[511] Ib., p. 353.
[512] Ib., pp. 350-355.
[513] Ante, p. 159.
[514] Ollech, p. 157.
[515] He could not at this time communicate with Thielemann and Bülow.
[516] Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 385; Ollech, p. 156.
[517] Ollech, p. 157. Maurice (pp. 354, 355: July, 1890) points out that this serves, as far as it goes, to show that Napoleon might have known of the retreat of Zieten and Pirch I. to Wavre without changing his opinion that the whole Prussian army was intending to fall back to the eastward.
[518] Damitz, p. 143.
[519] This is Ollech’s opinion (p. 156): “Thus had Gneisenau broken all bridges behind him, given up all communication with the Rhine, that he might once again offer the hand to the English for a common blow which should forever overthrow the French forces.” But this is surely going too far. Communication with the Rhine could be maintained as well by way of Maestricht as by way of Liége.
[520] Ante, pp. 151, 204. Cf. Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 386