The Campaign of Waterloo: A Military History / Third Edition

by John Codman Ropes

99 Mount Vernon Street:
Boston: June 1, 1892.

J. C. R.

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

Since the publication of this book the writer has been put in possession of facts which have led him to reverse his opinion of the truth of the story that the Duke of Wellington rode to Wavre on the evening of the 17th of June, 1815.

J. C. R.

99 Mount Vernon Street:
Boston: May 17, 1893.

---

[CONTENTS.]

		Page
[PREFACE]
CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN		[1]
The general military situation		[2]
Reasons for taking the offensive		[2], [3]
Napoleon decides to move against Wellington and Blücher		[3]
Positions of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian Armies		[3], [4]
Napoleon’s plan		[4]
As stated in Gourgaud’s Narrative		[4]
And in the “Memoirs”		[5]
The other plans which were open to him		[6]
His expectation that Blücher would accept battlesingle-handed		[7], [8]
NOTE TO CHAPTER I		[9]
Napoleon’s plan distinguished from certain otherplans attributed to him		[9]
Alison’s view that he threw himself between thetwo allied armies		[10]
Condemned by Wellington and Clausewitz		[10]
But adopted by Hooper and Quinet		[11]
Rogniat’s theory, that Napoleon ought to have aimedat seizing both Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the first day		[12]
Jomini’s belief, that he did have this intention		[12]
Adopted by La Tour d’Auvergne		[13]
And by Charras		[13]
Their view opposed to that of Napoleon, Wellingtonand Clausewitz		[13]
Napoleon desired and expected a battle with the Prussians		[14], [15]
CHAPTER II: THE FRENCH ARMY		[16]
The army as affected by Napoleon’s return from Elba		[16]
Confidence of the soldiers in Napoleon		[17]
Lack of confidence in the high officers		[17]
Napoleon’s choice of Soult to take Berthier’s place		[17]
Soult’s unfitness for the position of chief-of-staff		[18]
The five corps-commanders		[18]
Estimate of the defects of the French general officers by Napoleon and by Charras		[19]
Probability of the truth of their views		[19]
What Napoleon expected from his lieutenants		[20]
Marshal Ney sent for at the last moment		[20]
Sudden appointment of Marshal Grouchy to thecommand of the right wing		[21]
Napoleon’s error in not taking Marshal Davout withhim		[22]
Estimate of Napoleon’s own bodily and mental vigorat this period		[23]-[24]
Portrait of Napoleon by General Foy		[23]
Estimate of the French Army		[24]
It was not the best army which Napoleon had ever led		[24]
But it was a better army than either that of Wellingtonor of Blücher		[25]
Its strength and composition		[25]-[28]
NOTE TO CHAPTER II		[29]
Napoleon’s health—Gardner—Ségur		[29]
The Gudin story		[30]
Napoleon more or less a sufferer; but on the wholepossessed of good health and strength		[30], [31]
CHAPTER III: THE ALLIED ARMIES		[32]
Strength and composition of the Prussian army		[32], [33]
Location of the different corps		[33]
Temper and spirit of the army		[34]
Marshal Blücher		[34]
The Duke of Wellington’s army		[34]
Its strength and composition		[35]-[38]
Location of the various divisions		[38]
Merits and defects of the several parts of the army		[39]
The generals: the Prince of Orange		[40]
Lord Hill,—Sir T. Picton		[40]
The Duke of Wellington		[40]
The internal economy of the three armies		[41], [42]
That of the French army		[41]
That of the English army		[42]
That of the Prussian army		[42]
NOTE TO CHAPTER III		[43]
Defects peculiar to the inexperienced English regiments		[43]
CHAPTER IV: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON		[44]
Napoleon assembles his army near Charleroi		[44], [45]
He addresses it at Avesnes on the 14th		[45]
His letters to his brother Joseph and to Davoutconfirm the view above given of his plan of campaign		[45]
The general order of movement issued on the eveningof the 14th of June		[45], [46]
Accident in the transmission of his orders to GeneralVandamme on the 15th		[46]
Desertion of General Bourmont		[47]
The operations in the centre under Napoleon’s immediatesupervision		[47]
Positions of the centre and right on the night of the15th and 16th		[48]
Operations of the left wing. Arrival of Ney		[48], [49]
He pushes the divisions of Bachelu and Piré to Frasnes		[49]
And leaves those of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies		[49]
Backwardness of the 1st Corps		[50]-[52]
At 3 A.M. of the 16th one division had not arrivedat the Sambre		[51]
D’Erlon to blame for this tardiness		[52]
Napoleon’s own summary of the situation on theevening of the 15th		[53]
He had purposely abstained from occupying Sombreffe		[53]
He expected Blücher to fight the next day for thepreservation of his communications with Wellington		[53]
He gets a few hours’ sleep during the evening of the 15th		[54]
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV		[55]
