A significant fact about Marius is that he was not a Roman; he came from the small town of Arpinum. Technically he was a Roman citizen, for Arpinum was a community which had enjoyed for nearly a century the privileges of Roman citizenship; but his connexion with Rome was not the connexion of a Cornelius or an Æmilius. He was one of the many men from Italian towns who used their Roman citizenship to push a career at Rome; Cicero, also from Arpinum, and Pompeius from Picenum are well-known examples of the same class of men.
Each of these three men failed as a politician at Rome, and in much the same way each of them transferred to the wide arena of Roman politics the limitations imposed by the traditions of a small city state. Marius could not manage the Electorate nor the Senate; Pompeius could not manage the Senate; Cicero saw in Rome a magnified Arpinum. Of the three, Marius, in spite of the clumsiness which defeated his own purposes, had grasped the one political idea which was to conquer all others in the end; he saw that the men who fought in the armies of the Empire must have a share in the government of the Empire; he contributed to this end, perhaps unconsciously, by his reorganization of the Army. The reforms of Marius in military organization were in the first place technical, and unfortunately we cannot assign the several details to their responsible authors. We do not know exactly what was done by Marius himself, what by his successors; but we do know that his administration marks the period at which the Roman Army took the form of a professional standing army as distinct from a militia. The change had been long in progress, military necessities had imposed it; occasional service had been practically replaced by continuous service. Marius substituted in fact, if not in every form, a military organization in the army for a civil organization; the change was forced upon the Roman by the dangerous invasions from the north which had found the Government unprepared. Marius dispersed the invaders; he stood forth as the saviour not only of Rome, but of Italy, and he was able to reorganize the army in terms not of the Roman constitution but of military necessities. The Roman Armies at this date were not recruited exclusively or even in the greater proportion from Rome herself; not only was each legion supported by auxiliaries, such as cavalry and light armed skirmishers, drawn from non-Italian territories, but the legion itself was recruited from the allies in Italy as well as from Rome, and the balance of military strength was against the capital.
The State at once found itself confronted with a difficult problem: what was to be done with the professional soldiers when their time of service had expired? Men who had served for a term of years found their previous employments closed to them. Alongside with the expansion of the Empire went the depression of Italian agriculture; the food supplies of the capital were increasingly drawn from Sicily, Africa and Sardinia; soldiers who had been free agricultural labourers found their places taken by the captives whom they had themselves reduced to slavery. The remedy that suggested itself was to assign lands to the soldiers; they could either be sent to form military colonies in conquered territory, or be provided with land in Italy confiscated on various pretexts, or simply taken without further excuse. This remedy was not in all respects successful. Men who had become used to the excitements of war and the pleasures of looting, did not settle down readily to the drudgery of farming; some parted with their farms, others in cases where the farm had been one appropriated by the State, allowed the proprietor who had been defrauded to retain possession on condition of paying a rent; some of these men re-enlisted, others went to swell the mob of the capital and enjoy its amusements. The Roman people of Cicero’s days largely consisted of men drawn from many parts of Italy, who had been, or still were, soldiers, and who had no objection to being bribed to give their votes; if they had any political convictions they were Italian rather than Roman; if they resisted any further extension of the privileges of citizenship it was from interested motives, and not because they loved the Conservative party in the Senate. As Rome was the only place in which votes could be given, the tendency was for all Italians possessing the status of Roman citizens to drift into Rome, if they had no occupations to detain them elsewhere. Men who aspired to be political leaders had to win the favour of this increasing multitude.
