In the second part, devoted more specifically to the analysis and criticism of the leading conceptions of moral theory, the aim accordingly has not been to instill the notions of a school nor to inculcate a ready-made system, but to show the development of theories out of the problems and experience of every-day conduct, and to suggest how these theories may be fruitfully applied in practical exigencies. Aspects of the moral life have been so thoroughly examined that it is possible to present certain principles in the confidence that they will meet general acceptance. Rationalism and hedonism, for example, have contributed toward a scientific statement of the elements of conduct, even though they have failed as self-inclosed and final systems. After the discussions of Kant and Mill, Sidgwick and Green, Martineau and Spencer, it is possible to affirm that there is a place in the moral life for reason and a place for happiness,—a place for duty and a place for valuation. Theories are treated not as incompatible rival systems which must be accepted or rejected en bloc, but as more or less adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct. This mode of approach facilitates the scientific estimation and determination of the part played by various factors in the complexity of moral life. The student is put in a position to judge the problems of conduct for himself. This emancipation and enlightenment of individual judgment is the chief aim of the theoretical portion.
In a considerable part of the field, particularly in the political and economic portions of Part III., no definitive treatment is as yet possible. Nevertheless, it is highly desirable to introduce the student to the examination of these unsettled questions. When the whole civilized world is giving its energies to the meaning and value of justice and democracy, it is intolerably academic that those interested in ethics should have to be content with conceptions already worked out, which therefore relate to what is least doubtful in conduct rather than to questions now urgent. Moreover, the advantages of considering theory and practice in direct relation to each other are mutual. On the one hand, as against the a priori claims of both individualism and socialism, the need of the hour seems to us to be the application of methods of more deliberate analysis and experiment. The extreme conservative may deprecate any scrutiny of the present order; the ardent radical may be impatient of the critical and seemingly tardy processes of the investigator; but those who have considered well the conquest which man is making of the world of nature cannot forbear the conviction that the cruder method of trial and error and the time-honored method of prejudice and partisan controversy need not longer completely dominate the regulation of the life of society. They hope for a larger application of the scientific method to the problems of human welfare and progress. Conversely, a science which takes part in the actual work of promoting moral order and moral progress must receive a valuable reflex influence of stimulus and of test. To consider morality in the making as well as to dwell upon values already established should make the science more vital. And whatever the effect upon the subject-matter, the student can hardly appreciate the full force of his materials and methods as long as they are kept aloof from the questions which are occupying the minds of his contemporaries.
Teachers who are limited in time will doubtless prefer to make their own selections of material, but the following suggestions present one possible line of choice. In Part I., of the three chapters dealing with the Hebrew, Greek, and modern developments, any one may be taken as furnishing an illustration of the method; and certain portions of Chapter IX. may be found more detailed in analysis than is necessary for the beginner. In Part II., Chapters XI.-XII. may be omitted without losing the thread of the argument. In Part III., any one of the specific topics—viz., the political state, the economic order, the family—may be considered apart from the others. Some teachers may prefer to take Parts in their entirety. In this case, any two may be chosen.
As to the respective shares of the work for which the authors are severally responsible, while each has contributed suggestions and criticisms to the work of the other in sufficient degree to make the book throughout a joint work, Part I. has been written by Mr. Tufts, Part II. by Mr. Dewey, and in Part III., Chapters XX. and XXI. are by Mr. Dewey, Chapters XXII.-XXVI. by Mr. Tufts.
It need scarcely be said that no attempt has been made in the bibliographies to be exhaustive. When the dates of publication of the work cited are given, the plan has been in general to give, in the case of current literature, the date of the latest edition, and in the case of some classical treatises the date of original publication.
