[121] Kant's distinction between a mere wish, and "assuming all the means in our power," appears to recognize this fact, but he does not apply the fact in his theory.
[122] But, as we shall see, the utilitarians make finally a distinction between ends achieved and ends attempted.
[123] Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. x., § 3.
[124] Mill, Utilitarianism.
[125] Psychology, Vol. II., pp. 562-563. The whole passage, pp. 561-569, should be thoroughly familiar to every ethical student; and should be compared with what is said in Vol. I., pp. 284-290, about the selective tendency of feelings; and Vol. I., ch. xi., upon attention, and Vol. I., pp. 515-522, upon discrimination.
Höffding, Psychology (translated), is also clear and explicit with reference to the influence of our emotions upon our ideas. (See especially pp. 298-307.) The development of this fact in some of its aspects is one of the chief traits of the Ethics of Spinoza.
[126] Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. xi., § 1.
[127] Bentham does not mean "unreal" by a fictitious entity. According to his logic, all general and abstract terms, all words designating relations rather than elements, are "fictitious entities."
[128] By mischievous he means pernicious, bad, vicious, or even depraved in extreme cases.
[129] Ibid., ch. xi., § 3.