Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics

by John Dewey

To know one's self was declared by Socrates, who first brought to conscious birth the spirit of the moral life, to be the very core of moral endeavor. This knowledge of self has taken, indeed, a more circuitous and a more painful path, than Socrates anticipated. Man has had, during two thousand years of science, to go around through nature to find himself, and as yet he has not wholly come back to himself—he oftentimes seems still lost in the wilderness of an outer world. But when man does get back to himself it will be as a victor laden with the spoils of subdued nature. Having secured, in theory and invention, his unity with nature, his knowledge of himself will rest on a wide and certain basis.

This is the final justification of the moral value of science and art. It is because through them wants are inter-connected, unified and socialized, that they are, when all is said and done, the preëminent moral means. And if we do not readily recognize them in this garb, it is because we have made of them such fixed things, that is, such abstractions, by placing them outside the movement of human life.

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INDEX.

• Absolute—and relative Ethics, according to Spencer [72].
• Accountability—See [responsibility.]
• [Activity]—human, the subject-matter of ethics [1 ff].
• —the object of desire [21 ff].
• —the standard of pleasure [45]; [50].
• —equals exercise of function [101].
• —opposed to mere possession [209]; [215]; [218]; [220].
• —two sides of [219].
• —see [freedom].
• Æsthetic feelings—may be moral [199].
• —see [art].
• Agent—moral, one capable of acting from ideas [3].
• —see [person].
• Alexander, S.—quoted: on idea of sum of pleasures [46].
• —referred to: [9]; [46]; [77]; [111]; [134]; [158]; [165]; [202]; [216]; [221]; [227].
• [Altruism]—how identified with egoism [59].
• —reconciled, by Spencer, with egoism [70 ff].
• —conflicts, at present, with egoism [76].
• —older moralists termed benevolence [195].
• —not necessarily moral [107].
• —not disguised selfishness [109].
• —may equal charity [125].
• Amusements—moral nature of [133].
• Approbation—nature of [161].
• Aristotle—quoted: on pleasure [18];
• on pleasure and character [29];
• on the mean [136].
• —referred to: [31].
• [Art] (and Science)—nature of interest in [111].
• —distinction of fine and useful [112].
• —interest in, why moral [113 ff].
• —interest in, really social [118 ff].
• —life an, [120].
• —essentially dynamic [126].
• Asceticism—means formalism [94].
• —element of truth in [95].
• —results when interest is excluded [106].
• Aspiration—involved in morality [213]; [222].
• Autonomy—Kant's conception of justified [149].
• Badness—of environment a factor in right action [176]; [224].
• —its source and factors [214].
• —its relation to goodness [223].
• —potential and actual [223].
• —of good people [232].
• Bain, A.—quoted: that pleasure is a self-evident criterion [16];
• his definition of utilitarianism [53];
• on obligation [140]; [141].
• —referred to: [17]; [66]; [227].
• Barratt—quoted: that all pleasure is individual [14].
• Baseness—why badness becomes [219].
• Benevolence—see [altruism].
• Bentham, J.—quoted: pleasure both criterion and motive [15];
• self-evident criterion [16];
• all motives good [34 ff].;
• hedonistic calculus [36 ff].;
• identity of individual and general pleasure [57 ff].;
• influence of law [59].
• —referred to: [53].
• Birks—referred to: [66].
• Blackie, J. S.—referred to: [66].
• Bradley, F. H.—quoted: on pleasure and desire [21];
• scientific interest not necessarily social [122];
• on merely individual conscience [189].
• —referred to: [25]; [26]; [42]; [48]; [54]; [91]; [124]; [134]; [165]; [221].
• Browning, R.—referred to: [111].
• Butler—Bishop, quoted: on conscience [167].
• —referred to: [110].
• Caird, E.—quoted: on collision of moral ends [88].
• —referred to: [21]; [82]; [87]; [91]; [92]; [93]; [95]; [109]; [111]; [149]; [165].
• Calderwood—referred to: [158]; [166].
• [Capacity]—its relation to environment [97].
• —increased by moral action [206].
• Carlyle, T.—referred to: [128].
• Casuistry—inevitable, if moral end is not wholly social [119].
• [Character]—reciprocal with conduct [9].
• —the source of motive, desire and moral pleasure [26 ff].
• —separated from conduct by hedonists [32 ff].
• —and virtues [227 ff].
• —see [capacity], [conduct], [interests] and [motive].
• Charity—idea of, involves social inequality [125].
• Christianity—ethical influence of [224].
• —has no specific ethical code [231].