In conclusion, the authors desire to express their indebtedness to their colleagues and friends Dr. Wright, Mr. Talbert, and Mr. Eastman, who have aided in the reading of the proof and with other suggestions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
| CHAPTER | PAGE |
| I. Introduction | [1] |
| § 1. Definition and Method:—Ethical and moral, specificproblem, [1]; importance of genetic study, [3]. § 2. Criterion ofthe moral:—The moral in cross section, the "what" and the"how," [5]; the moral as growth, [8]. § 3. Divisions of thetreatment, [13]. | |
| PART I The Beginnings and Growth of Morality | |
| II. Early Group Life | [17] |
| § 1. Typical facts of group life:—Primitive unity andsolidarity, [17]. § 2. Kinship and household groups:—Thekinship group, [21]; the family or household group, [23].§ 3. Kinship and family groups as economic and industrialunits:—The land and the group, [24]; movable goods, [25].§ 4. Kinship and family groups as political bodies:—Theircontrol over the individual, [26]; rights and responsibility, [27].§ 5. The kinship or household as a religious unit:—Totemgroups, [30]; ancestral religion, [31]. § 6. Age and sex groups,[32]. § 7. Moral significance of the group, [34]. | |
| III. The Rationalizing and Socializing Agencies in EarlySociety | [37] |
| § 1. Three levels of conduct:—Conduct as instinctive andgoverned by primal needs, regulated by society's standards,and by personal standards, [37]. § 2. Rationalizing agencies:Work, [40]; arts and crafts, [41]; war, [42]. § 3. Socializingagencies:—Coöperation, [42]; art, [45]. § 4. Family life asidealizing and socializing agency, [47]. § 5. Moral interpretationof this first level, [49]. | |
| IV. Group Morality—Customs or Mores | [51] |
| § 1. Meaning, authority, and origin of customs, [51].§ 2. Means of enforcing custom:—Public approval, taboos,rituals, force, [54]. § 3. Conditions which render group controlconscious:—Educational customs, [57]; law and justice,[59]; danger or crisis, [64]. § 4. Values and defects of customarymorality:—Standards, motives, content, organization ofcharacter, [68]. | |
| V. From Custom to Conscience; from Group Morality toPersonal Morality | [73] |
| § 1. Contrast and collision, [73]. § 2. Sociological agenciesin the transition:—Economic forces, [76]; science and the arts,[78]; military forces, [80]; religious forces, [81]. § 3. Psychologicalagencies:—Sex, [81]; private property, [83]; strugglesfor mastery and liberty, [84]; honor and esteem, [85]. § 4. Positivereconstruction, [89]. | |
| VI. The Hebrew Moral Development | [91] |
| § 1. General character and determining principles:—TheHebrew and the Greek, [91]; Political and economic factors, [92].§ 2. Religious agencies:—Covenant, [94]; personal law-giver,[95]; cultus, [97]; prophets, [99]; the kingdom, [100]. § 3. Moralconceptions attained:—Righteousness and sin, [102]; responsibility,[104]; purity of motive, [105]; the ideal of "life," [107];the social ideal, [108]. | |
| VII. The Moral Development of the Greeks | [111] |
| § 1. The fundamental notes:—Convention versus nature, [111];measure, [112]; good and just, [113]. § 2. Intellectual forcesof individualism:—The scientific spirit, [114]. § 3. Commercialand political individualism:—Class interests, [119]; whyobey laws? [122]. § 4. Individualism and ethical theory:—Thequestion formulated, [124]; individualistic theories, [126].§ 5. The deeper view of nature and the good, of the individualand the social order:—Aristotle on the natural, [127];Plato's ideal state, [129]; passion or reason, [131]; eudæmonismand the mean, [134]; man and the cosmos, [135]. § 6. The conceptionof the ideal:—Contrast with the actual, [136]; ethicalsignificance, [138]. § 7. The conception of the self, of characterand responsibility:—The poets, [138]; Plato and theStoics, [140]. | |
| VIII. The Modern Period | [142] |
| § 1. The mediæval ideals:—Groups and class ideals, [143]; thechurch ideal, [145]. § 2. Main lines of modern development,[147]. § 3. The old and new in the beginnings of individualism,[149]. § 4. Individualism in the progress of liberty anddemocracy:—Rights, [151]. § 5. Individualism as affected bythe development of industry, commerce, and art:—Increasingpower and interests, [153]; distribution of goods, [157]; industrialrevolution raises new problems, [159]. § 6. The individualand the development of intelligence:—The Renaissance,[163]; the Enlightenment, [165]; the present significance of scientificmethod, [167]. | |