1. Marshal Ney’s lack of a proper staff		[56]
2. Discussion of the results of the operations onthe 15th		[56] et seq.
Jomini and Charras consider them incomplete andunsatisfactory		[56]
A. The question, as regards the non-occupation ofSombreffe on the evening of the 15th		[57]-[61]
Rogniat’s criticism		[57]
Napoleon’s answer		[57]
Charras and Jomini		[58], [59]
Re-statement of Napoleon’s plan and expectations		[59]
The plan suggested by Rogniat, Jomini and Charrasno improvement on that of Napoleon		[60]
B. The question as regards the non-occupation ofQuatre Bras on the evening of the 15th		[61]-[63]
(1.) Reasons why the effect on Blücher of theoccupation of Quatre Bras might be differentfrom that of the occupation of Sombreffe		[61]
(2.) The occupation of Quatre Bras on the eveningof the 15th not necessary to Napoleon’s scheme		[62]
3. Reasons why Napoleon blamed Ney for nothaving occupied Quatre Bras on the 15th		[63]
4. Did Napoleon give Ney a verbal order toseize Quatre Bras on the 15th?		[64]
The statements of Gourgaud and the Memoirs		[64]
The statement in the Bulletin of the Army, sent offin the evening of the 15th		[65]
The published statement of Marshal Grouchy in1818 that he heard the Emperor blame Ney forhaving disobeyed his orders to seize QuatreBras on the 15th		65, n. [122]
The subsequent hearsay evidence of little value		[66]-[67]
The Bulletin much the best evidence that we have		[67]-[69]
That no mention is made in the written orders ofthe 16th of the verbal order of the day before, is not material		[69]
CHAPTER V: THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON		[70]
Blücher on the 14th ordered his army to concentrateat Sombreffe		[70]
And without consulting Wellington		[70]
The nature of the understanding between them		[70] et seq.
Müffling’s statement generally misunderstood		[71]
There was every intention to act in concert, but nodefinite agreement as to details		[72]
Bülow’s disobedience of orders		[73]
Gneisenau’s remissness in not giving him full informationof the situation		[73]
Wellington’s desire to protect Ghent and Brussels		[74]
He retained his headquarters at Brussels		[74]
He thought it probable that the French wouldadvance by way of Mons		[74]
Hence he would not hastily move in force in thedirection of Quatre Bras		[75]
The Prince of Orange hears of the French advance		[76]
And brings word of it to the Duke at Brussels at3 P.M. of the 15th		[77]
Wellington’s first orders were issued between 5 and7 P.M.		[77]
They were simply for the concentration of the variousdivisions of his army		[78]
But they implied that Nivelles and not Quatre Braswas likely to be the point of concentration for the whole army		[78]
Information that Blücher is concentrating at Sombreffearrives in the evening at Brussels		[78]
And Wellington issues, about 10 P.M., his “AfterOrders” which direct a general movement towards the east		[79]
Difficulty of reconciling the evidence as to the subsequentorders of the Duke		[79]
The Duke’s official report states that he ordered thewhole army to Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th		[80]
Müffling’s statement		[80]
The Duke’s conversation with the Duke of Richmond		81, n. [170]
The instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey havebeen lost		[81]
The orders to Hill in the early morning of the 16th		[82]
They indicate that no decision for a concentrationat Quatre Bras had then been reached		[83]
This inference may be also drawn from the halt ofPicton’s division at Waterloo		[83]
It has even been maintained that as late as 10 A.M.of the 16th the Duke had not decided to hold Quatre Bras		84, n. [182]
But the Letter of the Duke to Marshal Blücher andthe “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey contradict this supposition		[85]
Character and meaning of the “Disposition”		[86]
The “Disposition” evidently the foundation of theLetter to Blücher		[87]-[88]
Taken together, they show that the Duke ordereda concentration of his army at Quatre Bras in the early morning of the 16th		[88]
But not until after he had given the orders abovementioned to Hill and Picton		[88]
His decision was probably arrived at while hewas at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball		[89]
NOTES TO CHAPTER V		[90]
1. The Duke’s “Memorandum on the Battle ofWaterloo”		[90]
Its surprising statements		[90]
2. No definite plan of action agreed on by Wellingtonand Blücher in the event of a French invasion		[91]
3. Wellington does not deserve credit for promptnessin deciding to concentrate at Quatre Bras		[92]
4. Wellington’s original intention of concentratingat Nivelles considered		[93]
It is approved by Colonel Maurice		[93]
A. But when Wellington knew that the Frenchmain army was in front of Blücher at Sombreffehe could run no great risk in concentratingat Quatre Bras		[94]
B. His fault was in delaying to issue the order to do so		[94]
If his orders had been strictly carried out, Neywould have occupied Quatre Bras withoutopposition, and been able to assist Napoleon at Ligny		[95]
C. Napoleon attached great importance to QuatreBras, and gave Ney a large force in order tomake sure of its acquisition		[95], [96]
5. The extent of the cantonments of the alliedarmies criticized		[96]
Opinion of Sir James Shaw-Kennedy		[96]
Opinions of Charras and Napoleon		[97], [98]
6. Napoleon’s criticism on Blücher for fixing Sombreffeas the point of concentration for hisarmy, well supported		[98]
But his censure of Wellington for concentrating atQuatre Bras undeserved		[99]
Because this decision of Wellington’s was basedon Napoleon’s having already concentrated infront of Sombreffe		[99], [100]
CHAPTER VI: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS		[101]