• Coit, S.—referred to: [28]; [66].
• Commands—moral value of: [203].
• [Common Good]—an ethical ideal [51].
• —not furnished by hedonism [60].
• —not furnished by Kant [91].
• —why necessarily involved in morality [117]; [217]; [222].
• —demands reciprocal satisfaction of individual and society [127].
• —its existence postulated by moral conduct [130].
• —results from exercise of function [168].
• —constituted by activity [169 ff].
• —realized in institutions [173].
• —development of [210].
• —see [institutions] and [society].
• Comprehensiveness—growth of, in moral end [210 ff].
• [Conduct]—defined [3].
• —relation to consequences [7].
• —relation to character [9].
• —an individual system [133].
• —a social system [136].
• —how related to character [163].
• —see [activity], [consequences], [character] and [motive].
• [Conflict]—of moral ends [88 ff].
• —morality has an aspect of [151]; [227].
• Conscience—Bain's idea of [141].
• —equals consciousness of action [181].
• —elements in [182].
• —not a special faculty [183].
• —kinds of [183 ff].
• —not merely individual [188].
• Conscientiousness—nature of [199].
• —does not equal introspection [200].
• —nor application of code [201].
• —a cardinal virtue [232].
• [Consequences]—moral value of [7 ff].; [84]; [114]; [160].
• —excluded from morality by Kantianism [13]; [29].
• —identified with moral value by hedonism [33].
• —responsibility for [160].
• Criterion—hedonistic is pleasure [15].
• —criticism of hedonistic [31 ff].
• —two ends to be met by every [32].
• —of higher and lower pleasures [49 ff].
• —when pleasure may be a [50].
• —Mill's really social [63].
• —Spencer's really social [73].
• —Kant's nominally formal [79 ff].
• —the real [132 ff].
• —its elasticity [135].
• Darwin, C.—referred to: [78].
• Demoralization—involved in badness [220].
• [Desire]—pleasure as end of [16]; [18 ff].
• —defined [19].
• —how spiritualized [23].
• —not purely pleasurable [27].
• —an expression of character [28].
• —excluded from moral motive by Kant [79].
• —all or no involved in morality [94].
• —relation to pleasure [83].
• —particular, an abstraction [96].
• —how distinguished from interest [103].
• —opposed to reason by Kant [147].
• —when opposed to moral action [148]; [155]; [213]; [216].
• —how socialized, [237].
• Dewey, J.—referred to: [25]; [78]; [194].
• Disinterestedness—equals full interest [107].
• —an aspect of cardinal virtue [232].
• Disposition—Bentham on [35].
• Dualism—the Kantian [148 ff].
• Duty—see [obligation].
• Egoism—see [altruism].
• Empiricism—Spencer's reconciliation with intuitionalism [69 ff].
• End—moral: see [common good]; [function]; [motive].
• Environment—defined by relation to capacity [99 ff].
• —meaning of adjustment to [115 ff].
• —moral, exists in institutions [171].
• —badness of, an element in right action [176]; [190].
• —enlarged by moral action [207].
• Ethical World—discussed [167 ff].
• —nature illustrated [168].
• —relation to moral law [174].
• —see [Institutions].
• Ethics—defined [1].
• —divided [3].
• —its object according to Spencer [68].
• —see [theory].
• Evolution, Theory of—combined with hedonism [67 ff].
• —not really hedonistic [71 ff].
• —its real standard objective [72].
• Faith—a factor in moral progress [123]; [127 ff].
• —in humanity, meaning of [129].
• —why demanded in moral action [217]; [222].
• Feelings—natural and moral [5 ff].; [25 ff].; [87].
• —sympathetic relied upon by utilitarians [57].
• —necessary in moral activity [85].
• —active, equal interests [102].
• —moral, defined by end [108];
• see also [motive].
• —value of [195 ff].
• —moral, not too narrowly limited [199].
• [Freedom]—is object of desire [24].
• —equals exercise of function [138].
• —various aspects of [158].
• —of choice defined [159].
• —of indifference discussed [161 ff].
• —actualized in rights [172]; [174].
• —positive, realized in virtues [229].
• [Function]—union of capacity and circumstance in act [103].
• —freedom found in exercise of [164 ff].
• Gizycki—referred to: [66].
• God—an external, cannot be the source of obligation [149].
• Goethe—referred to: [128].
• Golden Rule—identified by Mill with principle of utilitarianism [59].
• —gives no directions as to conduct [204].
• —is a concrete statement of ethical postulate [205].
• Green, T. H.—quoted: on desire and pleasure [21];
• on sum of pleasures [43];
• on nature of happiness [45];
• on conscientiousness [200]; [202];
• on goodness [215].
• —referred to: [9]; [25]; [42]; [54]; [110]; [158]; [165].
• Grote, J.—referred to: [66]; [158].
• Guyau—referred to: [66]; [143].
