On the other hand, if Grouchy had acted of his own motion on sound military principles at daybreak of the 18th, or even had been willing to follow the counsel of Gérard at noon, the same result would probably have been attained.
Napoleon took a wholly unnecessary risk when he detached Grouchy with such a large force, after he had reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, and he negligently omitted to take the usual means to reduce this risk by supplying his lieutenant with the necessary information, and with precise orders in case he should find that Blücher intended to coöperate with Wellington. He trusted to Grouchy to take the right course, and Grouchy failed to do so. Both Napoleon and Grouchy are therefore responsible for the intervention of the Prussians and the loss of the battle.
CHAPTER XVII.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.
The justification for this book on the well-worn subject of the campaign of Waterloo is to be found, if at all, in its treatment of certain topics to which we now propose very briefly to advert.
1. First among them is Napoleon’s plan of campaign.[782] In regard to this we have followed his own account, and have pointed out the difference between it and the plan which it has been claimed he either really did entertain or ought to have entertained.
2. In regard to the much-vexed question of the alleged verbal order to Marshal Ney to seize Quatre Bras on the afternoon of the 15th of June, new light, it is submitted, has been thrown.[783] The contemporaneous evidence of the bulletin, and the statement made by Marshal Grouchy in 1818, make it very difficult to disbelieve Napoleon’s account of this matter.
3. The true cause of the delay on the morning of the 16th of June has been, we submit, pointed out.[784] The fact that d’Erlon’s Corps was so far in the rear seems to have been the chief reason for delaying the forward movement both of the left wing and of the main army.
4. It has been shown by Marshal Ney’s orders to his command, and from other evidence furnished by his defenders, that his arrangements for carrying out his instructions on the 16th were extremely defective, and, in fact, that he perversely departed from the letter and spirit of his orders.[785] It has also been shown that a vigorous and unhesitating compliance with the orders which he received would in all probability have changed the issue of the campaign.[786]