Prince Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar occupies QuatreBras in the afternoon of the 15th		[101]
And is attacked by Reille’s advance between 5 and6 P.M.		[101]
The other brigade of Perponcher’s division, Bylandt’s,ordered there also		[102]
The Prince of Orange arrives at Quatre Bras at 6A.M. of the 16th		[102]
NOTE TO CHAPTER VI		[103]
Maurice’s criticism on the occupation of QuatreBras by the Dutch-Belgian generals		[103]
But the fact that they knew of the concentration ofthe French and Prussian armies near Sombreffefully justifies their course		[103], [104]
CHAPTER VII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: WELLINGTON		[105]
The Duke leaves Brussels about 7.30 A.M. of the16th		[105]
And rides at once to Quatre Bras		[106]
His letter to Blücher		[106]
Comparison of the statements in the Letter withthose in the “Disposition” of Sir W. De Lancey		[107]-[108]
He evidently accepted the “Disposition” as conclusive		[108]
He rides over to Brye to confer with Blücher		[108]
And returns to Quatre Bras between 2 and 3 P.M.		[109]
No doubt expecting to find a large part of his armythere		[109]
Delbrück’s theory, that the Duke deliberately misrepresentedthe situation of his army, entirelyunsupported		[109], [110]
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII		[111]
1. Actual positions of Wellington’s divisions at7 A.M. of the 16th		[111]-[113]
2. Whether, if the Duke had known the truth, hewould have stayed at Quatre Bras,—quære		[114]
3. Wellington badly served by his subordinates inthe matter of the transmission of intelligencefrom the front		[114]-[115]
CHAPTER VIII: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NEY		[116]
Ney returns from Charleroi to Gosselies at 2 A.M.		[116]
And at first orders Reille to set out at once forFrasnes		[116]
But afterwards changes his mind, and allows Reille,with the divisions of Jerome and Foy, to remainin Gosselies		[117]
He ought to have sent them to Frasnes at once		[117]
And to have filled their places at Gosselies with thedivisions of the 1st Corps		[118]
He does nothing to bring up the 1st Corps till latein the forenoon		[119]
Soult’s first order to him on the 16th		[120]
Received about 6 A.M., and answered before 7 A.M.		[120]
Ney then returns to Frasnes, leaving Reille at Gosselies,with instructions to march to the front atonce on receipt of orders from army headquarters		[120]
About 9 A.M. Reille receives word from Girardthat the Prussians are massing at Fleurus		[121]
And at 10 A.M. he reads the Emperor’s letter toNey, brought by Flahaut		[121]
But defers his march to Frasnes till he gets furtherorders from Ney		[122]
He gets further orders, and leaves Gosselies at 11.45A.M.		[122]
Soult’s second order directs Ney to march on QuatreBras		[122]
The Emperor’s letter to Ney		[123]
The 1st and 2d Corps and Kellermann’s cavalry areall put at Ney’s disposal		[123]
The third order to Ney from Soult that morning		[123], [124]
Its peremptory character		[124]
Ney refuses fully to obey his orders		[124]
His unwillingness to take the risks which they involve		[124]
He proposes to keep half his force in reserve		[125]
NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII		[126]
1. Summary of Ney’s conduct on the morning ofthe 16th		[126]
2. He evidently did not intend to obey his ordersstrictly		[127]
3. The light his conduct on the 16th throws on hisfailure to seize Quatre Bras the day before		[127]
4. No criticism can be made on Napoleon and Soult		[128]
5. Why Napoleon did not send Ney an earlier orderto seize Quatre Bras, answered in Chapter IX		[128]
CHAPTER IX: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON		[129]
Ney and Napoleon at Charleroi during the night ofthe 15th and 16th		[129]
Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness ofd’Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is ready		[130]
The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras notgiven until Ney’s report of the state of his commandhad arrived—between 8 and 9 A.M.		[131]
The advance of the centre and right also delayed toconform to the movements of the left		[131], [132]
Napoleon’s expectations as to the forwardness ofNey’s command		[132], [133]
Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney andGrouchy, in view of the possible withdrawalof Marshal Blücher		[134], [135]
He seems to have thought this probable		[136]
But he made every preparation for encountering theenemy in force both at Sombreffe and at QuatreBras		[137]
The 6th Corps regarded as a reserve for the wholearmy		[138]
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX		[139]
1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon forhis delays on the morning of the 16th notdeserved		[139]
Opinions of Wellington and Clausewitz		139, n. [310]
2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness ofthe 1st Corps during the night		[140]
3. Ney’s inactivity on returning to Gosselies		[140]
4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolutionon the part of Napoleon		[140]
5. Error of supposing that he ever thought ofpressing on to Brussels between the two alliedarmies—Chesney and Clinton		[141]
His letters to Ney and Grouchy conclusive asto this		[141], [142]
His object was to destroy the allied armies in succession—Jomini		[142]
CHAPTER X: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY:BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT ON WELLINGTON’SASSURANCE OF SUPPORT		[143]
Blücher concentrated his army without receivingany assurance of support from Wellington		[143]
He got Wellington’s letter about noon of the 16th		[144]
Wellington arrived at Brye at 1 P.M.		[144]
Their conversation		[144]
Wellington gave no unconditional promise		[145]
