An important fact is that the monopoly has as a motive the making of profits for its stockholders. Not only is that a less powerful motive than self-preservation, but it appeals largely to persons who are not themselves in control of the business. Absentee ownership is the chief disability of the monopoly. Managers may have other interests than those of large dividend making, and in such cases a monopoly is apt to wait too long before changing its appliances. It needs to be in no hurry to buy a new invention, and it can make delay and tire out a patentee, in order to make good terms with him; and this practice affords little encouragement to the independent inventor. On the whole, a genuine and perfectly secure monopoly would mean a certain degree of stagnation where progress until now has been rapid.
Why the Public depends on Competition for Securing its Share of Benefit from Improvements.—Another question is whether the two systems, that of competition, on the one hand, and monopoly, on the other, confer equal benefits on the public by virtue of the improvements they make. Competition does this with the greatest rapidity. As we have seen, it transforms the net profits due to economies into increments of gain for capitalists and laborers throughout all society. The wages of to-day are chiefly the transformed profits of yesterday and of an indefinite series of earlier yesterdays. The man who is now making the profits is increasing his output, supplanting less efficient rivals, and giving consumers the benefit of his newly attained efficiency in the shape of lower prices of goods. In practice rivals take turns in leading the procession; now one has the most economical method, now another, and again another; and the great residual claimant, the public, very shortly gathers all gains into its capacious pouch and keeps them forever.
Would a secure monopoly do something like this? Far from it. It would be governed at every step by the rule of maximum net profits for itself. Its output would not be carried beyond the point at which the fall in price begins really to be costly. The lowering of the price enlarges the market for the monopoly's product and up to a certain point increases its net gains. Beyond that point it lessens them.
Now, even the interest of the monopoly itself would lead it to give the public some benefit from every economy that it makes. This is because the amount of output that will yield a maximum of profit at a certain cost of production is not the same that will yield the maximum of net profit when the cost is lower. Every fall in cost makes it for the interest of the monopoly to enlarge its output somewhat, but by no means as much as competing producers would enlarge theirs. It will always hold the price well above the level of cost. In the accompanying figure distance along the line AK represents the amount of goods produced, while vertical distance above the line measures costs of production, as well as selling prices, and the descending curve FJ represents the fall of prices which takes place as the output of the goods is increased. Now, when the cost of production stands at the level of the line CI, the amount of output that will yield the largest amount of net profit is the amount represented by the length of the line AM. That amount of product can be sold at the price represented by the line MG. The gross return from the sale will be expressed by the area of the rectangle AEGM, and the area CEGN, which falls above the line of cost, CI, is net profits. They are larger than they would be if the line MG were moved either to the right or to the left, i.e., if the amount of production were made either larger or smaller. Now, if the cost of production falls to the level of the line BJ, it will be best to increase the output from AM to AL. The whole return will then be represented by the rectangle ADHL, and the area BDHO represents profits, with the cost at the new and lower level. These are somewhat larger than they would be if the output continued to be only the amount AM. Under free competition the price would fall to the line BJ, the net profits would disappear, and the public would have the full benefit of the improvement in production.
The Purpose of the System of Patents.—Patents are a legal device for promoting improvements, and they accomplish this by invoking the principle of monopoly which in itself is hostile to improvement. They do not as a rule create the exclusive privilege of producing a kind of consumers' goods, but they give to their holders exclusive use of some instrumentality or some process of making them. The patentee is not the only one who can reach a goal,—the production of a certain article,—but he is the only one who can reach it by a particular path. A patented machine for welting shoes stops no one from making shoes, but it forces every one who would make them, except the patentee or his assigns, to resort to a less economical process.
Patents Limited in Duration indispensable as Dynamic Agents.—If an inventor had no such protection, the advantage he could derive would be practically nil, and there would be no incentive whatever for making ventures except the pleasure of achievement or the honor that might accrue from it. In the case of poor inventors this would be cold comfort in view of the time and outlay which most inventions require. Not only on a priori grounds, but on grounds of actual experience and universal practice, we may say that patents are an indispensable part of a dynamic system of industry. It is also important that the monopoly of method which the patent gives should be of limited duration. If the method is a good one and the profit from using it is large, the seventeen years during which in our own country a patent may run affords, not only an adequate reward for the inventor, but an incentive to a myriad of other inventors to emulate him and try to duplicate his success. Ingenious brains, which are everywhere at work, usually prevent the owners of a particular patent from keeping any decisive advantage over competitors during the whole period of seventeen years. Long before the expiration of that time some device of a different sort may enable a rival to create the same product with more than equal economy, and the leadership in production then passes to this rival, to remain with him till a still further device effects a still larger economy and carries the leadership elsewhere. That alternation in leadership which we have described and illustrated takes place largely in consequence of our system of patents; and yet every particular patent affords a quasi-monopoly to its holder. The endless succession of them insures a wide diffusion of advantages. At the expiration of each patent, even if it has not been supplanted by a later and more valuable one, the public gets the benefit of the full economy it insures, and wherever an unexpired patent is supplanted by a new one, the public gets this benefit much earlier. Cost of production tends rapidly downward, and the public is the permanent beneficiary.
