At the end of the hiatus, we find Scipio, in reference to Gallus’s astronomical knowledge, which had been celebrated by Philus, relating, that when his father, Paulus Æmilius, commanded in Macedonia, the army being terrified by an eclipse, Gallus had calmed their fears by explaining the phænomenon—an anecdote, which, with another similar to it here told of Pericles, proves the value of physical pursuits, and their intimate connection with the affairs of life. This inference seems to have been drawn in a passage which is lost; and several beautiful sentiments follow, similar to some of those in the Somnium Scipionis, on the calm exquisite delights of meditation and science, and on the littleness of all earthly things, when compared with immortality or the universe. “Quid porro,” says Scipio, in the most elevated tone of moral and intellectual grandeur—“quid porro aut præclarum putet in rebus humanis, qui hæc deorum regna perspexerit? aut diuturnum, qui cognoverit quid sit æternum? aut gloriosum, qui viderit quàm parva sit terra, primum universa, deinde ea pars ejus quam homines incolant, quamque nos in exiguâ ejus parte adfixi, plurimis ignotissimi gentibus, speremus tamen nostrum nomen volitare et vagari latissime? Agros, vero, et ædificia, et pecudes, et immensum argenti pondus atque auri, qui bona nec putare nec appellare soleat, quod earum rerum videatur ei, levis fructus, exiguus usus, incertus dominatus, sæpe etiam teterrimorum hominum immensa possessio. Quàm est hic fortunatus putandus, cui soli vere liceat omnia non Quiritium sed sapientium jure pro suis vindicare! nec civili nexo, sed communi lege naturæ, quæ vetat ullam rem esse cujusquam nisi ejus qui tractare et uti sciat: qui imperia consulatusque [pg 270]nostros in necessariis non in expetendis rebus muneris fungendi gratiâ subeundos, non præmiorum aut gloriæ causâ adpetendos putet: qui denique ut Africanum avum meum scribit Cato solitum esse dicere, possit idem de se prædicare, nunquam se plus agere, quàm nihil cùm ageret; nunquam minus solum esse, quàm cùm solus esset.
“Quis enim putare vere potest plus egisse Dionysium tum cùm omnia moliendo eripuerit civibus suis libertatem, quàm ejus civem Archimedem, cùm istam ipsam Sphæram, nihil cùm agere videretur, effecerit? Quis autem non magis solos esse qui in foro turbâque quicum conloqui libeat non habeant, quam qui nullo arbitro vel secum ipsi loquantur, vel quasi doctissimorum hominum in concilio adsint cùm eorum inventis scriptisque se oblectent? Quis vero divitiorem quemquam putet, quàm eum cui nihil desit, quod quidem natura desideret? aut potentiorem quàm illum, qui omnia quæ expetat, consequatur? aut beatiorem quàm qui sit omni perturbatione animi liberatus?”
Lælius, however, is no way moved by these sonorous arguments; and still persists in affirming, that the most important of all studies are those which relate to the Republic, and that it concerned them to inquire, not why two suns had appeared in heaven, but why, in the present circumstances, (alluding to the projects of the Gracchi,) there were two senates, and almost two peoples. In this state of things, therefore, and since they had now leisure, their fittest object would be to learn from Scipio what he deemed the best condition of a commonwealth. Scipio complies with this request, and begins with defining a republic; “Est igitur respublica res populi—populus autem non omnis hominum cœtus quoquo modo congregatus, sed cœtus multitudinis juris consensu.” In entering on the nature of what he had thus defined, he remounts to the origin of society, which he refers entirely to that social spirit which is one of the principles of our nature, and not to hostility, or fear, or compact. A people, when united, may be governed by one, by several, or by a multitude, any one of which simple forms may be tolerable if well administered, but they are liable to corruptions peculiar to themselves. Of these three simple forms, Scipio prefers the monarchical; and for this choice he gives his reasons, which are somewhat metaphysical and analogical. But though he more approves of a pure regal government than of the two other simple forms, he thinks that none of them are good, and that a perfect constitution must be compounded of the three. “Quod cùm ita sit, tribus primis generibus longe præstat, meâ sententiâ, regium; regio autem ipsi præstabit id quod erit æquatum et tempera[pg 271]tum ex tribus optimis rerum publicarum modis. Placet enim esse quiddam in re publicâ præstans et regale; esse aliud auctoritate principum partum ac tributum; esse quasdam res servatas judicio voluntatique multitudinis. Hæc constitutio primum habet æqualitatem quamdam magnam, quâ carere diutius vix possunt liberi; deinde firmitudinem.”
