The philosophical writings of Varro are not numerous; but his chief work of that description, entitled De Philosophia Liber, appears to have been very comprehensive. St Augustine informs us that Varro examined in it all the various sects of philosophers, of which he enumerated upwards of 280. The sect of the old Academy was that which he himself followed, and its tenets he maintained in opposition to all others. He classed these numerous sects in the following curious manner: All men chiefly desire, or place their happiness in, four things—pleasure—rest—these two united, (which Epicurus, however, termed pleasure,) or soundness of body and mind. Now, philosophers have contended that virtue is to be sought after for the sake of obtaining one or other of these four; or, that some one of these four is to be sought after for the sake of virtue; or, that they and virtue also are to be sought after for their own sake, and from these different opinions each of the four great objects of human desire being sought after with three different views, there are formed twelve sects of philosophers. These twelve sects are doubled, in consequence of the different opinions created by the considerations of social intercourse—some maintaining that the four great desires should be gratified for our own sake, and others, that they should be indulged only for the sake of our neighbours. The above twenty-four sects become forty-eight, from each system being defended as certain truth, or as merely the nearest approximation to probability—twenty-four sects maintaining each hypothesis as certain, and twenty-four as only probable. These again were doubled, from the difference of opinion with regard to the suitable garb and external habit and demeanour of philosophers.
We have now got ninety-six sects by a very strange sort of computation, and all these are to be tripled, according to the different opinions entertained concerning the best mode of spending life—in literary leisure, in business, or in both[77].
Varro having followed the sect of the old Academy, in preference to all others, proceeded to refute the principles of [pg 46]the sects he had enumerated. He cleared the way, by dismissing, as unworthy the name of philosophical, all those sects whose differences did not turn on what is the supreme final good; for there is no use in philosophizing, unless it be to make us happy, and that which makes us happy is the final good. But those who dispute, for example, whether a wise man should follow virtue, tranquillity, &c. partly for the sake of others, or solely for his own, do not dispute concerning what is the final good, but whether that good should be shared. In like manner, the Cynic does not dispute with regard to the supreme good, but in what dress or habit he who follows the supreme good should be clad. So also as to the controversy concerning the uncertainty of knowledge. The number of sects were thus reduced to the twelve with which our author set out, and in which the whole question relates to what is the final good. From these, however, he abstracted the sects which place the final good in pleasure, rest, or the union of both—not that he altogether disdained these, but he thought they might be included in soundness of body and mind, or what he called the prima Naturæ. There are thus only three questions which merit full discussion. Whether these prima Naturæ should be desired for the sake of virtue, or virtue for their sake, or if they and virtue also should be desired for their own sake.
Now, since in philosophy we seek the supreme felicity of man, we must inquire what man is. His nature is compounded of soul and body. Hence the summum bonum necessarily consists in the prima Naturæ or perfect soundness of mind and body. These, therefore, must be sought on their own account; and under them may be included virtue, which is part of soundness of mind, being the great director and prime former of the felicity of life.
Such were the doctrines of the old Academy, which Varro was also introduced as supporting in Cicero’s Academica.—“I have comprehended,” says that illustrious orator and philosopher, in a letter to Atticus, “the whole Academic system in four books, instead of two, in the course of which Varro is made to defend the doctrines of Antiochus[78]. I have put into his mouth all the arguments which were so accurately collected by Antiochus against the opinion of those who contend that there is no certainty to be attained in human knowledge. These I have answered myself. But the part assigned to Varro in the debate is so good, that I do not think the cause which I support appears the better.”
I am not certain under what class Varro’s Novem libri Disciplinarum should be ranked, as it probably comprehended instructive lessons in the whole range of arts and sciences. One of the chapters, according to Vitruvius, was on the subject of architecture. Varro was particularly full and judicious in his remarks on the construction and situation of Roman villas, and seems to have laid the foundation for what Palladius and Columella subsequently compiled on that interesting topic. Another chapter was on arithmetic; and Fabricius mentions, that Vetranius Maurus has declared, in his Life of Varro, that he saw this part of the work, De Disciplinis, at Rome, in the library of the Cardinal Lorenzo Strozzi.