Patents as a Means of Curtailing Monopolies.—While a patent may sometimes sustain a powerful monopoly it may also afford the best means of breaking one up. Often have small producers, by the use of patented machinery, trenched steadily on the business of great combinations, till they themselves became great producers, secure in the possession of a large field and abundant profit. Moreover, in the case of a patent which builds up a monopoly and continues for the full seventeen years of its duration unsupplanted by any rival device, the public is likely to get more benefit than the patentee, or even the company which uses his invention. In widening the market for its product the company must constantly cater to new circles of marginal consumers, and must give to all but the marginal ones an increasing benefit that is in excess of what it costs them. Probably few patents have been issued in America which illustrate the unfavorable features of the system more completely than did the Bell telephone patent, which gave to a single company during a long period a monopoly of the telephone business; and yet there are few men of affairs who do not perceive that, in the saving of time which the telephone effected and in the acceleration of business which it caused, they gained from the outset more than they lost in the shape of high fees. Something of the same kind is true of the users of domestic telephones; for though they may cost more than they should, they do their share toward placing those who use them on a higher level of comfort.
The Law of Survival of Efficient Organization.—In broad outlines we have depicted the conditions which favor technical progress. There is a law of survival which, when competition rules, eliminates poor methods and introduces better ones in endless succession. Under a régime of secure monopoly this law of survival scarcely operates, though desire for gain causes a progress which is less rapid and sure. The same may be said of changes in organization, in so far as that means a coördinating of the labor and the capital within an establishment. When the manager of a mill so marshals his forces as to get a much larger product per man and per dollar of invested capital than a rival can do, he has that rival at his mercy and can absorb his business and drive him from the field. In order to survive, any producer must keep pace with the aggressive and growing ones among his rivals in the march of improvement, whether it comes by improved tools of trade or improved generalship in the handling of men and tools. Quite as remorseless as the law of survival of good technical methods is the law of survival of efficient organization, and so long as the organization is limited to the forces under the control of single and competing entrepreneurs, what we have said about the advance in methods applies to it. It is a beneficent process for society, though its future scope is more restricted than is that of technical improvement, since the marshaling of forces in an establishment may be carried so near to perfection that there is a limit on further gains. Moreover organization, in the end, ceases to confine itself to the working forces of single entrepreneurs, but often continues till it brings rival producers into a union.
The Extension of Organization to Entire Subgroups.—Both of these modes of progress cause establishments to grow larger, and the ultimate effect of this is to give over the market for goods of any one kind to a few establishments which are enormously large and on something like a uniform plane of efficiency. Then the organizing tendency takes a baleful cast as the creator of "trusts" and the extinguisher of rivalries that have insured progress. When monster-like corporations once start a competitive strife with each other, it is very fierce and very costly for themselves; and this affords an inducement for taking that final step in organization which brings competition to an end. That is organization of a different kind, and the effects of it are very unlike those of the coördinating process which goes on within the several establishments. In this, its final stage, the organizing tendency brings a whole subgroup into union, and undoes much of the good it accomplished in its earlier stage, when it was perfecting the individual establishments within the subgroup. While the earlier process makes the supply of goods of a certain kind larger and cheaper, the final one makes it smaller and dearer; and while the earlier process scatters benefits among consumers, the final one imposes a tax on consumers in the shape of higher prices for merchandise. Yet the union that is formed between the shops is, in a way, the natural sequel to the preliminary organization which took place within them and helped to make them few and large. Trusts are a product of economic dynamics, and we shall study them in due time. The organization we have here in view is the earlier one which takes place within the several establishments. It obeys a law of survival in which competition is the impelling force, though it leads to a condition in which an effort is made to bring competition to an end. This earlier organization is most beneficent in its general and permanent effects; and what has been said of the results of progress in the technique of production may, with a change of terms, be said again of progress in the art of coördinating the agents employed. It is a source of temporary gain for entrepreneurs and of permanent gains for laborers and capitalists. It adds to the grand total of the social product and leaves this to be distributed in accordance with the principle which, in the absence of untoward influences, would treat the producers fairly—that which tends to give to each producer a share more or less equivalent to his contribution. In its nature and in its results it is the opposite of that other type of organization which seeks to bring competitive rivalry to an end, and in so far as it succeeds divorces men's contributions to the social product from the shares that they draw from it.