| IX. A General Comparison of Customary and ReflectiveMorality | [171] |
| § 1. Elements of agreement and continuity:—Régime ofcustom, [172]; persistence of group morality, [173]; origin ofethical terms, [175]. § 2. Elements of contrast:—Differentiationof the moral, [177]; observing versus reflecting, [178]; thehigher law, [181]; deepening of meaning, [182]. § 3. Oppositionbetween individual and social aims and standards:—Withdrawalfrom the social order, [184]; individual emancipation,[186]. § 4. Effects upon the individual character:—Increasedpossibilities of evil as well as of good, [187]. § 5. Moraldifferentiation and the social order:—Effects on the family,[193]; on industry and government, [194]; on religion, [195]; generalrelation of religion to morality, [197]. | |
| PART II Theory of the Moral Life | |
| X. The Moral Situation | [201] |
| Distinguishing marks of the moral situation, [201]; Traits ofvoluntary activity, [202]; The good and bad in non-voluntarybehavior, [203]; Indifferent voluntary conduct, [205]; The moral isintroduced when ends have conflicting values, [207]; Selectionthen depends upon, and influences, the nature of the self,[209]. | |
| XI. Problems of Moral Theory | [212] |
| Theory grows from practical problems, [212]; Three typicalproblems of reflective practice, [213]; Corresponding problemsof theory, [214]; Their historical sequence, [215]; Growth of individualism,[220]; The two types of individualism, [221]. | |
| XII. Types of Moral Theory | [224] |
| § 1. Typical divisions of theories:—Teleological and jural,[224]; individual and institutional, [225]; empirical and intuitional,[226]. § 2. Division of voluntary activity into Innerand Outer:—The "how" and the "what," [227]; attitude andconsequences, [228]; different types of each theory, [229]; bearingof each theory upon problems of knowledge and of control,[231]. § 3. General interpretation of these theories:—Ordinaryview of disposition and of consequences, [232]; advantagesclaimed for emphasis upon consequences, [234]; foremphasis upon disposition or attitude, [236]; necessity of reconciliationof these theories, [237]. | |
| XIII. Conduct and Character | [240] |
| Problem of their relation, [240]. § 1. The good will ofKant:—Emphasis upon motive, [241]; motive with or withoutconsequences, [242]; necessity of effort, [243]; overt action requiredto prove motive, [245]. § 2. The "Intention" of theUtilitarians:—Emphasis upon consequences, [246]; distinctionof intention from motive, [247]; they are really identical, [248];motive as blind and as intelligent, [249]; practical importanceof insistence upon consequences, [251]; foresight of consequencesdepends upon motive, [252]. § 3. Conduct and character:—Thenature of disposition, [254]; partial and completeintention, [256]; complexity of motives, [257]. § 4. Morality ofacts and of agents:—Subjective and objective morality, [259];the doer and his deed, [260]; summary, [261]. | |
| XIV. Happiness and Conduct: The Good and Desire | [263] |
| Residence and nature of goodness, [263]; happiness as thegood, [264]; love of happiness as the evil, [265]; ambiguity inconception of happiness, [266]. § 1. The Object of Desire:—Isit pleasure? [269]; desire presupposes instinctive appetites,[270]; and objects of thought, [271]; happiness and desire, [272];need for standard, [274]. § 2. The Conception of Happinessas a Standard:—Utilitarian method, [275]; Difficulty of measuringpleasure, [276]; character determines the value of apleasure, [277]; Mill's introduction of quality of pleasure, [279].§ 3. The constitution of happiness:—Pleasures depend uponobjects, [281]; they are qualitative, [282]; they vary with disposition,[283]; happiness as the moral good, [284]. | |
| XV. Happiness and Social Ends | [286] |
| Utilitarianism aims at social welfare, [286]; value as a theoryof social reform, [287]; its aim conflicts with its hedonistic theoryof motive, [289]; Bentham's method of reconciling personaland general happiness, [291]; Mill's method, [293]; sympathyand the social self, [298]; the distinctively moral interest, [300];equation of virtue and happiness, [301]; moral democracy, [303]. | |
| XVI. The Place of Reason in the Moral Life: MoralKnowledge | [306] |
