CHAPTER IX.
THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON.
It is time that we returned to the headquarters of the French army.
Marshal Ney, as we have seen in the last chapter, reported in person to the Emperor at Charleroi at midnight of the 15th. “He rendered account” to him, says Colonel Heymès,[290] “of the dispositions he had made.” Napoleon was thus informed that Ney had halted at Frasnes and had not occupied Quatre Bras, the evening before. Ney must have stopped at Charleroi about an hour and a half, as he reached Gosselies on his return about two in the morning. He must have told the Emperor where some, at any rate, of his troops were,—that Bachelu’s infantry division and Piré’s cavalry division of the 2d Corps were at Frasnes; that the divisions of Jerome and Foy were at Gosselies; that Durutte’s division of the 1st Corps was between Jumet and Gosselies. So much as this Ney knew. But his arrival at the army had been so recent, and his occupations since his arrival had been so engrossing, that he could not probably have had much more information to give the Emperor as to the whereabouts of the 1st Corps. His almost total deficiency of staff officers was a grievous drawback, and prevented him from getting that hold on his entire command which otherwise he no doubt would have secured even by this time. Very possibly he had already sent word to d’Erlon to hurry up to the front. But he must have reported to the Emperor that a large part of the 1st Corps, perhaps half of it, was still far to the rear.
Napoleon does not mention this interview in his Memoirs, or in the Gourgaud Narrative, nor does he anywhere say that he, on the morning of the 16th, gave to Marshal Ney any other orders than the written ones of which we have in the last chapter given the substance.
It would seem from these orders that Napoleon thought it inexpedient that Ney should make any further endeavor to carry Quatre Bras by a coup-de-main. The situation was a different one from that which existed (as Napoleon correctly supposed) the evening before. It might now be expected that the cross-roads would be held by a respectable force from Wellington’s army; or, at least, it was obviously unwise and hazardous not to make adequate preparations for this very possible state of things. It was also plain, from what Ney had stated at the midnight conference, that his command would not be, in the early morning hours, sufficiently concentrated for any decisive stroke.[291] Hence, somewhere about five o’clock, the first of the three orders of which we have spoken in the last chapter was sent off from Charleroi; the one in which Ney was informed that Kellermann’s cavalry had been ordered to him to take the place of that of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and in which he was directed to report to the Emperor whether the 1st Corps had “executed its movement,” and to inform him of the exact positions of the 1st and 2d Corps. This order, as we have seen, Ney replied to before 7 A.M. His reply, which, we may assume, contained some news of the advance of the 1st Corps, and also stated that the divisions of Jerome and Foy of the 2d Corps were at Gosselies ready to march, must have reached headquarters shortly before 8 A.M. As soon as this reply was received, Napoleon and Soult prepared the formal order for the conduct of the left wing during the forenoon.
That order, as we have seen, directed Ney to unite the 1st and 2d Corps and the cavalry of the Count of Valmy, and to proceed at once to take possession of Quatre Bras. It was issued as soon as the Emperor had become satisfied, from Ney’s report, that such a movement had become practicable,—that is, that it could be made in sufficient force to overcome any opposition it would be likely to encounter. Until he had become satisfied of this, it was deemed unadvisable to issue the order to advance beyond Frasnes.
We are able to fix the hour at which this formal order to seize Quatre Bras was prepared by Soult with quite an approach to accuracy. We know that Napoleon dictated a letter to Ney, which he sent by Count Flahaut,[292] and which arrived at Gosselies about the same time[293] with the formal order,—that is,—about 10 A.M.[294] Flahaut wrote[295] to Marshal Ney’s son, then Duke of Elchingen, that, to the best of his recollection, the Emperor dictated the letter to him between 8 and 9 o’clock in the morning. Such a letter, dictated between 8 and 9, and afterwards reduced to proper form, would have reached Gosselies, a distance of about four miles and a half from Charleroi, about 10 A.M., as Reille[296] says it did. This accords perfectly with the statement made above that Napoleon waited to hear more definitely from Ney before framing his order for the morning’s operations.
But the backwardness of d’Erlon’s Corps not only deferred the forward moment of the left wing; it seems to have delayed the advance of the main body. Until Napoleon could be sure that Ney with the large force that had been assigned to him was in march on his left, able to give a good account of any Anglo-Dutch forces which might attempt to unite with the Prussians or to molest the left flank of the main French army, he seems to have been unwilling to move upon Blücher. It was part of his plan that Ney with the left wing should at least “contain” that part of Wellington’s army which that general might reasonably be expected to get together at Quatre Bras. Hence, when Ney reported to the Emperor at midnight the very backward state of the 1st Corps, the latter not only decided to wait before giving him further orders until something more definite and satisfactory should be learned respecting that corps, and until Ney could fairly be supposed to have had time enough to get his entire command well in hand, but he also postponed his own forward movement upon Fleurus and Sombreffe until Ney could move simultaneously upon Quatre Bras. These considerations certainly go far to account for and justify the delay in the early morning hours of the 16th, which has drawn down upon the Emperor so much severe and almost contemptuous criticism. Napoleon, in truth, could have done nothing else, unless he had risked a battle with the Prussians on the chance that Ney, with the 2d Corps alone, could prevent their being assisted by the English. It is true, this is what actually happened; but it was Napoleon’s intention that Ney should operate against the English with his entire command, and in deferring the giving of orders for the advance of the army until he had reason to believe that Ney could do this, he was simply carrying out his original scheme.