successive advance prevented the English from developing any such intention. They could not well deploy among the “pools” and marshes.
183 quyntis. “Quyntis is merely the French cointises, signifying finery or quaint attire” (Skeat); generally, ornamental attachments to the armour. E reads quhytys, and H coates, so that we may have to do with the “white” surcoats. In viii. 232 Barbour speaks of hauberks “quhit as flour.”
208 the Scottis archeris. The effective part played by the Scottish archers is usually overlooked.
283 quhen the King of England saw his men fle. The English writers make no mention of the appearance of the camp-followers. They date the break-up from the failure of Gloucester’s attack with the van. As those behind, says the Lanercost chronicler, could not get forward (see note on 275), nothing remained but to take measures for flight (pp. 225-6). The front line had fallen back only to add to the confusion (cf. line 170, etc.). “When those who were with the King saw the Earl’s division smashed up (contritum) and their friends making ready to fly, they said it was dangerous to stay longer,” etc. (Vita Edw. Sec., p. 205). Gray says the King went much against his will (as Barbour reports one version in line 298), and that he knocked over with his mace the Scots that were catching at his charger’s housings (Scala., p. 142). Trokelowe affirms that he laid about him “like a lion,” and brandished a sword dripping with blood (Annales, p. 86).
297 By the renyhe. “Those who had been assigned to the King’s rein were drawing the King forward by the rein out of the plain (hors du chaumpe) towards the castle” (Scala., p. 142).