Thus was Quatre Bras occupied on the evening and night of the 15th, not only without orders from Wellington, but contrary to his orders. Had his orders been obeyed, Ney would have found on the next morning no one to oppose him.
NOTE TO CHAPTER VI.
“Almost all historians” says Colonel Maurice,[227] “write as if the occupation of Quatre Bras by Prince Bernhard was a step for which he not only deserves the greatest credit, but one which in itself was sure to be of vast advantage to the English army.” In this opinion Colonel Maurice does not share. We have fully treated of this subject before.[228] All we need say here is to repeat, that the question of the suitableness of Quatre Bras as the point of concentration for the Anglo-Dutch army could not have been considered by the Duke of Wellington at this moment apart from the fact that Marshal Blücher was concentrating his army at Sombreffe; and that, when this fact was ascertained, the Duke must concentrate at Quatre Bras or abandon all hope of assisting his ally. We have also pointed out that the fact that the main French army was opposed to the Prussians constituted this case an exception to the general rule; for, in this instance, ex hypothesi, the Duke would encounter only those troops which Napoleon would feel himself strong enough to detach from his main body.
If we are right in this contention, therefore, then the Dutch-Belgian generals,—Constant Rebecque, Perponcher, and the Prince of Saxe Weimar,—having learned the situation of the French and Prussian armies before the Duke heard of it, did what Wellington, had he known what they knew, would have ordered to be done.[229] And it may be added, that we fully concur in the commendation which has so generally been awarded to them for their prompt and vigorous action.
CHAPTER VII.
THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: WELLINGTON.
The Duke of Wellington, as we have seen, did not decide on ordering a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras until the early morning hours of the 16th of June.