Hooper[429] also says that Ney used Kellermann’s cavalry “sparingly, in obedience to the instructions of Napoleon.”
The orders speak for themselves. Ney was not only permitted to use Kellermann’s Corps, but was positively directed to do so. It was only in his use of the cavalry of the Guard—the division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes[430]—that he was restricted.
2. Napoleon in his account of the campaign labored under a mistake as to the time when he gave Ney his orders on the 16th. He says it was in the night. This involved him in another mistake, namely, that the orders directed Ney “to push on at daybreak beyond Quatre Bras.” It is true that he rendered it possible for the readers of his book to rectify these errors, for he says that Flahaut was the bearer of these orders, and he survived the campaign. Doubtless if the Emperor could have had access to him, these mistakes would have been rectified; as it is, they render much of what Napoleon says of no value. Then, Napoleon never learned the truth about the wanderings of d’Erlon’s Corps; and this of course, invalidates his criticisms as to that matter.
But in regard to the main point made in this chapter, the Emperor’s opinion is given explicitly. He blames Ney[431] for not having “executed his orders and marched on Quatre Bras with his 43,000 men.” That Ney should concentrate his entire command was in reality, the burden of his orders.
That this neglect to keep his command together was in Napoleon’s eyes Ney’s principal fault in his conduct on the 16th, appears unmistakably from the following passages in Soult’s despatch[432] to Ney of the next day:—
“The Emperor has seen with pain that you did not yesterday unite your divisions; they acted independently of each other; hence they experienced losses.
“If the corps of the Counts d’Erlon and Reille had been together, not an Englishman of the troops which attacked you would have escaped. If the Count d’Erlon had executed the movement upon St. Amand which the Emperor had ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed, and we should have taken perhaps 30,000 prisoners.
“The corps of Generals Gérard and Vandamme and the Imperial Guard have always been united: one exposes one’s self to reverses when detachments are put in peril.
“The Emperor hopes and desires that your seven divisions of infantry and your cavalry shall be well united and organized, and that together they shall not occupy more than one league of ground, so that you may have them under your hand and may be able to employ them at need.”
What Soult told Sir William Napier,[433] years afterwards, is without question the truth:—“Ney neglected his orders at Quatre Bras.”