TABLE OF CONTENTS
| I. | Thought and its Subject-Matter | [1] |
| By John Dewey | ||
| II. | Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Antecedents of Thought | [23] |
| By John Dewey | ||
| III. | Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Datum of Thinking | [49] |
| By John Dewey | ||
| IV. | Thought and its Subject-Matter: The Content and Object of Thought | [65] |
| By John Dewey | ||
| V. | Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment | [86] |
| By Helen Bradford Thompson, Ph.D., Director of the Psychological Laboratory of Mount Holyoke College | ||
| VI. | Typical Stages in the Development of Judgment | [127] |
| By Simon Fraser McLennan, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in Oberlin College | ||
| VII. | The Nature of Hypothesis | [142] |
| By Myron Lucius Ashley, Ph.D., Instructor, American Correspondence School | ||
| VIII. | Image and Idea in Logic | [183] |
| By Willard Clark Gore, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Psychology in the University of Chicago | ||
| IX. | The Logic of the Pre-Socratic Philosophy | [203] |
| By William Arthur Heidel, Ph.D., Professor of Latin in Iowa College | ||
| X. | Valuation as a Logical Process | [227] |
| By Henry Waldgrave Stuart, Ph.D., Instructor in Philosophy in the State University of Iowa | ||
| XI. | Some Logical Aspects of Purpose | [341] |
| By Addison Webster Moore, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the University of Chicago |
I
THOUGHT AND ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: THE GENERAL
PROBLEM OF LOGICAL THEORY
No one doubts that thought, at least reflective, as distinct from what is sometimes called constitutive, thought, is derivative and secondary. It comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of something. No one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life and of science is of this reflective type. We think about; we reflect over. If we ask what it is which is primary and radical to thought; if we ask what is the final objective for the sake of which thought intervenes; if we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a derived procedure, we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of the logical problem: the relation of thought to its empirical antecedents and to its consequent, truth, and the relation of truth to reality.