It may perhaps be, that Grouchy’s expressed intention that he would try to prevent Blücher from joining Wellington was held by both the Emperor and his chief-of-staff as indicating with sufficient certainty that, if he found that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he would proceed at once to cross the Dyle at Moustier or Limale, and operate on the left bank of that river, on the right of the main army.[566] This course was almost necessarily implied in an attempt to prevent the Prussians at Wavre from joining the English, as we have just pointed out; it may be, therefore, that the Emperor thought another order needless. But whatever the reason, no order was sent to Grouchy till 10 A.M. the next morning. This did not reach him till 4 P.M.[567] that afternoon, when he was fighting in front of Wavre.
Marshal Grouchy, then, acted up till 4 o’clock of the 18th of June under the order dictated the previous day by the Emperor to Count Bertrand. This fact we desire distinctly to bring out, so that there shall be no possibility of further mistake on this subject. The history of this day, from the very first narratives down to the very last, has been illustrated by the mistakes of historians and critics as to the orders under which Marshal Grouchy acted. Not only did Grouchy himself deliberately deny for nearly thirty years that he received any written order on the 17th, thereby misleading the most sagacious critics and rendering their criticisms on this part of the campaign in great part valueless, but even long after the fact was universally acknowledged that he did get a written order in the shape of the Bertrand letter, a certain unwillingness or inability to take in the meaning of this written order, to recognize that it imposed a different task on Marshal Grouchy from that laid upon him by the verbal orders which had previously been given him, has, nevertheless, strangely enough existed. We have pointed this out in the Notes to Chapter XIII; but we will add one or two more instances here.
The Bertrand order, as we have seen, instructed Grouchy to find out what the Prussians were intending to do,—whether they were intending to separate themselves from the English, or to unite with them for the purpose of trying the fate of another battle for the defence of Brussels or Liége,—and the order closed without giving him any directions whatever in case either of these emergencies should arise. The thing which Grouchy was to do, therefore, was to ascertain whether the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, and then to act in accordance with his best judgment. No directions whatever, we repeat, were given to him for his conduct if he should find that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English. We have just adverted to this omission of the Emperor to give Grouchy precise instructions in this emergency. There is no question that he did not give any. Grouchy was entirely untrammelled. If he found that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English to fight another battle for the defence of Brussels, he was absolutely free to adopt whatever course might seem to him best.
Yet we find the latest American historian of this campaign, in speaking of Grouchy’s rejection of the advice given by Gérard, when the cannon of Waterloo was heard, saying, that the question was, “whether to turn the army to its left on reaching Corbaix, and, crossing the Dyle by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, to take the road to Maransart and Planchenoit, or to adhere to the Emperor’s orders to follow the Prussians whom they now knew to be at Wavre,”—[568] and, again, that Grouchy “persisted in adhering to the orders the Emperor had given him.”[569]
In the same way we find the latest English commentator on the campaign saying, “Whether Grouchy can be held responsible for not having” marched to the sound of the guns “when Napoleon’s instructions directed him on Wavre, will always be a subject for endless, and, I think, not very profitable, debate.”[570]
It is quite time that an end should be put to misunderstandings on this subject. Until 4 P.M., we repeat, Grouchy acted under the Bertrand order only.
To return to the narrative.
Marshal Grouchy had written to the Emperor at 10 P.M. of the 17th, as we have seen, telling him that, “arrived at Sauvenières, the Prussians had divided into two columns, one taking the road for Wavre in passing by Sart-à-Walhain, and the other appearing to be directed on Perwez.” He then went on to say that he would operate in the direction in which he found that the mass of their forces had gone.
Being thus in doubt as to the direction of the retreat of the enemy, he determined to move at first on Sart-à-Walhain, from which point he could march either on Wavre or on Perwez according to the information he might there receive. Inclining probably at this time to the opinion that the Prussians had retreated by way of Perwez, in which case there would be no necessity for unusual haste, he determined to give his troops a good night’s rest. Of the absolute necessity of gaining time in case he should find that the Prussians had retreated on Wavre with the intention of joining Wellington, he seems to have been utterly unmindful.