Thus a standing army and excise have, from the first slender origins, tho' always hated, always feared, always opposed, at length swelled up to their vast present bulk.
These facts are sufficient to support what I have said. 'Tis true that all the mischiefs apprehended by our ancestors from a standing army and excise, have not yet happened: but it does not follow from thence, that they will not happen. The inside of a house may catch fire, and the most valuable apartments be ruined, before the flames burst out. The question in these cases is not, what evil has actually attended particular measures—but what evil, in the nature of things, is likely to attend them. Certain circumstances may for some time delay effects, that were reasonably expected, and that must ensue. There was a long period, after the Romans had prorogued the command to[55]Q. Publilius Philo, before that example destroyed their liberty. All our kings, from the revolution to the present reign have been foreigners. Their ministers generally continued but a short time in authority;[56] and they themselves were mild and virtuous princes.
A bold, ambitious Prince, possessed of great abilities, firmly fixed in the throne by descent, served by ministers like himself, and rendered either venerable or terrible by the glory of his successes, may execute what his predecessors did not dare to attempt. Henry IV. tottered in his seat during his whole reign. Henry V. drew the strength of the kingdom into France, to carry on his wars there, and left the Commons at home, protesting, "that the people were not bound to serve out of the realm."
It is true, that a strong spirit of liberty subsists at present in Great-Britain, but what reliance is to be placed in the temper of a people, when the prince is possessed of an unconstitutional power, our own history can sufficiently inform us. When Charles II. had strengthened himself by the return of the garrison of Tangier, "England (says Rapin) saw on a sudden an amazing revolution; saw herself stripped of all her rights and privileges, excepting such as the King should vouchsafe to grant her; and what is more astonishing, the English themselves delivered up these very rights and privileges to Charles II. which they had so passionately, and, if I may say it, furiously defended against the designs of Charles I." This happened only thirty-six years after this last prince had been beheaded.
Some persons are of opinion, that liberty is not violated, but by such open acts of force; but they seem to be greatly mistaken. I could mention a period within these forty years, when almost as great a change of disposition was produced by the secret measures of a long administration, as by Charles's violence. Liberty, perhaps is never exposed to so much danger, as when the people believe there is the least; for it may be subverted, and yet they not think so.
Public-disgusting acts are seldom practised by the ambitious, at the beginning of their designs. Such conduct silences and discourages the weak, and the wicked, who would otherways have been their advocates or accomplices. It is of great consequence, to allow those, who, upon any account, are inclined to favour them, something specious to say in their defence. The power may be fully established, though it would not be safe for them to do whatever they please. For there are things, which, at some times, even slaves will not bear. Julius Cæsar and Oliver Cromwell did not dare to assume the title of King. The grand Seignior dares not lay a new tax. The King of France dares not be a protestant. Certain popular points may be left untouched, and yet freedom be extinguished. The commonality of Venice imagine themselves free, because they are permitted to do, what they ought not. But I quit a subject, that would lead me too far from my purpose.
By the late act of parliament, taxes are to be levied upon us, for "defraying the charge of the administration of justice, the support of civil government—and the expences of defending his Majesty's dominions in America."
If any man doubts what ought to be the conduct of these colonies on this occasion, I would ask them these questions.
Has not the parliament expressly avowed their intention of raising money from us for certain purposes? Is not this scheme popular in Great-Britain? Will the taxes, imposed by the late act, answer those purposes? If it will, must it not take an immense sum from us? If it will not, is it to be expected, that the parliament will not fully execute their intention, when it is pleasing at home, and not opposed here? Must not this be done by imposing new taxes? Will not every addition, thus made to our taxes, be an addition to the power of the British legislature, by increasing the number of officers employed in the collection? Will not every additional tax therefore render it more difficult to abrogate any of them? When a branch of revenue is once established, does it not appear to many people invidious and undutiful, to attempt to abolish it? If taxes, sufficient to accomplish the intention of the Parliament, are imposed by the Parliament, what taxes will remain to be imposed by our assemblies? If no material taxes remain to be imposed by them, what must become of them, and the people they represent? [57] "If any person considers, these things, and yet not thinks our liberties are in danger, I wonder at that person's security."