• [Hedonism]—defined [14 ff].
• —its paradox [25].
• —confuses feeling and idea [26]; [43 ff].
• —summarized [30].
• —all motives good [33].
• —its calculus [36].
• —fails to provide laws [39 ff].
• —its contrast with Kantianism [82 ff].
• —its treatment of obligation [140 ff].
• —is correct in holding rightness to be pleasurable [228].
• —truth and falsity in [234].
• Hegel—quoted: on reflective conscience [188];
• on merely individual conscience [189].
• Hinton, J.—quoted: on altruism [109];
• on badness [216].
• —referred to: [202].
• Hodgson, S. H.—referred to: [14].
• Idealism—when feeble [128].
• Ideals—moral, progressive, [206].
• Imperative, Categorical—of Kant [147].
• —of conscience [191].
• Impulse—and pleasure [17].
• —and desire [22].
• —nature of action from [159].
• —see [desire].
• Individuality—defined [97].
• —not identical with inner side alone [98].
• —evils of defining from this standpoint [110].
• —made by function [131].
• —realized is autonomy [150].
• —realized is freedom [164].
• —growth in [210].
• —see [freedom] and [rights].
• [Institutions]—nature of [169 ff].
• —sovereignty, rights and law inhere in [171 ff].
• —influence of, upon conscience [184]; [189].
• —movement of, the source of duties, [194].
• —see [common good] and [society].
• [Interests]—are functions on personal side [102 ff].
• —classified and discussed [104 ff].
• —social, involve science and art [123 ff].
• —realized in institutions [170].
• —their relation to conscience [198].
• —pure, are virtue [228].
• —the active element of [218].
• —the freeing of, the moral goal [233].
• James, Sr., H.—referred to: [202].
• James, Wm.—quoted: on pleasure and desire [20].
• —referred to: [77].
• Kant—agrees with hedonism as to end of desire [79].
• —his end an abstraction [84].
• —his practical ideal that of Mill and Spencer [93].
• —value of his theory [93].
• —his theory of obligation [147].
• —his conception of autonomy [149].
• —his idea of duty [156].
• —his conception of practical reason [191].
• —quoted: on pleasure [47];
• on pleasure as common good [52];
• on priority of duty to good [78];
• on good will [79];
• his formula for right action [80];
• illustrations of moral law [80 ff].
• —referred to: [14]; [78]; [212]; [221]; [235].
• Kantianism—compared with hedonism [82 ff].
• —its practical breakdown [90].
• Knowledge—moral effect of advance in [207].
• —socializes wants [237].
• —see [art].
• Laurie, S. S.—quoted: on happiness [66].
• —referred to: [227].
• [Law]—utilitarian use of [58]; [61 ff].
• —Kant's moral, formal [78].
• —relation to desire [94].
• —realized in institutions [172]; [174].
• —of the 'is', not merely of the 'ought' [175].
• —idea of, in general [195].
• —see [obligation].
• Lawlessness—involved in morality [216].
• Leckey—referred to: [66].
• Limitation—the basis of moral strength [128].
• Lincoln, A.—anecdote regarding [28].
• Lotze—referred to: [16]; [166].
• Love—the union of duty and desire [154].
• Martineau, J.—quoted: on the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus [38].
• —referred to: [42]; [78]; [158]; [166]; [227].
• Maurice, F. D.—referred to: [191].
• Merit—means social desert [225].
• Mill, J. S.—criticizes Kant [91].
• —his equivoke of pleasure and pleasant thing [20].
• —his fallacy [56].
• —introduces quality of pleasure into hedonism [42]; [46].
• —quoted: pleasure self-evident criterion [16];
• end of desire [17];
• on rules of morality [39 ff];
• on moral tribunal [48];
• on utilitarian standard [53];
• on importance of law and education [59];
• on social feeling [63 ff].
• —referred to: [25]; [30]; [49].
• Morality—sphere of as broad as conduct [2]; [154].
• —not dependent upon an individual's wish [167 ff].
• —realized in institutions [170].
• —struggle for private, bad [202].
• —in the nature of things [233].
• [Motive]—defined [5].
• —two elements in [10].
• —determined by character [28].
• —never bad according to hedonism [33].
• —formal and legislative according to Kant [80].
• —not a subjective mood [232].
• Norms—in philosophy [1].
• [Obligation]—in conflict with pleasure [76 ff].
• —how related to function [138].
• —theories regarding [139].
• —distinct from coercion [144].
• —enforced, not created by power [145].
• —Kantian idea of criticized [148].
• —does not relate simply to what ought to be, but is not [151]; [174 ff].
• —relation to conscience [183].
• —how made known [190 ff].
• —practical value of sense of [196].
• —must be individualized [197]; [201].
• —when opposed to desire [213]; [216].
• —the union with desire the moral ideal [234].
