[106] The italics are our own.
[107] pp. 264, 265.
[108] It is not easy to see what is meant here. It is certain that, without having occupied Sombreffe on the 15th, Napoleon did fight the Prussians separately on the 16th. That Ligny was not a more decisive victory was due to special causes.
[109] Vol. 1, p. 115, note. Quinet, p. 102, does not follow Charras here.
[110] Jomini, pp. 123, 125.
[111] La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 73 et seq. takes the same view.
[112]Vaudoncourt, vol. 3, 2d part, pp. 134, 135, states the Emperor’s plan with admirable clearness. But on pp. 165, 166, he slides into the theory of Jomini.
[113] Cf. Clausewitz, ch. 22, p. 46. “It was certainly to be assumed that both generals would remain in communication with each other.”
[114] “Bonaparte hoped, if he met Blücher’s main body, to destroy it by a quick attack, before Wellington could arrive.” Ib., ch. 22, p. 46.
[115] But see La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 75, 76.