J. D.

Columbia University
April 3, 1916

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE
I.[Introduction]1
II.[The Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter]75
III.[The Antecedents and Stimuli of Thinking]103
IV.[Data and Meanings]136
V.[The Objects of Thought]157
VI.[Some Stages of Logical Thought]183
VII.[The Logical Character of Ideas]220
VIII.[The Control of Ideas by Facts]230
IX.[Naïve Realism vs. Presentative Realism]250
X.[Epistemological Realism: The Alleged Ubiquity of the Knowledge Relation]264
XI.[The Existence of the World as a Logical Problem]281
XII.[What Pragmatism Means by Practical]303
XIII.[An Added Note as to the "Practical"]330
XIV.[The Logic of Judgments of Practice]335
[Index]443

I
INTRODUCTION

The key to understanding the doctrine of the essays which are herewith reprinted lies in the passages regarding the temporal development of experience. Setting out from a conviction (more current at the time when the essays were written than it now is) that knowledge implies judgment (and hence, thinking) the essays try to show (1) that such terms as "thinking," "reflection," "judgment" denote inquiries or the results of inquiry, and (2) that inquiry occupies an intermediate and mediating place in the development of an experience. If this be granted, it follows at once that a philosophical discussion of the distinctions and relations which figure most largely in logical theories depends upon a proper placing of them in their temporal context; and that in default of such placing we are prone to transfer the traits of the subject-matter of one phase to that of another—with a confusing outcome.