Paragraph No. 2.—‘With respect to the question of jurisdiction, it is unnecessary for me to add to what I have already stated. After the example of Lord Thurlow, in Orby Hunter’s case, I shall act upon the notion that this Court has such jurisdiction, until the House of Lords shall decide that my predecessors have been unwarranted in the exercise of it.’—No word here about Shelley’s opinions.
Paragraph No. 3.—‘I have carefully looked through the answer of the defendant, to see whether it affects the representation made in the affidavits filed in support of the petition, and in the exhibits referred to, of the principles and conduct of life of the father in this case. I do not perceive that the answer does affect the representation, and no affidavits are filed against the petition.’—Shelley’s principles are here referred to, in connection with his conduct.
Paragraph No. 4.—‘Upon the case as represented in the affidavits, the exhibits and the answer, I have formed my opinion; conceiving myself, according to the practice of the Court, at liberty to form it, in the case of an infant, whether the petition in its allegations and suggestions has or has not accurately presented that case to the court, and having intimated in the course of the hearing before me, that I should so form my judgment.’—No word here about Shelley’s opinions.
Paragraph No. 5.—‘There is nothing in evidence before me, sufficient to authorise me in thinking that this gentleman has changed, before he arrived at the age of twenty-five, the principles he avowed at nineteen. I think there is ample evidence in the papers, and in conduct, that no such change has taken place.’—Observe again how the Lord Chancellor keeps Shelley’s conduct as well as his avowed and unrecanted principles clearly in view.
Paragraph No. 6.—‘I shall studiously forbear in this case, because it is unnecessary, to state in judgment what this Court might or might not be authorised to do in the due exercise of its jurisdiction, upon the ground of the probable effect of a father’s principles, of any nature, whatever upon the education of his children, where such principles have not been called into activity or manifested in such conduct in life, as this Court, upon, such an occasion as the present, would be bound to attend to.’—Observe, the Lord Chancellor declares, that the case under his consideration is not a case where he has to consider a father’s principles apart from his conduct; that the case is one of a father’s principles having been acted upon by him; that the judgment he is about to deliver has been formed on a consideration of Shelley’s conduct in connection with his avowed principles.
Paragraph No. 7.—‘I may add, that this case differs also, unless I misunderstand it, from any case in which such principles having been called into activity, nevertheless, in the probable range and extent of their operation, did not put to hazard the happiness and welfare of those whose interests are intrusted to the protection of this Court.’—Observe how, in this paragraph, principles and conduct are both kept in view.
Paragraph No. 8.—‘This is a case in which, as the matter appears to me, the father’s principles cannot be misunderstood, in which his conduct, which I cannot but consider as highly immoral, has been established in proof, and established as the effect of those principles: conduct nevertheless, which he represents to himself and others, not as conduct to be considered as immoral, but to be recommended and observed in practice, and as worthy of approbation.’—Again in this paragraph the Lord Chancellor declares his judgment to result from the consideration of Shelley’s conduct, following from his avowed and unrecanted principles.
Paragraph No. 9.—‘I consider this, therefore, as a case in which the father has demonstrated that he must and does deem it to be a matter of duty which his principles impose upon him, to recommend to those whose opinions and habits he may take upon himself to form, that conduct in some of the most important relations of life, as moral and virtuous, which the law calls upon me to consider as immoral and vicious—conduct which the law animadverts upon as inconsistent with the duties of persons in such relations of life; and which it considers as injuriously affecting both the interests of such persons and those of the community.’—Here again the Lord Chancellor speaks of conduct; declaring that by conduct, resulting from his avowed and unrecanted principles, Shelley has shown himself a man likely to educate his children to imitate his conduct.
Paragraph No. 10.—‘I cannot, therefore, think that I should be justified in delivering over these children for their education exclusively, to what is called the care, to which Mr. Shelley wishes it to be entrusted.’—No word in this paragraph about either principles or conduct.
Paragraph No. 11.—‘If I am wrong in my judgment which I have formed in this painful case, I shall have the consolation to reflect that my judgment is not final.’—No word in this paragraph about either principles or conduct.