The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History / Third Edition

by John Codman Ropes

These changes in the military organization of the country required time. Besides, Napoleon was not desirous to precipitate matters. He was naturally solicitous not to appear to commence an avoidable war. He was, moreover, much occupied with domestic politics, but of his dealings with the chambers and of his new constitution we do not propose to speak.

Besides increasing and reconstituting the army, work was begun on the fortifications of the principal cities.

By the first of June, no change having taken place in the relations of France with her neighbors, it became incumbent on the Emperor to decide what he would do.

The situation was, in brief, as follows: Two large armies, one composed of English, Dutch, Belgian and Hanoverian troops, with contingents from Brunswick and Nassau, the whole under command of the Duke of Wellington, the other composed of Prussians, Saxons, and other Germans under Marshal Blücher, lay scattered in their cantonments in Belgium to the north and east of the rivers Sambre and Meuse. On the eastern frontier, the Austrians were collecting a formidable force, and were expecting to be reinforced in July by a powerful Russian army. If Napoleon should maintain a strictly defensive attitude, France would again be the theatre of hostilities, as in the previous year. True, time would be gained by the delay, and time was most important for filling the ranks of the army, completing the fortifications, manufacturing ammunition, and generally putting the country into a state of defence. But when the invasion came, it would be made in overwhelming force. It was possible, certainly, to hope for the repetition of the exploits of 1814, for victories like Champ Aubert, Montmirail and Rheims; on the other hand, bloody and indecisive battles like those of Brienne, Laon, and Arcis-sur-Aube were to be expected with equal probability. The thing for Napoleon to do, if possible, was to reduce this tremendous disparity of numbers, and this could only be effected by beating his enemies in detail. If he could dispose of the armies of Wellington and Blücher now, he would have so much the better chance against the Austrians and the Russians. And Napoleon undoubtedly hoped that if fortune should favor him in 1815 as in 1805 and 1806, for instance,—if he should be able to repeat in Belgium the astonishing successes of Austerlitz and Jena,—he would not find it impossible to make peace with his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and that Russia, whose interests in the war were remote and really theoretical, would willingly retire from the contest. When we add to this that Napoleon’s forte was the offensive, that his genius was specially adapted for enterprising and daring strategy, we are not surprised that he should have decided to move at once, with all his available force, upon the armies of Wellington and Blücher.[5]

These armies were, as has been stated, lying in their cantonments on and behind the Belgian frontier. (See Map 1.) Their front covered, roughly speaking, an extent of a hundred miles, from Namur and Huy on the east to Mons and Tournay on the west. They were distributed in numerous towns and villages, some of these being as far back as forty miles from the frontier. With the location of the various detachments Napoleon was undoubtedly, to a great extent, acquainted. He calculated that Wellington’s forces, which were scattered over a wide extent of country, could not be concentrated in less than two days; and that it would require more than one day for Blücher to assemble the four corps of which his army was composed.

The high-road, which runs from Charleroi north through Quatre Bras, Genappe and Waterloo to Brussels, ran between these armies,—that of the Duke of Wellington lying to the westward of the road and that of Marshal Blücher lying to the eastward of it. The Prussians lay considerably closer to the frontier than the English and Dutch. Wellington’s headquarters were at Brussels; Blücher’s at Namur. The turnpike, which runs from Namur through Quatre Bras to Nivelles, was the main avenue of communication between these two armies.

The Prussian lines of supply extended by way of Liége and Maestricht to the Rhine; the English by way of Ostend and Antwerp to the sea. The bases of the two armies were thus situated in opposite directions. It was, of course, probable that if either of these armies should be obliged to retreat, it would retreat towards its own base. But to retreat towards its own base would be to march away from its ally. On this peculiarity in the situation Napoleon’s plan of campaign was, to a great degree, founded. The situation was far more favorable for him than if the 220,000 men in Belgium had all belonged to one army, for now, not only were there two armies, under two commanders, in whose operations he might safely count upon the existence of more or less misunderstanding and failure fully to meet each other’s expectations, but the two armies were bound, in case of disaster to either or both, to follow lines of retreat which were wholly divergent.

We are now prepared to consider Napoleon’s plan. He proposed to assemble his own forces with all possible secrecy in the neighborhood of Charleroi,—near the point of junction of the two opposing armies. He expected that, on the first news of his approach, the two armies would respectively concentrate, and then endeavor to unite. He expected that the Prussians, being less scattered than the English, and being likely to know of the approach of the French before the English could possibly hear of it, would be the first to concentrate, and he expected therefore to encounter them alone and unsupported by their allies.

The statement of Napoleon’s plan of campaign in Gourgaud’s narrative is as follows:—[6]