There is in fact no reason to doubt that Napoleon’s habitual activity and even his capacity for physical exertion had in 1815 sensibly diminished. Like most men of forty-five, he was not so full of energy as he had been at five and twenty. He had also grown stout, and he was furthermore a sufferer from some painful maladies which rendered it difficult for him to keep on horseback for any great length of time.[31] All these circumstances would naturally tend to diminish, more or less, the once ceaseless activity of his mind; we may, therefore, expect to find him less thoughtful, less vigilant, less careful, than he had been in his earlier campaigns. But it is plain that the standard by which the Napoleon of 1815 is tested is no ordinary standard,[32] and it may well be that although he may have failed to come up to the high mark which he formerly attained, we shall nevertheless find in this campaign of Waterloo no conspicuous lack of ordinary activity and energy.
In conclusion, we may fairly say that while we recognize that the army with which Napoleon was preparing to take the field in June, 1815, was not as well-organized a body of troops as some of the armies which he had led to victory, that its corps-commanders were not as brilliant soldiers as were many of the distinguished generals of that period, that peculiar circumstances rendered Soult, Ney and Grouchy less serviceable than they probably would have been had things been otherwise ordered, and that the Emperor himself was more or less deficient in the never-resting activity of mind and body which he had once possessed, we must not forget that the soldiers and their officers were all veterans, that their generals had won their rank by distinguished service on many a bloody field, and that no man living surpassed their leader in military talent. It is not correct to say[33] that the army which Napoleon led into Belgium was the finest he had ever commanded, but it is quite certain that it was by far the best of the three armies then in the field.
The strength and composition of this army, was, according to Charras,[34] whom we may safely follow, as follows:—
| 1st Corps: d’Erlon. | |||
| Four divisions of infantry,— | |||
| Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet, Durutte | 16,885 | Men | |
| One division of cavalry,—Jaquinot | 1,506 | „ | |
| Artillery,—46 guns,—engineers, etc. | 1,548 | „ | |
| Total, | 19,939 | „ | |
| 2d Corps: Reille. | |||
| Four divisions of infantry,— | |||
| Bachelu, Jerome Napoleon,[35] Girard, Foy | 20,635 | Men | |
| One division of cavalry,—Piré | 1,865 | „ | |
| Artillery,—46 guns,—engineers, &c. | 1,861 | „ | |
| Total, | 24,361 | „ | |
| 3d Corps: Vandamme. | |||
| Three divisions of infantry,— | |||
| Lefol, Habert, Berthezène | 16,851 | „ | |
| One division of cavalry,—Domon | 1,017 | „ | |
| Artillery,—38 guns,—engineers, &c. | 1,292 | „ | |
| Total, | 19,160 | „ | |
| 4th Corps: Gérard. | |||
| Three divisions of infantry,— | |||
| Pécheux, Vichery, Bourmont[36] | 12,800 | „ | |
| One division of cavalry,—Maurin | 1,628 | „ | |
| Artillery,—38 guns,—engineers, &c., | 1,567 | „ | |
| Total, | 15,995 | „ | |
| 6th Corps: Lobau. | |||
| Three divisions of infantry,— | |||
| Simmer, Jeannin, Teste | 9,218 | „ | |
| Artillery,—32 guns,—engineers, &c., | 1,247 | „ | |
| Total, | 10,465 | „ | |
| Imperial Guard: | |||
| Old Guard: | |||
| One division,—Friant,—grenadiers | 4,140 | „ | |
| Middle[37] Guard: | |||
| One division,—Morand,—chasseurs | 4,603 | „ | |
| Young Guard: | |||
| One division,—Duhesme,—voltigeurs, &c., | 4,283 | „ | |
| Two divisions of cavalry,—Guyot, Lefebvre-Desnouettes | 3,795 | „ | |
| Artillery,—96 guns,—engineers, &c., | 4,063 | „ | |
| Total, | 20,884 | „ | |
| Reserve Cavalry: Grouchy. | |||
| 1st Cavalry Corps: Pajol. | |||
| Two divisions,—Soult, Subervie | 2,717 | ||
| Artillery,—12 guns, | 329 | ||
| 3,046 | |||
| 2d Cavalry Corps: Exelmans. | |||
| Two divisions: Stroltz, Chastel | 3,220 | ||
| Artillery,—12 guns, | 295 | ||
| 3,515 | |||
| 3d Cavalry Corps: Kellermann. | |||
| Two divisions,—L’Heritier, Roussel | 3,360 | ||
| Artillery,—12 guns, | 319 | ||
| 3,679 | |||
| 4th Cavalry Corps: Milhaud. | |||
| Two divisions,—Wathier, Delort | 3,194 | ||
| Artillery,—12 guns, | 350 | ||
| 3,544 | |||
| Total, | 13,784 | „ | |
| Workmen, waggoners, &c., about | 3,500 | „ | |
| Grand Total, | 128,088 | „ | |
Leaving out the last item as consisting chiefly of non-combatants, wehave an army consisting of | 124,588 | men. | |
Of these, the infantry numbered, | 89,415 | Men | |
the cavalry, including the horse artillery ofthe reserve cavalry, numbered, | 23,595 | „ | |
the artillery (344 guns including the above)numbered, | 11,578 | „ | |
| Total,[38] as above, | 124,588 | „ | |
NOTE TO CHAPTER II.
The opinion expressed here in regard to the health of the Emperor is substantially that entertained by Thiers and Chesney. The former says that the Emperor’s brother Jerome, and also one of the surgeons on the Emperor’s staff, both told him that Napoleon was a sufferer at this time from an affection of the bladder. But this was, he says, denied by Marchand, the Emperor’s valet. “Whatever may have been the health of Napoleon at this epoch, his activity was not diminished.”[39]
To the same effect is Chesney’s opinion,[40] opposing that of Charras.[41] Further evidence on the subject has been collected by Mr. Dorsey Gardner.[42] His conclusion is entirely opposed to that of Colonel Chesney, and in our judgment he places altogether too much reliance on that delightful, but gossipy, writer, the Comte de Ségur. Ségur’s History of the Russian Campaign is the best known work on the subject, but it is essentially a romance. In it he advances with great boldness his favorite theme of the breaking down of Napoleon’s health.[43] But the Emperor’s health was able to endure without injury that terrible strain; he certainly showed in 1813 and 1814 every evidence of physical vigor. No doubt the peculiar maladies from which he suffered occasionally impaired the activity of both mind and body; but the talk of Ségur verges at times on puerility. Gourgaud’s Examen Critique of Ségur’s work points out its defects cleverly and unsparingly. As for the conversation, referred to by Gardner, which the Earl of Albemarle[44] reports as having taken place in 1870 between his son and General Gudin, who was, in 1815, a page in waiting on the Emperor, to the effect that Napoleon secluded himself all the forenoon of the day of the battle of Waterloo, and that “it was nearly noon when the Emperor descended the ladder that led to the sleeping room and rode away,” it is really impossible to accept the story. Charras, who for his own reasons (and, by the way, not for the reasons which Chesney very naturally supposes actuated him), endeavors to magnify Napoleon’s inactivity throughout this campaign, represents him as, on this morning of the 18th, reconnoitring the position after eight o’clock,[45] giving his orders for the marshalling of the army, watching the deployment of the troops between nine and half-past ten, riding along the lines, and dictating the order of battle before eleven o’clock. On all such points we are quite safe in following Charras, and we must consider Gudin’s story as having (to say the least) suffered greatly in its transmission. Besides, there was no “ladder that led to the sleeping room,” in the house[46] in which Napoleon slept the night before Waterloo.