In this panegyric on a mixed constitution, Cicero has taken his idea of a perfect state from the Roman commonwealth—from its consuls, senate, and popular assemblies. Accordingly, Scipio proceeds to affirm, that of all constitutions which had ever existed, no one, either as to the distribution of its parts or discipline, was so perfect as that which had been established by their ancestors; and that, therefore, he will constantly have his eye on it as a model in all that he means to say concerning the best form of a state.
This explains what was the chief scope of Cicero in his work De Republica—an eulogy on the Roman government, such as it was, or he supposed it to have been, in the early ages of the commonwealth. In the time of Cicero, when Rome was agitated by the plots of Catiline, and factions of Clodius, with the proscriptions of Sylla but just terminated, and the usurpation of Cæsar impending, the Roman constitution had become as ideal as the polity of Plato; and in its best times had never reached the perfection which Cicero attributes to it. But when a writer is disgusted with the present, and fearful for the future, he is ever ready to form an Utopia of the past[467].
In the second book, which, like the first, is imperfect at the beginning, (though Mai seems to think that only a few words are wanting;) Scipio records a saying of Cato the Censor, that the constitution of Rome was superior to that of all other states, because they had been modelled by single legislators, as Crete by Minos, and Sparta by Lycurgus, whereas the Roman commonwealth was the result of the gradually improved experience and wisdom of ages. “To borrow, therefore,” says he, “a word from Cato, I shall go back to the origin of the Roman state; and show it in its birth, childhood, youth, and maturity—a plan which seems preferable to the delineation of an imaginary republic like that of Plato.”
Scipio now begins with Romulus, whose birth, indeed, he seems to treat as a fable; but in the whole succeeding development of the Roman history, he, or, in other words, Cicero, exercises little criticism, and indulges in no scepticism. He [pg 272]admires the wisdom with which Romulus chose the site of his capital—not placing it in a maritime situation, where it would have been exposed to many dangers and disadvantages, but on a navigable river, with all the conveniences of the sea.—“Quî potuit igitur divinitus et utilitates complecti maritimas Romulus et vitia vitare? quàm quòd urbem perennis amnis et æquabilis et in mare late influentis posuit in ripâ, quo posset urbs et accipere ex mari quo egeret, et reddere quo redundaret: eodemque ut flumine res ad victum cultumque maxime necessarias non solum mari absorberet sed etiam advectas acciperet ex terrâ: ut mihi jam tum divinâsse ille videatur, hanc urbem sedem aliquando ut domum summo esse imperio præbituram: nam hanc rerum tantam potentiam non ferme facilius aliâ in parte Italiæ posita urbs tenere potuisset.”—In like manner he praises the sagacity of the succeeding rulers of the Roman state. “Faithful to his plan,” says M. Villemain, “of referring all to the Roman constitution, and of forming rather a history than a political theory, Cicero proceeds to examine, as it were chronologically, the state of Rome at the different epochs of its duration, beginning with its kings. This plan, if it produced any new light on a very dark subject, would have much more interest for us than ideas merely speculative. But Cicero scarcely deviates from the common traditions, which have often exercised the scepticism of the learned. He takes the Roman history nearly as we now have it, and his reflections seem to suppose no other facts than those which have been so eloquently recorded by Livy.” But although, for the sake of illustration, and in deference to common opinion, he argues on the events of early Roman history, as delivered by vulgar tradition, it is evident that, in his own belief, they were altogether uncertain; and if any new authority on that subject were wanting, Cicero’s might be added in favour of their total uncertainty; for Lælius thus interrupts his account of Ancus Martius—“Laudandus etiam iste rex—sed obscura est historia Romana;” and Scipio replies, “Ita est: sed temporum illorum tantum fere regum illustrata sunt nomina.”