The Roman people so constituted had no particular affection for Rome, and none for the Senate of Rome as a body; its affections were centred on those who could promote its own interests, on those who were lavish in providing it with amusements and distributing doles, on generals who promised large rewards to their soldiers, on orators who flattered the vanity of the mob; if it had any genuine political sympathies they were with the Army, and with Italy rather than with the hierarchy at Rome. The greatness of the Roman statesmen lies in this, that though nominally the magistrates were elected and laws passed by this rabble, and the whole administration lay at its mercy, outside Italy the Roman Government steadily grew in strength; the love of order and faith in law were so deeply implanted in the Roman character that the administration was not shattered by years of apparent anarchy, in which the constitution seemed to have fallen into abeyance, and the fate of the civilized world to depend upon the caprices of a mob or the loyalty of soldiers to their leaders. The Roman resembled the Englishman in being able to make the best of a bad government or no government; disorder called his reserve of moral strength into action; the executive was always superior to the constitution; however unruly the city, the Roman citizen in the provinces preserved the qualities which had made Rome the ruling power in the Mediterranean.
The character of the Roman people having changed, the mass of citizens being no longer Romans and nothing else, the ruling classes at Rome did their best to organize the numbers who filled the streets. All the methods by which elections may be controlled were resorted to: political clubs were formed, the great families looked up their clients, some of them provided themselves with armed bands of retainers, bribery was systematic and constant; but all efforts to introduce order into the unwieldy body of the Roman people alike failed. It is possible that if the popular assembly had had no further voice in public affairs than to elect magistrates, a way might have been found out of the difficulty; but the mob was not only the electorate, it was also the legislative body, or rather a legislative body. It could not only pass laws, but it could prevent through its representatives, the tribunes, any laws being passed, or any business being conducted. The rule of the Roman people under these conditions was simply authorized anarchy, and the deeply lamented fall of the Republic with which school histories are apt to close, was the restoration of order. In fact just at the time when the history of Rome became the history of the civilized world, there was no longer any political meaning in the term “the Roman People”; it was a survival from previous conditions. The attempt to call to life the forms of popular government resulted, as it was bound to result, not in government, but in anarchy.
III
The Senate
If the Roman people acquired a political significance in the later days of the Republic only to show that it was an unmanageable part of the constitution, the Roman Senate had always been an organized power. Had it pursued the comparatively liberal policy which prevailed in its councils immediately after the second Punic War, the Empire would probably have come, but it might have come without the intervening period of revolution; this, however, was not to be; the temptations of wealth and power were too strong. While, however, we are at liberty to condemn the Senate as it is revealed to us by the transactions with Jugurtha and other scandalous incidents, we must not forget that the same body which failed so deplorably at one period of its career produced the men by whom the Empire was made. It was the embodiment of all that was politically good in the Roman character, as well as of much that was evil; its faults were the faults inherent to a close corporation of nobles enjoying vast responsibilities which it did not altogether comprehend; its virtues have impressed themselves upon subsequent history.
A peculiarity of the Roman constitution in the later centuries of the Republic is that it was practically unworkable even as a city government, unless everybody was agreed to exercise forbearance, and not to push constitutional powers to their legitimate extremes. Two chief magistrates were elected every year, each of whom could neutralize the work of the other; all public business could be stopped at a moment’s notice on religious grounds; the magistrates elected by the popular assembly could impose their veto upon the action of all other magistrates. As long as the Senatorial families worked together, and abandoned their mutual differences in the presence of external pressure, the popular element in the constitution could be disregarded; but when the Senate became divided against itself, or when individual Senators chose to ignore the traditional checks by which the whole body was enabled to work in the interests of the order rather than of the individuals composing the order, it was possible to paralyze the Government without departing from the strict letter of the constitution.
The Senate was a strictly aristocratical body, practically a co-optative body, for every five years the Censor, himself a Senator, revised the list of the Senate. It was in his power to remove members, who had in various ways disgraced themselves, or who had fallen below the property qualification demanded of a Senator; he could summon new members, and though, after Sulla had passed a decree to that effect, he was bound to summon all men who had held the elective office of Quæstor, so long as the Senate was united, it could control the elections, and take care that no undesirable politician should in this way effect his admission to the order. This quality of an Aristocratical Order still hung about the Senate in the early days of the Empire; it was felt even then to be a public misfortune that a Senatorial family should be unequal to maintaining its position, and such families were occasionally subsidised by the Emperors.