• —see [desire], [law] and [universal].
• Pater—referred to: [66].
• Pathological—all inclination, according to Kant [86].
• —opposed to active [212].
• Paulsen—referred to: [67]; [111].
• [Person]—is one capable of conduct [97].
• Pleasure—an element in activity [24].
• —not the moving spring to action [26].
• —sum of, dependent on objective conditions [44 ff].
• —quality of, similarly dependent [47 ff].
• —may symbolize action [51].
• —general, a vague idea [62].
• —fixed by social relations [65]; [77].
• —not a sufficient guide at present [75].
• —dependent on self-realization [83].
• —all right action involves [228].
• —see [desire] and [hedonism].
• Postulate—moral, defined [129 ff].
• —equals Golden Rule [205].
• Problem—moral [3].
• Progress—necessary in moral action [135 ff].
• —moral, nature of [209].
• Prudence—not outside moral sphere [105].
• Reason—opposed to desire by Kant [147].
• —Kant's conception too immediate [150].
• —practical, idea of [191].
• Reformation—possibility of [162 ff].
• Relativity—of morals, means what [136].
• [Responsibility]—nature of [160 ff].
• —of parents and children [203].
• Reverence—Kant regards as sole moral feeling [86].
• [Rights]—exist by common will [172].
• Rousseau—his influence upon Kant [148].
• Royce, J.—referred to: [61]; [111].
• Rule—moral, not a command [204].
• —a tool of analysis [204].
• Satisfaction—moral, creates new wants [208].
• —good and bad [217].
• Science—nature of interest in [111].
• —the preëminent moral means [237].
• —see [art].
• Schurman, J. G.—referred to: [78].
• Self—interest in [105 ff].
• —involves sympathy [109].
• —dualism in self, how arises [216].
• —knowledge of [237].
• Selfishness—involved in immorality [216].
• Self-sacrifice—its moral nature [222].
• Sentimentality—immoral [113].
• —escape from, only through knowledge [120].
• —results from abstract idea of duty [157].
• —refined, equals sensuality [220].
• Shakespeare—quoted: on common good [131].
• Sidgwick, H.—quoted: on the hedonistic assumption [43];
• on utilitarian standard [53];
• on intuitional utilitarianism [54].
• —referred to: [14]; [16]; [18]; [66]; [111]; [227].
• [Society]—its moral influence [146]; [157].
• —its relation to obligation [152].
• —constituted by moral relationships [175].
• —development of, changes moral ideals [207].
• —see [common good], [institutions].
• Socrates—author of idea of reflective conscience [188].
• —initiator of modern ethical spirit [237].
• Sorley—referred to: [78]; [111].
• Sovereignty—exists in common will and good [171].
• —ultimate possessed in humanity [173].
• Spencer, H.—believes in fixed social ideal [73 ff].; [235].
• —quoted: on pleasure as a necessary effect [68];
• not immediate object of desire [69];
• egoism and altruism [70 ff].;
• on ideal man [73];
• equilibrium of functions [74];
• on obligation [142]; [143].
• —referred to: [16]; [67]; [72]; [73]; [74]; [75]; [76]; [111]; [125]; [235].
• Stephen, L.—quoted: on feeling as universal motive [27];
• on sympathy [109 ff].
• —referred to: [16]; [25]; [67]; [68]; [78]; [111]; [165]; [227].
• Struggle—when morality is a [212].
• —changed by Christianity into movement [225].
• —see [conflict].
• Sully, J.—referred to: [17].
• [Theory]—ethical and conduct [1].
• —ethical, sub-divided [13].
• —ethical, not casuistry [89].
• —value of [186].
• [Universal]—a, lacking in hedonism [37].
• —Kant's emphasis of [80].
• —Kant's, formal [80]; [85]; [90].
• —Kant's, leads to conflict [87].
• —true, equals organization, [88]; [90]; [96].
• —bad action cannot be [221].
• —means a method, not a thing [136].
• —found in movement of character [234].
• —see [law].
• Utilitarianism—is universalistic hedonism [13]; [53].
• —defined by Mill, Sidgwick, Bain, [53].
• —criticized [54 ff].
• —assumes social order [63 ff].
• —combined with evolution [67].
• Virtue—change in nature of [211].
• —correlative to duty [225].
• —distinguished from merit [226].
• —is an interest of character [228].
• —two types of [229].
• —cardinal [230].
• Wants—see [desires].
• Wilson (and Fowler)—referred to: [67].
• Will—Kant's good will [79].

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Transcriber's Corrections:

page	original text	correction
[17]	endquote missing
[20]	sweat-meats	sweet-meats
[24]	becoms	becomes
[35]	suprise	surprise
[38]	the the	the
[38]	cicumstances	circumstances
[42]	pleasnres	pleasures
[47]	agreableness	agreeableness
[68]	Ehtics	Ethics
[74]	endquote missing
[83]	of	as
[92]	expressily	expressly
[124]	and and	and
[156]	what what	what
[183]	LVIX	LIX
[192]	superflous	superfluous
[251]	entry Society missing in original