Blücher’s decision to fight was arrived at before heheard from or saw Wellington		[146]
And on entirely independent grounds		[147]
NOTE TO CHAPTER X		[148]
Blücher’s reasons for deciding to accept battle atLigny as given by Damitz		[148]
He was unwilling to retreat		[148]
Suggestions of Ollech and Delbrück not of anyvalue here		[149]
Blücher expected to concentrate his whole army of120,000 men		[149]
And was unwilling to change his decision when hefound he could not count upon Bülow’s arrival		[150]
CHAPTER XI: THE BATTLE OF LIGNY		[151]
Position of the Prussian army at Ligny		[151]
Napoleon examines the position		[152]
The most obvious plan of battle was to turn thePrussian right		[152]
But Napoleon decides to attack the centre		[153]
Positions taken by the French		[153], [154]
The 2 P.M. order sent to Ney to coöperate withthe main army		[154]
The battle begins at 2.30 by attacking Ligny andSt. Amand		[154]
The 3.15 P.M. order to Ney		[155]
Napoleon determines about half-past five o’clock toput in the Guard		[156]
The unexpected appearance of d’Erlon’s Corpscauses a delay of nearly two hours		[157]
The attack by the Guard breaks the Prussian centre		[158]
The Prussians fall back to Brye and Sombreffe		[159]
Losses of the Prussians and French		[159]
The non-employment of the 6th Corps		[159], [160]
Extent of the victory		[160], [161]
It was not equal to Napoleon’s hopes, but it haddisposed of the Prussians for a time		[161], [162]
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI		[163]
1. Napoleon’s delay in beginning the battle		[163]
His reasons considered		[164]
2. His plan of battle criticised by Rogniat andothers		[164]
Napoleon’s reply to Rogniat		[165]
His reasons for taking the course he did		[165]
The criticism of Davout and Clausewitz considered		[166]
3. Clausewitz’s doubts as to the decisive result ofNey’s movement		[167]
The question fully stated and Napoleon’s expectationsjustified		[167]
4. What Napoleon had a right to expect from Ney		[168]
5. Whether Napoleon’s plan was the best, consideringthat he could not absolutely rely on Ney’s coöperation		[169]
6. Why Napoleon did not order d’Erlon to remainand take part in the battle		[170]
He must have assumed that d’Erlon had come uponthe field for this purpose		[170]
And there was not time to send him orders		[170]
7. Napoleon’s skill well displayed at Ligny		[171]
Clausewitz’s review of the battle		[171]-[173]
He points out that Napoleon was more economicalin the use of his troops than Blücher		[171]
Severe and unwarranted criticism of Marshal Davouton Napoleon’s tactics		[173]
Napoleon not responsible for the error whichbrought d’Erlon on the field		[174]
8. Whether Napoleon was wise in arresting theprogress of the battle on the appearance of thestrange corps (d’Erlon’s),—Quære		[174]-[175]
9. Napoleon to be censured for not having madeuse of the 6th Corps		[175]
CHAPTER XII: THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS		[176]
Résumé of Marshal Ney’s doings in the forenoonof the 16th		[176]
He should have ordered Jerome and Foy to Gosseliesin the early morning		[177]
He scattered his command instead of uniting it, ashe was ordered to do		[177]
He begins the action at 2 P.M., with the divisionsof Bachelu, Foy and Piré		[178]
Jerome’s division arrives at 3 P.M.		[178]
Wellington returns to Quatre Bras at 2.30 P.M.		[178]
Picton’s division arrives at 3.30 P.M.		[178]
Alten’s division arrives at 5 P.M.		[179]
At this hour Ney has only the 2d Corps on the field		[179]
Reasons for the non-arrival of the 1st Corps		[179]
Its delay in starting		[180]
Its leading division—Durutte’s—turned off by anaide of the Emperor’s from Frasnes towards St. Amand		[180]
The corps is seen approaching St. Amand about5 P.M.		[180]
It must, therefore, have left the Charleroi road atFrasnes about 4.30 P.M.		[181]
This was two hours and a half after Jerome’s divisionhad passed through Frasnes		[181]
Responsibility of Ney and d’Erlon for this extraordinarystate of things		[181]
Marshal Ney not to blame for recalling D’Erlon toQuatre Bras		[181]
It was probably the staff-officer who carried the2 P.M. order who turned the 1st Corps off fromthe turnpike		[182]
For the non-arrival of Kellermann’s cavalry Neyalone was responsible		[182]
He ordered it to remain in the rear at Frasnes andLiberchies		[182], [183]
In this he deliberately disobeyed orders		[183]
He finally, at 6 P.M., puts in one brigade ofKellermann’s Corps		[183]
Which is at first successful, but is afterwards drivenback with loss		[184]
The French retire to Frasnes		[184]
The casualties on both sides		[184]
If d’Erlon’s Corps had not been turned off, it isprobable that Wellington would have beenbadly beaten		[184], [185]
If Ney had concentrated his whole command between12 M. and 2 P.M., Quatre Bras wouldprobably have been evacuated		[185], [186]
In this case Ney could have spared 10,000 or 20,000men to assist Napoleon		[186]
Criticism on Marshal Ney’s management		[186]
Wellington’s skilful handling of his troops		[187], [188]
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII		[189]
1. Charras’ erroneous statements as to Ney’s ordersin regard to the employment of Kellermann’scavalry		[189]
2. Napoleon’s mistakes in his account of thematter in his Memoirs		[190]
But his principal censure on Ney for not having gothis command together and used it as a whole,is fully borne out		[191]
3. Curious error of Siborne’s		[191]
4. Jomini’s defence of Reille’s delay to march toFrasnes		[192]
It overlooks the necessity of occupying Frasnes inany event, and therefore cannot be accepted		[193]
5. Baudus’ account of his carrying an order fromSoult to d’Erlon		[193]
Reasons for thinking that this order must have beendirected to Ney		[194]
