[641] Marshal Soult, according to Baudus (vol. 1, pp. 222, 223), was opposed to detaching Grouchy with the large body of troops assigned to him. He said to one of his aides that it was a great fault to detach so considerable a force from the army which was going to march against the Anglo-Belgian troops; that in the condition in which the defeat of the evening before had put the Prussian army, a feeble force, with the cavalry of General Exelmans, would suffice to follow and observe it in its retreat. We concur in Marshal Soult’s conclusion, but not with his reasons. It was not because the Prussian army was so weak, but because it was still so formidable, that Napoleon should have kept all his army together.
[642] See the admirable observations of Siborne (vol. 1, pp. 318 et seq.); and of Van Loben Sels, pp. 319 et seq. With many writers, to blame Napoleon is to exonerate Grouchy; with others, again, to blame Grouchy is to exonerate Napoleon.
[643] Cf. Kennedy, pp. 160, 161; Chesney, pp. 206, 207. On the other hand see Van Loben Sels, pp. 323, 324.
[644] Operations of War, p. 196 et seq.
[645] Hamley, p. 196.
[646] Frag. Hist.; Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy, p. 5; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 44.
[647] Jomini, p. 176.
[648] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 62, 63. Hooper’s view [pp. 342 et seq.] is substantially that of Charras. He also seems to think that unless Grouchy could succeed in defeating the Prussian troops opposed to him, his intervention would be useless. It seems to us, on the other hand, that all that it was needful for Grouchy to do was to engage, and so to detain, the corps of Bülow and Pirch I.; and by marching from the Dyle upon their line of march from Wavre to St. Lambert, he was, it seems to us, certain to accomplish this. This view is well presented by Quinet, pp. 301-304.
[649] Charras, vol. 2, p. 42.
[650] Ante, p. 232.