[174] Spencer puts the matter truly, if ponderously, in the following: "The citizens of a large nation industrially organized, have reached their possible ideal of happiness when the producing, distributing and other activities, are such in their kinds and amounts, that each individual finds in them a place for all his energies and aptitudes, while he obtains the means of satisfying all his desires. Once more we may recognize as not only possible, but probable, the eventual existence of a community, also industrial, the members of which, having natures similarly responding to these requirements, are also characterized by dominant æsthetic faculties, and achieve complete happiness only when a large part of life is filled with æsthetic activities" (Principles of Ethics, Vol. I., p. 169).
[175] Machiavelli, transferring from theology to statecraft the notion of the corruption and selfishness of all men, was the first modern to preach this doctrine.
[176] See, for example, Hobbes, Leviathan; Mandeville, Fable of the Bees; and Rochefoucauld, Maxims.
[177] Compare what was said above, p. 273, on the confusion of pleasure as end, and as motive. Compare also the following from Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 241. It is often "insinuated that I dislike your pain because it is painful to me in some special relation. I do not dislike it as your pain, but in virtue of some particular consequence, such, for example, as its making you less able to render me a service. In that case I do not really object to your pain as your pain at all, but only to some removable and accidental consequences." The entire discussion of sympathy (pp. 230-245), which is admirable, should be consulted.
[178] Psychology, Vol. I., p. 320. The whole discussion, pp. 317-329, is very important.
[179] See, for example, James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II., ch. xxiv.
[180] Measures of public or state activity in the extension, for example, of education (furnishing free text-books, adequate medical inspection, and remedy of defects), are opposed by "good people" because there are "charitable" agencies for doing these things.
[181] Compare Spencer's criticisms of Bentham's view of happiness as a social standard in contrast with his own ideal of freedom. See Ethics, Vol. I., pp. 162-168.
[182] See Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics, ch. ii.
[183] Compare the following extreme words of Sumner (Folkways, p. 9): "The great question of world philosophy always has been, what is the real relation between happiness and goodness? It is only within a few generations that men have found courage to say there is none." But when Sumner, in the next sentence, says, "The whole strength of the notion that they are correlated is in the opposite experience which proves that no evil thing brings happiness," one may well ask what more relation any reasonable man would want. For it indicates that "goodness" consists in active interest in those things which really bring happiness; and while it by no means follows that this interest will bring even a preponderance of pleasure over pain to the person, it is always open to him to find and take his dominant happiness in making this interest dominant in his life.