Baudus probably carried the duplicate of the 3.15P.M. order to Ney		[195]
The evidence on certain minor points conflicting		[196]
CHAPTER XIII: THE SEVENTEENTH OFJUNE: NAPOLEON		[197]
Résumé of the campaign up to date		[197]
Napoleon had no reason for delay		[197]
He had a disposable army composed almost entirelyof fresh troops		[197]
Reasons for thinking that the Prussians might soonrecover from the defeat of Ligny		[198]
Opportunity open to Napoleon of overwhelmingthat part of Wellington’s army which was atQuatre Bras		[199]
Napoleon’s inactivity on this morning		[200]
Probably the result of fatigue		[200]
Ney sends no report to the Emperor		[200]
Soult’s first order to him to move on Quatre Bras		[201]
Napoleon presumes that Wellington has long sincefallen back		[201]
Napoleon’s lack of energy and activity this morning		[202]
Before noon, however, the 6th Corps and the Guardare ordered to Marbais		[203]
Second order to Ney at noon		[203]
Girard’s division of the 2d Corps left at Ligny		[203]
Napoleon’s reasons for supposing that Blücher hadretired on Namur		[203], [204]
Of which the principal was that he had on the daybefore employed so large a part of his army inholding the Namur road		[204]
Pajol captures some prisoners and a battery on theroad to Namur		[205]
Napoleon’s neglect to send out cavalry to explorethe country to the north		[205]
Napoleon determines to send Grouchy with the 3dand 4th Corps to pursue the Prussians		[206]
His verbal orders to Grouchy, and Grouchy’s remonstrances		[207]
Grouchy’s points not well taken		[207]
Grouchy’s denial that he ever received on that daya written order		[208]
Berton reports a whole Prussian corps at Gembloux		[209]
The Emperor, then, in the absence of Soult, dictatesto Bertrand an order to Grouchy		[209]
Full text of this order		[209], [210]
This order changes entirely the task assigned toGrouchy		[210]
He is to ascertain whether the Prussians intend toseparate from the English or to unite with themto cover Brussels or Liége in trying the fate ofanother battle		[211]
And is left full discretion as to his course in eitherevent		[211]
Strength and composition of his command		[212]
He reaches Gembloux that evening		[212]
And writes to the Emperor a report in which hesays he shall try to separate the Prussians fromWellington		[212], [213]
Strength of Wellington’s force at Quatre Bras		[214]
At Quatre Bras the Emperor in person leads thepursuit of the English		[214]
His remark to d’Erlon		[215]
Interesting picture of the march by the author of“Napoléon à Waterloo”		[215]
Skirmish at Genappe		[216]
The English take up positions south of the hamlet ofMont St. Jean		[216]
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII		[217]
1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pursuedthe Prussians in the early morning of the17th. Clausewitz’s opinion		[217]
2. Napoleon probably would not have detachedGrouchy had he known that the Prussians hadretired on Wavre		[218]
3. Effect on the contemporary historians ofGrouchy’s concealment of the Bertrand order—e. g.,on Clausewitz		[218]
4. Curious survival of this effect on historians whowrote after the order had come to light		[219]
On Chesney		[219]
On Maurice		[219]
On Hamley		[221]
On Hooper		[222]
5. Whether the Bertrand order was sufficientlyexplicit. Charras’ opinion		[222]
6. The reasons for directing Grouchy on Gemblouxconsidered		[223]
7. Valuable suggestions of Maurice as to the reasonswhich induced Napoleon to suppose thatthe Prussians had retreated to Namur		[223]
8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the probabilities,when so much was at stake		[224], [225]
CHAPTER XIV: THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE:BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON		[226]
Zieten and Pirch I. fall back towards Wavre		[226]
Renunciation of the line of Namur		[226]
But a general concentration at Wavre not necessarilyimplied		[226]
Although it was rendered possible by Gneisenau’saction		[227]
Gneisenau unwilling to renounce all hope of unionwith the English		[228]
Although he recognized the difficulties attending it		[228]
And doubted whether he could rely on Wellington		[229]
Blücher carried off the field to Mellery		[229]
Hardinge’s story of the discussion between Blücherand Gneisenau		[230]
The Prussian generals decide to march to join Wellington		[230]
Movements of Thielemann and Bülow		[231]
Admirable conduct of the Prussian corps-commanders		[231]
The Prussians fall back on Wavre		[232]
Leaving a detachment at Mont St. Guibert		[232]
The artillery trains arrive at Wavre at 5 P.M.		[232]
Wellington at Quatre Bras on the morning of the17th		[233]
His message to Blücher sent through Lieut. Massow		[233]
Blücher replies about midnight, promising support		[234]
Wellington’s uncertainty during the day and eveningof the 17th		[234]
The risk which he ran		[235], [236]
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV		[237]
1. Maurice’s correction of Siborne		[237]
2. The story of the Duke’s ride to Wavre on theevening of the 17th		[238]-[242]
Lockhart’s brief statement		[239]
Lord Ellesmere’s denial of Lockhart’s statement		[239]
The story as told by the Rev. Julian Charles Young		[239]-[241]
Mr. Coltman’s recollection of his father’s statementabout it		[241]
Reasons for rejecting the story		[242]
3. Napoleon’s criticism on the course of Wellingtonand Blücher after the battle of Ligny		[243]
Clausewitz denies that Wellington ran any risk		[243]
His view not tenable		[244]
The question of the advisability of running the riskstated		[244]
CHAPTER XV: THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE:GROUCHY AND BLÜCHER		[245]
Grouchy’s letter from Gembloux of 10 P.M. notreally satisfactory		[245]