At the close of Scipio’s discourse, which is a perpetual panegyric on the successive governments of Rome, and, with exception of the above passage, an uncritical acquiescence in its common history, Tubero remarks, that Cicero had rather praised the Roman government, than examined the constitution of commonwealths in general, and that hitherto he had not explained by what discipline, manners, and laws, a state is to be constituted or preserved. Scipio replies, that this is to be a farther subject of discussion; and he seems now to [pg 273]have adopted a more metaphysical tone: But of the remainder of the book only a few fragments exist; from which, however, it appears, that a question was started, how far the exact observance of justice in a state is politic or necessary. This discussion, at the suggestion of Scipio, is suspended till the succeeding day[468].
As the third book of Cicero’s treatise began a second day’s colloquy, it was doubtless furnished with a proœmium, the greater part of which is now lost, as also a considerable portion of the commencement of the dialogue. Towards the conclusion of the preceding book, Scipio had touched on the subject, how far the observance of justice is useful to a state, and Philus had proposed that this topic should be treated more fully, as an opinion was prevalent, that policy occasionally required injustice. Previously to the discovery of Mai, we knew from St Augustine, De Civitate Dei, that in the third book of the treatise De Republicâ, Philus, as a disputant, undertook the cause of injustice, and was answered by Lælius. In the fragment of the third book, Philus excuses himself from becoming (so to speak) the devil’s advocate; but at length agrees to offer, not his own arguments on the subject, but those of Carneades, who, some years before, had one day pleaded the cause of justice at Rome, and next day overturning his own arguments, became the patron of injustice. Philus accordingly proceeds to contend, that if justice were something real, it would be everywhere the same, whereas, in one nation, that is reckoned equitable and holy, which in another is unjust and impious; and, in like manner, in the same city, what is just at one period, becomes unjust at another. In the palimpsest, these sophisms, which have been revived in modern times by Mandeville and others, are interrupted by frequent chasms in the MS. Lælius, as we learn from St Augustine, and from a passage in Aulus Gellius, was requested by all present to undertake the defence of justice; but his discourse, with the exception of a few sentences, is wholly wanting in the palimpsest. At the close he is highly complimented by Scipio, but a large hiatus again intervenes. After this, Scipio is found contending, that wealth and power, Phidian statues, or the most magnificent public works, do not constitute a republic, but the res populi, the good of the whole, and not of any single governing portion of the state. He then concludes with affirming, that of all forms of government, the [pg 274]purely democratic is the worst, and next to that, an unmixed aristocracy.
Of the fourth book only one leaf remains in the palimpsest, the contents of which seem to confirm what we learn from other sources, that it treated of Education and Morals. It is particularly to be regretted that this book has disappeared. It is easy to supply abstract discussions about justice, democracy, and power, and, if they be not supplied, little injury is sustained; but the loss of details relating to manners and customs, from such a hand as that of Cicero, is irreparable. The fifth book is nearly as much mutilated as the fourth, and of the sixth not a fragment remains in the palimpsest, so that Mai’s discovery has added nothing to the beautiful extract from this book, entitled the Somnium Scipionis, preserved by Macrobius. The conclusion of the work De Republicâ, had turned on immortality of fame here, and eternity of existence elsewhere. The Somnium Scipionis is intended to establish, under the form of a political fiction, the sublime dogma of the soul’s immortality, and was probably introduced at the conclusion of the work, for the purpose of adding the hopes and fears of future retribution to the other motives to virtuous exertion. In illustration of this sublime topic, Scipio relates that, in his youth, when he first served in Africa, he visited the court of Massinissa, the steady friend of the Romans, and particularly of the Cornelian family. During the feasts and entertainments of the day, the conversation turned on the words and actions of the first great Scipio. His adopted grandchild having retired to rest, the shade of the departed hero appeared to him in sleep, darkly foretold the future events of his life, and encouraged him to tread in the paths of patriotism and true glory, by announcing the reward provided in Heaven for those who have deserved well of their country.