That Cumyn commanded the cavalry is merely a conjecture of his Lordship; but allowing it to have been the case, we conceive there is a material difference between a leader joining in the general flight of his army, and one riding off with part of the forces, and leaving the rest to stand the brunt of the engagement. If Warren had acted so, we presume he would either have been punished as a traitor, or cashiered as a coward. That Cumyn was afterwards elected one of the regents of the kingdom, affords no satisfactory evidence of his having acted correctly. He was at the head of the only entire body of troops in the country, and his faction unbroken—of course, there could be no opposition to his election. And the wonder is, considering the ambition of the man, that under these circumstances he was not appointed sole regent, in place of sharing a divided authority, as will be seen in the sequel, with one who was his inferior in birth, talents, and influence.
We cannot see any great improbability of the “congress” (as his Lordship calls it) having taken place in the manner described, provided that Bruce was present. Wallace had already secured his troops from immediate pursuit. Bruce might think it a favourable opportunity to palliate his conduct at Irvine; and Wallace, who was seldom afraid to come in juxtaposition with any one, might have been easily induced to stand when he hailed him. His Lordship’s objection is founded chiefly on the length of the conversation. Now, if any one will peruse it, even in the most verbose of our historians, he will find that it could not have occupied more than five minutes, which certainly cannot be called “a long conversation,” or at least so long as to afford any thing like a plausible objection to its occurrence. As to Fordun having placed “a narrow inaccessible glen” between the parties, it does not in the least affect the credibility of the account. Few glens are to be found in Scotland, without a river or stream of some description running through them; and in speaking of any of these, it is no uncommon thing for one person to allude to the glen, and another to the river or stream so connected with it.
That all our ancient authors should agree in the circumstance of Bruce being present at the battle, is very singular, provided he was not there. How they should all be in this state of ignorance is rather unaccountable, considering the facility they had of informing themselves; as some of them must have written from authority, if not of eye-witnesses, at least of those who derived their accounts from such. It is not at all probable that Bruce, who is universally acknowledged to have been a monarch of great political sagacity, would have allowed a tale, so likely to injure him in the opinion of his subjects, to get into general circulation, while the contrary statement, if true, would have tended to exalt him in their estimation. There appear so many irreconcilable circumstances involved in the belief of this opinion, that we feel much inclined to suspect some little discrepancy in the evidence to which his Lordship so confidently alludes,[25] more particularly as Wyntowne, whose authority is highly appreciated by all writers, is so very pointed in asserting the presence of Bruce in the English army. The words are,
“Bot yhit the lele Scottis men,
That in that feld ware feychtand then,
To-gyddyr stwd sá fermly
Strykand before thame manlykly,
Swá that náne thare thyrl thame mycht,
Bot Robert the Brows than wyth a slycht,
(He thare wes wyth this King Edwart,
Set he oure Kyng wes eftyrwart)
Wyth Schyre Anton the Bek a wyly man,
Of Durame Byschape he wes than,
A-bowt ane hill a well fere way
Owt of that stowre than prikyd thay;
Behynd bakkis alsá fast
Thare thai come on, and layid on fast;
Swá made thai the dyscumfytowre.”
Here our author, not satisfied with stating, that “Robert de Brows” was with “King Edwart;” but, in order to establish the identity of the person, and guard against his being confounded with the elder Robert Bruce, or any other of the same name, he says expressly,
“Set he oure Kyng wes eftyrwart.”
If Bruce was at this time on the side of the patriots, as his Lordship says, it is singular that he did not appear among them on this eventful day, in a manner becoming his birth, talents, and great territorial influence. When all the chiefs of the party had collected their followers for a grand national struggle, Bruce is represented as employed in guarding, what his Lordship, for the sake of effect, calls the “important castle of Ayr,” which, it seems in those days, “kept the communication open with Galloway, Argyllshire, and the Isles.”[26] Had the possession of this “important castle” been of any use to an army stationed between Linlithgow and Falkirk, it certainly could have been defended by a person of less consequence than Bruce, whose military talents and numerous vassals would have been of infinitely greater service in the field. When Wallace was straining every nerve to collect the strength of the country, to oppose the formidable invaders, and with his utmost efforts could not muster more than 30,000 soldiers, can it be supposed, that he would have failed to summon to the standard of liberty a baron of such influence as the Earl of Carrick, if he thought there were a chance of the summons being obeyed?
Though his Lordship asserts that Bruce had deserted the cause of Edward, yet he does not attempt to show that any communication took place between him and the Scottish army; nor by what authority he assumed the defence of the castle of Ayr, which was a fortress at that time belonging to the Crown. If Hemingford, on whose authority his Lordship chiefly relies, could have gone so egregiously astray from every thing like probability in the account he gives of the casualties of the battle, we may, without injustice, receive his testimony on this, or on any other subject, with suspicion; particularly when it goes to contradict historians of acknowledged veracity, who had opportunities of being at least equally well informed on the subject as himself. It has been advanced by the learned annalist, in evidence of the truth of Hemingford’s statement, that lands and castles belonging to Bruce were plundered and taken by the English army. By a parity of reasoning, if these lands and castles had been exempt from the general outrage, it would have proved that Bruce was in the interest of England; and the Guardian and Barons of Scotland would thereby have stood convicted of the unparalleled folly of allowing lands to be occupied, and castles to be held, in the very centre of the country, by the open and declared partisan of their enemy. That the title of Bruce to his Scottish estates was in abeyance, and his castles garrisoned for the safety of the commonwealth of Scotland, is the most probable state of the affair. When the half-famished soldiers of Edward, therefore, pillaged the lands, and attacked the castles of Bruce, they did what their King, under such circumstances, neither could nor would restrain, whether his vassal had renounced his allegiance or not. This conduct on the part of the English, therefore, can afford no evidence whatever of Bruce being at the time “in arms against England.”
These observations the writer has thought it expedient to make, in support of the relation given of the battle of Falkirk by the ancient historians of Scotland. As the talents, however, which Lord Hailes has displayed in his researches into Scottish history, are held by the public in high, and in many instances, deserved estimation; and though it is with reluctance that we differ from one whose opinions in general are entitled to credit; yet, as we find him in this instance at variance with most of our ancient Scottish authorities, we have thought it our duty to endeavour to lay both sides of the question fairly before the reader, in order that he may be able to form his own opinion of the matter.