But Napoleon and Soult do not give him furtherinstructions or any information		[246]
Napoleon thinks Grouchy may arrive by the bridgeof Moustier and sends Marbot to look out for him		[247]
Grouchy was acting under the Bertrand order		[248]
Which laid upon him the task of ascertaining theintentions of the Prussians		[249]
And then left him entire liberty of action		[249]
Errors of Gardner and Maurice as to this latter point		[249], [250]
Grouchy at 10 P.M. of the 17th issues his ordersfor the next day to move on Sart-à-Walhain at6 and 8 A.M.		[250]
But at daybreak he has learned that the Prussianshad retired on Brussels		[251]
Yet he does not change his orders		[252]
He should have marched for the bridge of Moustierat daybreak		[253]
Opinion of Jomini		[253]
Opinion of Clausewitz		[253]
Opinion of Charras		[253]
Grouchy neglects to reconnoitre to his left		[254]
He arrives at Walhain and stops at the house ofM. Hollert, a notary		[255]
He writes a despatch to the Emperor		[255]
Analysis of this despatch		[255], [256]
The sound of the cannon of Waterloo is heard		[256]
Grouchy’s plain duty		[256]
Gérard’s advice		[256]
Grouchy refuses to follow it		[257]
And resumes his march on Wavre		[257]
Condition of the roads and bridges		[258]
Grouchy might have crossed the Dyle after havingarrived at La Baraque		[259]
Three general misconceptions		[259]
1. As to the place where the sound of the cannonwas heard		[259]
2. As to the necessity of marching by way of MontSt. Guibert		[259]
3. As to the resistance to be expected at the bridges		[260]
Grouchy might have been across by 4 P.M.		[260]
Positions of the IVth and IId Prussian Corps atthat moment		[261]
And of the Ist Corps		[261]
Probability that Grouchy would have arrested themarch of Bülow and Pirch I.		[261]
Zieten’s march, however, would not have beeninterfered with		[261]
Bülow reaches St. Lambert at noon		[262]
Pirch I. and Zieten do not leave Wavre till nearlynoon		[262]
Tardiness of these movements		[263]
Accounted for by Gneisenau’s distrust of Wellington		[263]
His postscript to the letter to Müffling		[263]
His doubts as to Wellington’s accepting battle dispelledby the sound of the cannon of Waterloo		[264]
The combat at Wavre		[264], [265]
The bridge of Limale carried by the French between6 and 7 P.M.		[265]
Soult’s 10 A.M. order to Grouchy		[265]
Analysis of this order		[266]
Its main object		[266]
It furnishes no justification for Grouchy’s course		[267]
Inconsistency between this despatch and the instructionsgiven to Marbot		[268]-[270]
The despatch probably not revised by Napoleon		[270]
The 1 P.M. order to Grouchy		[270], [271]
Both despatches show that Napoleon was relying onGrouchy		[272]
The postscript to the second shows that the Emperorhad become alarmed		[272]
NOTES TO CHAPTER XV		[273]
1. The wisdom of detaching Grouchy with 33,000men considered		[273]
This course was decided on when it was believedthat the Prussians had retreated on Namur		[273]
For Grouchy was not needed for the battle with theAnglo-Dutch army		[274]
But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon fearedthat Blücher might have undertaken to joinWellington		[274]
In which case he would have had a long start bythe time when Grouchy could move		[275]
Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision tosend Grouchy off, although he gave him a distinctwarning		[276]
Risks incurred by this course		[276]
It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchyand his two corps with the main army		[277]
2. Kennedy’s reason against the detachment ofGrouchy		[277]
But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy wasneeded, but to keep off Blücher		[278]
3. Importance of treating independently of theconduct of Napoleon and Grouchy		[279]
4. Hamley’s opinion as to Grouchy’s proper coursegiven and commented on		[280]
5. The probable results, if Grouchy had marchedfor Moustier at daybreak		[281]
It would seem that he might easily have concealedthe object of his march		[281]
Charras, however, is of a different opinion		[282]
Examination of his views		[282]
Probability that Grouchy could have effected acrossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 11 A.M.		[283]
And that Bülow would have stopped to concentratehis corps and fight		[283]
And that Pirch I. and Thielemann would have reinforcedBülow		[284]
Zieten, however, if he chose to do so, might havecontinued his march		[284]
6. Charras’ view as to the difficulty of Grouchy’seffecting a crossing after he had arrived at LaBaraque		[284]
His statements as to the Prussian force in thevicinity of the lower bridges unsupported		[285]
7. It is generally stated that Grouchy was at Sart-à-Walhainwhen he heard the sound of thecannon of Waterloo		[286]
Statements of the different narratives		[286], [287]
He was, however, at Walhain, at the ChateauMarette, then the residence of M. Hollert, theNotary of Nil St. Vincent		[287], [288]
CHAPTER XVI: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO		[289]
Napoleon examines the allied position at 1 A.M.		[289]
Early in the morning he again goes to the front tosee if the English are there		[290]
His expectation of victory		[290]
The rôle which he expected Grouchy to play		[290]
He does not seem to have drawn the very naturalinference that Wellington was expectingBlücher; or, if he did, he certainly did not actupon it		[291]
The rain ceased about 8 A.M.		[291]
The original intention was to begin the battle at9 o’clock		[292]
But Drouot suggested delay and Napoleon acquiesced		[292]
Napoleon forms the army in three lines		[292]
His delay in beginning the action criticised		[293]
And his neglect to send word to Grouchy		[294]
Every hour’s delay a gain to Wellington		[294]
