For instance, Napoleon says in his “Memoirs”[811] that “on the 14th in the evening,”[812] General Bourmont deserted to the enemy. The whole army broke camp in the early hours of the 15th. When the 4th Corps moved at five o’clock, it was discovered that Bourmont had left. Charras states that the staff-records of the 4th Corps, to which Bourmont belonged, mention that he deserted on the 15th, and that he wrote a letter to Gérard announcing his desertion dated at Philippeville on the 15th. But Napoleon at St. Helena had neither the staff-records of the 4th Corps to go by, nor the letter of Bourmont to Gérard. Yet Charras[813] calls the Emperor’s statement a designed misstatement (une inexactitude calculée).
But we have no disposition to dwell on harsh criticisms of this kind. Our purpose at present is to call attention to a peculiarity of Napoleon’s which may serve to explain the existence in his Memoirs of very definite statements which are apparently very wide of the truth. This peculiarity is, that while his orders to his lieutenants were often very general in their character,—pointing out clearly enough, it is true, the thing to be aimed at, or the danger to be feared,—but leaving entirely to the officer the course to be adopted if the emergency should arise,—yet these orders never seem to have been retained in Napoleon’s memory in the shape in which they were given, but what he did recall about them was his expectation that, on receiving his order, his lieutenant would act in such or such a manner. This expectation, that such or such action would be taken by his lieutenant on receiving such or such an order, was all that was left of the order in his mind; and, when he came to write his narrative, he would often (at any rate) state that he had given definite instructions to such or such an effect, when all he had really done was to give a general order, from the giving of which he expected such or such a course of action to be taken by his subordinate.
Thus, take the orders to Ney, issued on the afternoon of the 16th, at 2 and 3.15 P.M.[814] They were, as we have seen, very general in character; Ney was directed, after he should have beaten, or, at least, checked, the English, to turn round, and manœuvre so as to take the Prussians in flank and rear. But the “Memoirs”[815] say:—
“He [Napoleon] reiterated the order for him to push on in front of Quatre Bras; and, as soon as he should have taken position there, to detach a column of 8,000 infantry, with the cavalry-division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and 28 pieces of cannon, by the turnpike which ran from Quatre Bras to Namur, which he was to leave at the village of Marbais, in order to attack the heights of Brye, in the enemy’s rear.”
It is to be observed that the Memoirs make no mention of the orders which were actually sent to Ney that afternoon. And Napoleon sent to Ney no such order as this. What he here calls an order was really what he expected Ney to do when he should get the 2 and 3.15 P.M. orders. That this was so, appears from what follows:—
“After having made this detachment, there would still remain to him [Ney] in his position of Quatre Bras 32,000 men and 80 pieces of cannon, which would be sufficient to hold in check all the English troops which could be expected to arrive from their cantonments during the day of the 16th.”
That is,—the Emperor had figured it all out in his own head, as if he were in Ney’s place. Ney could spare so many men and so many guns; he would have so many men and so many guns left. But, in fact, the orders to Ney left it to him to make these calculations for himself.
Let us apply now this mode of working of Napoleon’s mind to his statements in regard to the orders which he says in his “Memoirs” he sent to Grouchy.[816]
“At ten o’clock in the evening the Emperor sent an officer to Marshal Grouchy, whom he supposed to be at Wavre, to inform him that there would be a great battle the next day; that the Anglo-Dutch army was in position in front of the Forest of Soignes, its left resting on the village of La Haye; that he ordered him to detach before daybreak from his camp at Wavre a division of 16,000 men of all arms and 16 pieces of cannon on St. Lambert, in order to connect with the main army and operate with it; that as soon as he should be assured that Blücher had evacuated Wavre, whether to continue his retreat on Brussels or to move in any other direction, he (Grouchy) was to march with the larger part of his troops to support the detachment which he had sent to St. Lambert.”