Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics - John Dewey

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
REGISTER PUBLISHING COMPANY
The Inland Press
1891.

CONTENTS.

Introduction	[1-12]
PART I.—FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL NOTIONS.
Chapter I.—The Good	[13-138]
Hedonism	[14]
Utilitarianism	[52]
Evolutionary Utilitarianism	[67]
Kantianism	[78]
Problem and Solution	[95]
Realization of Individuality	[97]
Ethical Postulate	[127]
Chapter II.—The Idea of Obligation	[139-158]
Bain's Theory	[140]
Spencer's Theory	[142]
Kant's Theory	[147]
Its Real Nature	[152]
Chapter III.—The Idea of Freedom	[158-166]
Negative Freedom	[158]
Potential Freedom	[159]
Positive Freedom	[164]
PART II.—THE ETHICAL WORLD.
Social Relations	[167]
Moral Institutions	[169]
PART III.—THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INDIVIDUAL.
Division of Subject	[181]
Chapter I.—The Formation and Growth of Ideals	[182-211]
Conscience	[182]
Conscientiousness	[199]
Development of Ideals	[206]
Chapter II.—The Moral Struggle or the Realizing of Ideals	[211-227]
Goodness as Struggle	[211]
Badness	[214]
Goodness and Badness	[221]
Chapter III.—Realized Morality or the Virtues	[227-233]
Cardinal Virtues	[231]
Conclusion	[233-238]

PREFACE.

Although the following pages have taken shape in connection with class-room work, they are intended as an independent contribution to ethical science. It is commonly demanded of such a work that its readers shall have some prefatory hint of its sources and deviations. In accordance with this custom, I may state that for the backbone of the theory here presented—the conception of the will as the expression of ideas, and of social ideas; the notion of an objective ethical world realized in institutions which afford moral ideals, theatre and impetus to the individual; the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom, as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing—for this backbone I am especially indebted to Green's 'Prolegomena to Ethics', to Mr. Bradley's 'Ethical Studies', to Professor Caird's 'Social Philosophy of Comte' and 'Critical Philosophy of Kant' (to this latter book in particular my indebtedness is fundamental), and to Alexander's 'Moral Order and Progress'. Although I have not been able to adopt the stand-point or the method of Mr. Spencer, or of Mr. Leslie Stephen my obligation to the 'Data of Ethics' and to the 'Science of Ethics' (especially to the latter) is large.

As to the specific forms which give a flesh and blood of its own to this backbone, I may call attention to the idea of desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession; to the analysis of individuality into function including capacity and environment; to the treatment of the social bearings of science and art (a point concerning which I am indebted to my friend, Mr. Franklin Ford); to the statement of an ethical postulate; to the accounts of obligation, of moral rules, and of moral badness.