Whose army was unequal to the shock without theassistance of the Prussians		[294]
Kennedy’s explanation of Wellington’s course		[295]
Risks that Wellington took		[295]
Wellington had had the field surveyed		[296]
Description of the English position		[297]
Composition and strength of Wellington’s army		[298]
Positions of the various troops		[299]
Hougomont and La Haye Sainte		[300]
Strength and composition of the French army		[301]
Positions of the corps		[301]
Napoleon’s plan of battle		[302]
Establishment of a great battery east of the Charleroiturnpike		[302]
It has been universally commended		[303]
The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a preliminaryto the main attack, which was to be onthe centre, very rashly and carelessly conducted		[303], [304]
The assault by d’Erlon’s Corps		[304]-[307]
Formation of the troops		[305]
No assignable reason for such a peculiar and unwieldyformation		[305]
The attack is made and repulsed		[307]
Napoleon sees the Prussians on the heights of St.Lambert		[307]
Capture of La Haye Sainte		[307]
The great cavalry attacks on the English centre		[308]
They were made against troops in good condition tostand them		[308]
Napoleon is called away at 4 P.M. to take chargeof the resistance to the Prussians		[308]
Necessity of maintaining the Charleroi road andPlanchenoit against their assaults		[309]
Napoleon’s personal supervision needed		[309]
The great cavalry charges		[309]
They accomplish little and the cavalry is ruined		[310]
French batteries placed to the south of La HayeSainte enfilade the English line west of theturnpike		[310]
But this was only done to a limited extent		[310]
The attack by the heavy cavalry of the Guard		[311]
Napoleon succeeds in repulsing Bülow		[311]
The battle against the English not actively carriedon after the cessation of the cavalry attacks		[312]
But the English line at this period becomes fromvarious causes very weak. Kennedy’s descriptionof it		[312]
What Napoleon might have accomplished againstthe English had he not been fighting the Prussiansat this time		[313]
The fight with the Prussians terminated, Napoleonreturns to the front		[314]
Wellington has made every effort to restore hisline; its condition to the west of the pike		[314]
Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attackto be made by the Imperial Guard		[315]
Disposition at this time of the various battalions ofthe Guard		[315], [316]
Strength and composition of the attacking force		[316]
The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regimentsof grenadiers and two of chasseurs		[317]
They are formed in columns of battalions and marchin échelon, the right in advance		[317]
Premature attack of a body of French horse on theleft of the Guard		[317]
No support furnished by Reille		[318]
Admirable conduct of d’Erlon		[318]
The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland’sbrigade of guards		[319]
Captain Powell’s account		[319]
The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten		[320]
General Maitland’s account		[321]
Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett		[322]
The left and rear battalions of the Guard continueto advance		[323]
But are attacked in flank by the 52d regiment		[324]
And are completely overthrown		[324]
The failure of the attack largely due to the absenceof supports		[324]
Arrival of the van of Zieten’s Corps on the field		[324]
The French right wing retires in confusion		[325]
Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur		[325]
Exertions of Napoleon to restore order		[325]
He is finally forced to retire		[326]
The French retreat blocked at Genappe		[326]
The result of the battle due to the intervention ofthe Prussians		[327]
Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detainedBülow and Pirch I.		[328]
Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for thedefeat		[328]
NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI		[329]
1. The French tactics generally censured		[329]
Napoleon and Ney both to blame		[329]
Injurious effect on the French chances of success ofNapoleon’s absence at Planchenoit		[330]
The attack on Hougomont criticised		[330]
The defence of Planchenoit praised		[331]
2. The English tactics exceedingly good		[331]
3. The attack of the Imperial Guard		[331]
A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns		[332]
B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered		[333]
The notion that it was only the skirmishers of theImperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’sbrigade refuted by the testimony of eyewitnesses		[334]
The great credit due to Colborne		[335]
4. Napoleon’s reasons for ordering the attack considered		[336]
Zieten’s intervention not anticipated		[336]
The English reported as growing weaker		[337]
Ney ordered and expected to support the attack byBachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left		[337]
Ney disappoints the Emperor’s expectations in bothrespects		[337]
The charge of the Guard might have been properlysupported		[338]
Contrast between Ney and Wellington		[338]
Note on Ney’s state of mind		338, n. [777]
5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men atHal and Tubize, not to be defended		[339]
6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearanceof Grouchy’s force marching fromthe Dyle		[339]
7. The rout of the French army due to the irruptionof Zieten’s Corps		[340]
The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutcharmy at the close of the action		[341]
8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchyfor the intervention of the Prussians		[341]
Both are responsible for it		[342]
CHAPTER XVII: CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS		[343]
The principal points treated of in this book		[343]-[350]
Appendix A.
