The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History / Third Edition

by John Codman Ropes

1. That the tactics employed by the French at the battle of Waterloo in their operations against the army of the Duke of Wellington were unworthy of the experience and reputation of their commanders is almost universally admitted. The word “commanders” is used advisedly, because Ney seems to have had the immediate direction of the 1st and 2d Corps even when the Emperor was personally superintending the battle, and when Napoleon was called off to direct the defence of Planchenoit, Ney was certainly in sole control. But this does not fully exonerate the Emperor from responsibility for the dispositions which were made.

The faulty formation of d’Erlon’s Corps in its great assault on the English left was the first blunder. The employment of the whole of Reille’s Corps in the attack on Hougomont was the next. Then the negligent and wasteful way in which the attacks on both Hougomont and La Haye Sainte were conducted warrant severe criticism. The employment of all the reserve cavalry of the army was a most unheard of and uncalled for proceeding; they were all put in, and kept in until they were all exhausted. One would certainly suppose that Ney, who was responsible for this proceeding, must have seen, long before the close of the afternoon, that the cavalry were being completely ruined, and that no appreciable injury was being inflicted on the enemy.

We cannot but think that if Napoleon had personally directed the battle at this period, this useless and wasteful employment of the cavalry would not have been made. And we cannot help thinking, also, that the Emperor would have brought some at least of Reille’s troops out of the enclosures of Hougomont to support any attacks of cavalry which he might have ordered, either in conjunction with the divisions of Donzelot and Quiot, or with the Imperial Guard, which, but for the attack of the Prussians, he would no doubt have put in between 4 and 5 o’clock. We must bear in mind, that Napoleon was fighting the Prussians near Planchenoit during a large part of the afternoon, and, in fact during the critical period of the battle; and that he cannot fairly be held liable to the censure for the tactics used in the fight against the English, which some English writers, in forgetfulness of this fact, have undertaken to apply to him.

The 1st Corps, after its severe repulse, rallied well and did extremely good work. The persistent attacks of Quiot’s and Donzelot’s infantry showed great enterprise and daring, up to the very last; and these troops deserve all praise. No doubt the bravery of the men of the 2d Corps in their ineffectual attacks on Hougomont was equally commendable; but it was a great waste of material to employ the entire corps in such an operation as attacking Hougomont. Hougomont should have been attacked, undoubtedly, but only by a moderate force; very possibly it might have been carried, had proper means been employed.[756] But it was of far more importance to utilize the infantry of the 2d Corps in breaking the English lines to the eastward of Hougomont, in conjunction with cavalry or the Imperial Guard, than to persist in throwing fresh regiments against the brick walls of the house and garden. Hougomont might in fact have been turned; and, if the last charge had succeeded, it would have been. A notable exception to the unfavorable criticism on the French tactics on this day is made by all historians when speaking of the gallant, skilful and obstinate defence of Planchenoit against the Prussians by the 6th Corps under the Count de Lobau, assisted by the Young Guard and some regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs. No praise is too high for these troops.

2. The English tactics deserved, and have always received, the high commendation of historians. Not only was the Duke himself always watchful and alert, but his efforts were admirably seconded by his officers. The unfailing energy and enterprise shown even at the very close of this exhausting day by the Duke himself and his lieutenants is at least quite as remarkable as the obstinacy and courage displayed in resisting the repeated attacks of their antagonists. The conduct of Maitland, Halkett and Colborne in the last great emergency exhibits the tenacity, courage, presence of mind, and readiness to seize the opportunity, which are the great military virtues, existing in undiminished vigor at the close of a most bloody and doubtful contest.

3. The account given in the text of the charge of the Imperial Guard does not agree fully with any of the narratives, but will be found, on reflection, it is submitted, to harmonize most of the conflicting evidence. The subject is a large one, and the testimony is very confusing. It is impossible to reconcile all the statements. But it is believed that the view maintained in the text,—that the Imperial Guard advanced in one body, or column, not in two; that this column (as we may call it, for lack of a better term) consisted at most of eight, and probably of only six battalions, each formed in close column of grand divisions,—that is, with a front of two companies,—the usual practice in those days,—presenting about 75 men in the front rank,—that these battalions advanced in échelon, the right in advance,—explains most of the discrepancies, and accounts for all or nearly all the important statements contained in the different narratives. It was the leading battalions of this column which were met and defeated by Maitland’s guards; it was the rear battalions which were flanked and routed by the 52d and the other regiments of Adam’s (light) brigade.

A. There is, in our judgment, no foundation for the hypothesis of two columns, which, introduced by Siborne, has received the indorsement of Chesney, Kennedy and Hooper. It is opposed to the contemporaneous authorities of both nations. Napoleon’s report of the battle,[757]—Ney’s letter to the Duke of Otranto,[758]—Drouot’s speech in the chamber of Peers,[759]—speak but of one column,—of one attack,—of one repulse. Sir Digby Mackworth, who was on Lord Hill’s staff, in a position where he could observe everything, wrote in his journal at eleven o’clock at night, after the battle was over, as follows:—[760]

“A black mass of the grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, with music playing and the great Napoleon at their head, came rolling onward from the farm of La Belle Alliance. * * * The point at which the enemy aimed was now evident. It was an angle formed by a brigade of guards [Maitland’s] and the light brigade [Adam’s] of Lord Hill’s Corps.”

Mackworth then goes on to describe the contest, and the rout of the enemy. There is not a word of there being two columns and two attacks.