Varro derived much notoriety from his satirical compositions. His Tricarenus, or Tricipitina, was a satiric history of the triumvirate of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus. Much pleasantry and sarcasm were also interspersed in his books entitled Logistorici; but his most celebrated production in that line was the satire which he himself entitled Menippean. It was so called from the cynic Menippus of Gadara, a city in Syria, who, like his countryman Meleager, was in the habit of expressing himself jocularly on the most grave and important subjects. He was the author of a Symposium, in the manner of Xenophon. His writings were interspersed with verses, parodied from Homer and the tragic poets, or ludicrously applied, for the purpose of burlesque. It is not known, however, that he wrote any professed satire. The appellation, then, of Menippean, was given to his satire by Varro, not from any production of the same kind by Menippus, but because he imitated his general style of humour. In its external form it appears to have been a sort of literary anomaly. Greek words and phrases were interspersed with Latin; prose was mingled with verses of various measures; and pleasantry with serious remark. As to its object and design, Cicero introduces Varro himself explaining this in the Academica. After giving his reasons for not writing professedly on philosophical subjects, he continues,—“In those ancient writings of ours, we, imitating Menippus, without translating him, have infused a degree of mirth and gaiety along with a portion of our most secret philosophy and logic, so that even our unlearned readers might more easily understand them, being, as it were, invited to read them with some pleasure. Besides, in the discourses we have composed in praise of the dead, and in the introductions to our antiquities, it was our wish to write in a manner worthy of philosophers, provided we have attained the desired object.” From what Cicero afterwards says in this dialogue, while addressing himself to Varro, it would appear, that he [pg 48]had indeed touched on philosophical subjects in his Menippean satire, but that, learned as he was, his object was more to amuse his readers than instruct them: “You have entered on topics of philosophy in a manner sufficient to allure readers to its study, but inadequate to convey full instruction, or to advance its progress.”
Many fragments of this Menippean satire still remain, but they are much broken and corrupted. The heads of the different subjects, or chapters, contained in it, amounting to near one hundred and fifty, have been given by Fabricius in alphabetical order. Some of them are in Latin, others in Greek. A few chapters have double titles; and, though little remains of them but the titles, these show what an infinite variety of subjects was treated by the author. As a specimen, I subjoin those ranged under the letter A. Aborigines,—Περι Ανθρωπων φυσεως,—De Admirandis, vel Gallus Fundanius,—Agatho,—Age modo,—Αιει διβυη, vel περι Αἱρεσεων,—Ajax Stramentitius,—Αλλος ὁυτος Ἡρακλης,—Andabatæ,—Anthropopolis,—περι Αρχης, seu Marcopolis,—περι Αρχαιρεσιων, seu Serranus,—περι Αρετης κτησεως,—περι Αφροδισιων, seu vinalia,—Armorum judicium,—περι Αρρενοτητος, seu Triphallus,—Autumedus,—Mæonius,—Baiæ, &c.[79]
There is a chapter concerning the duty of a husband, (De officio Mariti,) in which the author observes, that the errors of a wife are either to be cured or endured: He who extirpates them makes his wife better, but he who bears with them improves himself. Another is inscribed, “You know not what a late evening, or supper, may bring with it,” (Nescis quid vesper serus vehat.) In this chapter he remarks, that the number of guests should not be less than that of the Graces, or more than that of the Muses. To render an entertainment perfect, four things must concur—agreeable company, suitable place, convenient time, and careful preparation. The guests should not be loquacious or taciturn. Silence is for the bed-chamber, and eloquence for the Forum, but neither for a feast. The conversation ought not to turn on anxious or difficult subjects, but should be cheerful and inviting, so that utility may be combined with a certain degree of pleasure and allurement. This will be best managed, by discoursing of those things which relate to the ordinary occurrences or affairs of life, concerning which one has not leisure to talk in the Forum, or while transacting business. The master of the feast should rather be neat and clean than splendidly attired; and if he introduce reading into the entertainment, it should be so [pg 49]selected as to amuse, and to be neither troublesome nor tedious[80]. A third chapter is entitled, περι ἐδεσματων; and treats of the rarer delicacies of an entertainment, especially foreign luxuries. Au. Gellius has given us the import of some verses, in which Varro mentioned the different countries which supplied the most exquisite articles of food. Peacocks came from Samos; cranes from Melos; kids from Ambracia; and the best oysters from Tarentum[81]. Part of the chapter γνωθι σεαυτον was directed against the Latin tragic poets.
What remains of the verses interspersed in the Menippean satire, is too trifling to enable us to form any accurate judgment of the poetical talents of Varro.