On some characteristics of Napoleon’s Memoirs		[351]
Injustice done Napoleon by Charras and others		[351]
Peculiarity of Napoleon’s memory		[352]
He recalls his expectations, but not the tenor of theorders which he gave		[352]
Illustration from the orders sent to Ney on the afternoonof the 16th		[352]
The same thing probably true as to the order sentto Grouchy		[353]
The orders given in the “Memoirs” were probablynever sent		[354]
And the Bertrand order, which was sent, was forgotten		[354]
Appendix B.
On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand order		[355]
Denials by Marshal Grouchy in his pamphlets publishedin Philadelphia that he received on the17th any written order		[355]
He relied on the fact that no copy of the Bertrandorder was among the major-general’s papers		[356]
Publication of the order in 1842		[357]
It is now recognized in the Grouchy Memoirs		[357]
Original text of the Bertrand Order		[358]
Grouchy’s report to the Emperor dated Gembloux,10 P.M., June 17, given in full		[359]
It is in reality a reply to the Bertrand order		[360]
Mutilation by Marshal Grouchy of the text of thisreport		[360]
Object of the change		[360]
No doubt as to the correct reading		[361]
Appendix C.
I.	Napoleon’s Address to his army, June 14,1815	[362]
II.	Order of movement, June 14, 1815	[363]
III.	Order to the Count Reille, 8.30 A.M., June15, 1815	[366]
IV.	Order to the Count d’Erlon, 10 A.M., June1815	[367]
V.	Order to the Count d’Erlon, 3 P.M., June 15,1815	[367]
VI.	Subsequent Order to the Count d’Erlon, June15, 1815	[367]
VII.	Order to Gen. Noguès, 3 A.M., June 16,1815	[368]
VIII.	Bulletin of the army, June 15, 1815, evening	[369]
IX.	Wellington’s first Memorandum of Orders,June 15, 1815	[370]
X.	Wellington’s letter to the Duc de Feltre, 10P.M., June 15, 1815	[371]
XI.	Wellington’s “After Orders,” 10 P.M., June15, 1815	[371]
XII.	Extract from Wellington’s Report of theOperations, June 19, 1815	[372]
XIII.	Wellington’s Conversation with the Dukeof Richmond, June 16, 1815	[373]
XIV.	Wellington’s Orders to Lord Hill, June 16,1815	[374]
XV.	Extract from Wellington’s “Memorandumon the Battle of Waterloo”	[374]
XVI.	Wellington’s Letter to Blücher, 10.30 A.M.,June 16, 1815	[376]
XVII.	Soult’s first order to Ney, June 16, 1815	[377]
XVIII.	The Emperor’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815	[377]
XIX.	Count Reille’s Letter to Ney, June 16, 1815	[379]
XX.	Ney’s Orders to Reille and d’Erlon, June 16,1815	[379]
XXI.	Soult’s formal Order to Ney to carry QuatreBras, June 16, 1815	[380]
XXII.	Soult’s second Order to Ney to carry QuatreBras, June 16, 1815	[381]
XXIII.	Flahaut’s Letter to the Duke of Elchingen	[382]
XXIV.	Napoleon’s Letter to Grouchy, June 16, 1815	[382]
XXV.	The 2 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney	[383]
XXVI.	The 3.15 P.M.—June 16th—Order to Ney	[384]
XXVII.	Soult’s Letter to Ney, June 17, 1815	[384]
XXVIII.	Soult’s Order to Ney, 12 M., June 17, 1815	[385]
XXIX.	Capt Bowles’ story of Wellington at QuatreBras, June 17, 1815	[386]
XXX.	Grouchy’s report to Napoleon from Sart-à-Walhain,11 A.M., June 18, 1815	[386]
XXXI.	General Order of preparation for the Battleof Waterloo, June 18, 1815	[387]
XXXII.	Order for the attack to begin at 1 P.M.,June 18, 1815	[388]
XXXIII.	The 10 A.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy	[388]
XXXIV.	The 1 P.M.—June 18th—Order to Grouchy	[389]
MAPS
(At end of this [volume].)
The Theatre of War.
The Field of Waterloo at 11 A.M., June 18, 1815.