| § 1. Problem of reason and desire:—Nature of a reasonableact, [306]; theories about moral knowledge, [307]. § 2. Kant'stheory of practical reason:—Traits of morality, [309]; reasonas a priori and formal, [310]; true meaning of generalization,[313]; the general and the social, [314]. § 3. Moral sense intuitionalism:—Functionof reason, [317]; habit and sense, [319];invalid intuitions, [321]; deliberation and intuition, [322]; thegood man's judgment, [324]. § 4. The place of general rules:—Theirvalue, [325]; casuistry, [326]; and its dangers, [327];secondary ends of utilitarianism, [329]; empirical rules andcustoms, [330]; distinction of rules and principles, [333]; sympathyand reasonableness, [334]. | |
| XVII. The Place of Duty in the Moral Life: Subjection toAuthority | [337] |
| Conflict of the rational with the attractive end, [337]. § 1.The subjection of desire to law, [339]; cause of conflict ofdesire and thought, [342]; demand for transformation of desire,[343]; social character of duties, [345]; the social self is the"universal" self, [346]. § 2. Kantian theory:—Accord withduty versus from duty, [346]; the two-fold self of Kant, [347];criticism of Kant, [348]; emphasis falls practically on politicalauthority, [351]; "Duty for duty's sake," [351]. § 3. The Utilitariantheory of duty:—The hedonistic problem, [353]; Moralsanctions, [354]; they are too external, [355]; Bain's account,[356]; Spencer's account, [358]; such views set up a fictitious non-socialself, [361]. § 3. Final statement:—Growth requires disagreeablereadjustments, [362]. | |
| XVIII. The Place of the Self in the Moral Life | [364] |
| Problems regarding the self, [364]. § 1. The doctrine of self-denial:—Explanationof its origin, [365]; four objections todoctrine, [366]. § 2. Self-assertion:—Ethical dualism, [369];"naturalistic" ethics, [369]; false biological basis, [371]; misinterpretsnature of efficiency, [373]. § 3. Self-love and benevolence;or egoism and altruism:—The "crux" of ethical speculation,[375]; are all motives selfish? [376]; ambiguity of termselfish, [377]; are results selfish? [379]; self-preservation, [380];rational regard for self, [382]; regard for others, [384]; the existenceof "other-regarding" impulses, [385]; altruism maybe immoral, [387]; social justice necessary to moral altruism,[389]. § 4. The good as self-realization:—Self-realization anambiguous idea, [391]; true and false consideration of the self,[393]; equation of personal and general happiness, [395]. | |
| XIX. The Virtues | [399] |
| Introductory—virtue defined, [399]; natural ability and virtue,[400]; evolution of virtues, [401]; responsibility for moral judgment,[402]; futility of cataloguing virtues, [402]; their cardinalaspects, [403]. § 1. Temperance:—Greek, Roman, and Christianconceptions, [405]; negative and positive aspects, [407];pleasure and excitement, [408]. § 2. Courage or persistentvigor:—Dislike of the disagreeable, [410]; "dimensions" ofcourage, [411]; optimism and pessimism, [412]. § 3. Justice:—Threemeanings of, [414]; justice and love, [415]; justice andpunishment, [416]. § 4. Wisdom or conscientiousness:—Importanceof intelligent interest, [418]; Greek and modern ideasof moral wisdom, [419]; ideals and thoughtfulness, [420]; idealsand progress, [422]. | |
| PART III The World of Action | |
| XX. Social Organization and the Individual | [427] |
| Object of discussion, [427]. § 1. Growth of individualitythrough social organizations:—Emancipation from custom,[428]; double movement towards individuality and complexassociations, [429]; morality and legality, [432]; two-fold contributionof social environment to individual morality, [433];moral value of the state, [434]. § 2. Responsibility and freedom:—Liability,[436]; freedom as exemption and as power,[437]; legal and moral freedom, [438]. § 3. Rights and obligations:—Theirdefinition, [439]; they are correlative, [440]; physicalrights, [442]; limitations put upon them by war and punishment,[443]; by poverty, [444]; mental rights, [445]; limitations tofreedom of thought and expression, [446]; education, [448]. | |
| XXI. Civil Society and the Political State | [451] |
