[133] A remark may be added here by way of caution. The presented self, we have said, attenuates to a mere maxim or tacit presumption in favor of a certain type of logical procedure in dealing with the situation. It must be remembered that the presented self, like all other presentation, is and comes to be for the sake of its function in experience, and so is practical from the start. The process sketched above is therefore not from bare presented content as such to a methodological presumption, which, as methodological and not contentual, is qualitatively different from what preceded it.
[134] Recognized authority is, of course, not the same thing by any means as authority unrecognized because absolutely dominant.
[135] We may be pardoned for supplying from the history of ethics no illustrations of this slight sketch.
[136] In fact, as suggested above, the Prolegomena to Ethics is in many respects essentially intuitional in spirit, though its intuitionism is of a modern discreetly attenuated sort.
[137] This would appear to be the logical value of functional psychology as a science of mental process.
[138] We have already given a slight sketch of the historical process here characterized in the barest logical terms.
[139] Further consideration of the problem of factual judgment must be deferred to Part V.
[140] The relation of the empirical self to the "energetic" and to standards will come in for statement in Part V in the connection just referred to.
[141] It might be possible to construct a "logic" of these various types of working moral standard in such a way as to show that in each type there is implied the one next higher morphologically, and ultimately the highest—that is, some sort of concept of the "energetic" self.
[142] It matters not at all whether, in ethics or metaphysics, our universal be abstract or on the other hand "concrete," like Green's conception of the self, or a "Hegelian" Absolute. Its logical use in the determination of particulars must be essentially the same in either case.