These eight battalions[730] constituted four regiments, namely, the 3d and 4th grenadiers (Old Guard) and the 3d and 4th chasseurs (Middle Guard). The 3d and 4th regiments of grenadiers constituted the brigade of General Roguet; the 3d regiment was commanded by General Poret de Morvan, the 4th by General Harlet. The 3d and 4th regiments of chasseurs constituted the brigade of General Michel; the 3d regiment was commanded by General Mallet, the 4th by General Henrion.[731] The whole force, which could not have much exceeded 3,000 men, was under the command of General Friant, a very distinguished officer, titular colonel of the 1st regiment of foot-grenadiers of the Guard.
The Imperial Guard, which consisted of 24 battalions, organized into 12 regiments, of which 4 belonged to the Old Guard, 4 to the Middle Guard, and 4 to the Young Guard, had been stationed at the beginning of the day just in front of the farm of Rossomme, and on either side of the Charleroi turnpike. From this point 16 battalions had been detached to various points, as we have seen. The Emperor in person now took the remaining 8 battalions[732] from this position to the front, and handed them over to Ney just to the south of La Haye Sainte. This was about 7 P.M. Here he addressed them; he encouraged them, and urged them to make their best efforts. These eight (or, probably, only six battalions) were then formed in as many columns, each of a front of two companies, and arranged in échelon,[733] the right battalion in front.[734] This was the 1st battalion of the 3d regiment of grenadiers, commanded by General Poret de Morvan. Two batteries of horse-artillery, placed on the left flank, accompanied the infantry. There seems to have been no arrangement for the proper support of the movement by cavalry, although a body of cuirassiers did, shortly before the main shock took place, charge Napier’s battery. They were, however, easily and speedily driven off. The French cavalry was, in fact, nearly exhausted. Protection on the left of the advancing column, however, the Guard imperatively needed, as, in its march towards the enemy, its left flank would inevitably be exposed to all the troops stationed between the north end of Hougomont and the main British line. On its right, the column was protected from a flank attack by the troops of the 1st Corps. (See Map 14.)
It was, according to all the accounts, Napoleon’s intention that Reille should disengage at least one division of his corps from the enclosures of Hougomont, and support this charge of the Guard on the left; but this does not seem to have been even attempted. D’Erlon, on the other hand, must have exerted himself to the utmost to support the Guard; for the divisions of Donzelot and Quiot most gallantly and forcibly attacked the Anglo-Allied line for about a third of a mile to the west of the turnpike, overthrowing and driving back the Brunswick and Nassau troops, and even the Hanoverians and English, so that the personal interposition of the Duke was required to reëstablish the line. These attacks were made about the time when the Guard began its forward movement, and they had the effect of shaking the allied troops on this part of the field so much that they certainly could not have stood another serious and well-sustained assault, such as might have been delivered by the Imperial Guard.
But the movement of the column[735] of the Imperial Guard was not made in this direction, but diagonally across the field towards the enemy’s right centre, where Wellington had stationed his reserves, and where he had at least one battery, Bolton’s, then commanded by Napier, in good condition.
The English, as soon as they perceived the famous bearskin caps of the Imperial Guard, directed all their disposable guns upon their approaching foes; but, whether it was owing to the smoke, or to the inequalities of the ground, the Guard does not seem to have suffered until it got to close quarters with the 1st (Maitland’s) brigade of the English guards.[736]
The leading battalion of the Guard was, as we have seen, formed in column with a front of two companies in three ranks. As each battalion had four companies,[737] and consisted of about 500 men,[738] there would be about 75 men in the front rank of the leading battalion, allowing for the file-closers. To its left and rear, marching in échelon, were the other battalions which constituted the attacking force, accompanied by two batteries of horse artillery of six pieces each, which kept up a destructive fire as the infantry advanced. We quote from the journal of an officer[739] in the English guards:—
“Suddenly the firing ceased, and, as the smoke cleared away, a most superb sight opened on us. A close column of Grenadiers (about seventies in front) of la Moyenne Garde,[740] about 6,000 strong, led, as we have since heard, by Marshal Ney, were seen ascending the rise, au pas de charge, shouting “Vive l’Empereur.” They continued to advance till within fifty or sixty paces of our front, when the brigade[741] were ordered to stand up. Whether it was from the sudden and unexpected appearance of a corps so near them, which must have seemed as starting out of the ground, or the tremendously heavy fire we threw into them, La Garde, who had never before failed in an attack, suddenly stopped. Those, who from a distance and more on the flank could see the affair, tell us that the effect of our fire seemed to force the head of the column bodily back.
“In less than a minute above 300 were down. They now wavered, and several of the rear divisions began to draw out as if to deploy, whilst some of the men in their rear beginning to fire over the heads of those in front was so evident a proof of their confusion that Lord Saltoun * * * holloaed out, ‘Now’s the time, my boys.’ Immediately the brigade sprang forward. La Garde turned, and gave us little opportunity of trying the steel. We charged down the hill till we had passed the end of the orchard of Hougomont, when our right flank became exposed to another heavy column (as we afterwards understood, of the chasseurs of the Garde) who were advancing in support of the former column. This circumstance, besides that our charge was isolated, obliged the brigade to retire towards their original position.”
It is plain from this account that the head of the French column consisted of some 70 (or 75) men, as we have pointed out would be the case if the leading battalion was in column with a two company front; and that the fire of Maitland’s brigade, which must have had a front of about 450 men, added to that of a part of Halkett’s brigade, to that of Napier’s battery, and to that of the Dutch-Belgian battery of Van der Smissen,[742] which General Chassé had most opportunely brought up, destroyed this leading battalion and one or more of those in échelon with it on its left and rear. It is also clear from this account that the pursuing troops soon found themselves flanked by the other battalions of the Imperial Guard, which they took to be a separate column, and were obliged to fall back. It is very unlikely, by the way, that they advanced as far as the end of the orchard of Hougomont, a quarter of a mile from their position.
It may be that the rear battalions of the Guard inclined in their advance, by accident or oversight, more to their left than they should have done, and thus presented the appearance of a separate column. General Maitland says:—[743]