| § 1. Civil rights and obligations:—Their definition, [451]; theirclasses, [452]; significance of established remedies for wrongs,[454]. § 2. Development of civil rights:—Contrast with savageage justice, [456]; social harm versus metaphysical evil, [457];recognition of accident and intent, [459]; of character andcircumstances, [460]; of mental incapacity, [462]; significanceof negligence and carelessness, [464]; conflict of substantial andtechnical justice, [465]; relations of the legal and moral, [467];reform of criminal procedure necessary, [468]; also of punitivemethods, [470]; and of civil administration, [471]. § 3. Politicalrights and obligations:—Significance of the state, [473];distrust of government, [474]; indifference to politics, [476];political corruption, [477]; reform of partisan machinery, [478];of governmental machinery, [479]; constructive social legislation,[480]; a federated humanity, [481]. § 4. The moral criterionof political activity:—Its statement, [482]; the individualisticformula, [483]; the collectivistic formula, [484]. | |
| XXII. The Ethics of the Economic Life | [486] |
| § 1. General analysis:—The economic in relation to happiness,[487]; relation to character, [488]; social aspects, [491].§ 2. The problem set by the new economic order:—Collectiveand impersonal organizations, [495]; readjustments required,[496]. § 3. The agencies for carrying on commerce and industry:—Earlyagencies, [497]; the business enterprise, [498]; thelabor union, [499]; reversion to group morality, [500]; membersand management, [500]; employer and employed, [501]; relationsto the public, [502]; to the law, [503]. § 4. The methodsof production, exchange, and valuation:—The machine, [507];basis of valuation, [508]. § 5. The factors which aid ethicalreconstruction:—Principles more easily seen, [511]. | |
| XXIII. Some Principles in the Economic Order | [514] |
| 1. Wealth subordinate to personality, [514]. 2. Wealth andactivity, [514]. 3. Wealth and public service, [515]. 4. Achange demanded from individual to collective morality, [517].5. Personal responsibility, [519]. 6. Publicity and legal control,[520]. 7. Democracy and distribution, [521]. | |
| XXIV. Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order | [523] |
| § 1. Individualism and socialism:—General statement, [523];equal opportunity, [526]. § 2. Individualism or free contractanalyzed; its values:—Efficiency, [527]; initiative, [527]; regulationof production, [528]. § 3. Criticisms upon individualism:—Itdoes not secure real freedom, [528]; nor justice, [530]; competitiontends to destroy itself, [531]; position of the aristocraticindividualists, [532]. | |
| XXV. Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order (Continued) | [536] |
| § 4. The theory of public agency and control, [536]. § 5.Society as agency of production:—Charges against privatemanagement, [537]; corruption, [538]; conditions of labor, [540];collective agency not necessarily social, [544]. § 6. Theoriesof just distribution:—Individualistic theory, [546]; equal division,[547]; a working programme, [548]. § 7. Ownership anduse of property:—Defects in the present system, [551]. § 8.Present tendencies:—Individualistic character of the Constitution,[554]; increased recognition of public welfare, [555];social justice through economic, social, and scientific progress,[557]. § 9. Three special problems:—The open versus theclosed shop, [559]; the capitalization of corporations, [561]; theunearned increment, [564]. Appendix: Prof. Seager's programmeof social legislation, [566]. | |
| XXVI. The Family | [571] |
| § 1. Historical antecedents of the modern family:—Maternaltype, [572]; paternal type, [572]; influence of the church, [576].§ 2. The psychological basis of the family:—Emotional andinstinctive basis, [578]; common will, [580]; parenthood, [581];social and religious factors, [582]; the children, [582]. § 3.General elements of strain in family relations:—Differencesbetween the sexes in temperament and occupation, [584]; inattitude toward the family, [587]; differences between parentsand children, [589]. § 4. Special conditions which give rise topresent problems:—The economic factors, [590]; cultural andpolitical factors, [593]. § 5. Unsettled problems:—Economicproblems, [594]; the dilemma between the domestic life andoccupations outside the home, [595]; the family as consumer,[598]. § 6. Unsettled problems:—Political problems, authoritywithin the family, [599]; equality or inequality, [600]; isolationnot the solution, [602]; authority over the family, divorce,[603]; general law of social health, [605]; conclusion, [605]. | |