Some persons may perhaps think that arguments of this force are unnecessarily dragged from the obscurity to which they are now for the most part happily consigned; but it is essential, in order to set Galileo's character and merits in their true light, to show how low at this time philosophy had fallen. For we shall form a very inadequate notion of his powers and deserts if we do not contemplate him in the midst of men who, though of undoubted talent and ingenuity, could so far bewilder themselves as to mistake such a string of unmeaning phrases for argument: we must reflect on the difficulty every one experiences in delivering himself from the erroneous impressions of infancy, which will remain stamped upon the imagination in spite of all the efforts of matured reason to erase them, and consider every step of Galileo's course as a triumph over difficulties of a like nature. We ought to be fully penetrated with this feeling before we sit down to the perusal of his works, every line of which will then increase our admiration of the penetrating acuteness of his invention and unswerving accuracy of his judgment. In almost every page we discover an allusion to some new experiment, or the germ of some new theory; and amid all this wonderful fertility it is rarely indeed that we find the exuberance of his imagination seducing him from the rigid path of philosophical induction. This is the more remarkable as he was surrounded by friends and contemporaries of a different temperament and much less cautious disposition. A disadvantageous contrast is occasionally furnished even by the sagacious Bacon, who could so far deviate from the sound principles of inductive philosophy, as to write, for instance, in the following strain, bordering upon the worst manner of the Aristotelians:—"Motion in a circle has no limit, and seems to emanate from the appetite of the body, which moves only for the sake of moving, and that it may follow itself and seek its own embraces, and put in action and enjoy its own nature, and exercise its peculiar operation: on the contrary, motion in a straight line seems transitory, and to move towards a limit of cessation or rest, and that it may reach some point, and then put off its motion."[22] Bacon rejected all the machinery of the primum mobile and the solid spheres, the eccentrics and the epicycles, and carried his dislike of these doctrines so far as to assert that nothing short of their gross absurdity could have driven theorists to the extravagant supposition of the motion of the earth, which, said he, "we know to be most false."[23] Instances of extravagant suppositions and premature generalizations are to be found in almost every page of his other great contemporary, Kepler.
It is with pain that we observe Delambre taking every opportunity, in his admirable History of Astronomy, to undervalue and sneer at Galileo, seemingly for the sake of elevating the character of Kepler, who appears his principal favourite, but whose merit as a philosopher cannot safely be brought into competition with that of his illustrious contemporary. Delambre is especially dissatisfied with Galileo, for taking no notice, in his "System of the World," of the celebrated laws of the planetary motions which Kepler discovered, and which are now inseparably connected with his name. The analysis of Newton and his successors has now identified those apparently mysterious laws with the general phenomena of motion, and has thus entitled them to an attention of which, before that time, they were scarcely worthy; at any rate not more than is at present the empirical law which includes the distances of all the planets from the sun (roughly taken) in one algebraical formula. The observations of Kepler's day were scarcely accurate enough to prove that the relations which he discovered between the distances of the planets from the sun and the periods of their revolutions around him were necessarily to be received as demonstrated truths; and Galileo surely acted most prudently and philosophically in holding himself altogether aloof from Kepler's fanciful devices and numeral concinnities, although, with all the extravagance, they possessed much of the genius of the Platonic reveries, and although it did happen that Galileo, by systematically avoiding them, failed to recognise some important truths. Galileo probably was thinking of those very laws, when he said of Kepler, "He possesses a bold and free genius, perhaps too much so; but his mode of philosophizing is widely different from mine." We shall have further occasion in the sequel to recognise the justice of this remark.
In the treatise on the Sphere which bears Galileo's name, and which, if he be indeed the author of it, was composed during the early part of his residence at Padua, he also adopts the Ptolemaic system, placing the earth immoveable in the centre, and adducing against its motion the usual arguments, which in his subsequent writings he ridicules and refutes. Some doubts have been expressed of its authenticity; but, however this may be, we have it under Galileo's own hand that he taught the Ptolemaic system, in compliance with popular prejudices, for some time after he had privately become a convert to the contrary opinions. In a letter, apparently the first which he wrote to Kepler, dated from Padua, 1597, he says, acknowledging the receipt of Kepler's Mysterium Cosmographicum, "I have as yet read nothing beyond the preface of your book, from which however I catch a glimpse of your meaning, and feel great joy on meeting with so powerful an associate in the pursuit of truth, and consequently such a friend to truth itself, for it is deplorable that there should be so few who care about truth, and who do not persist in their perverse mode of philosophizing; but as this is not the fit time for lamenting the melancholy condition of our times, but for congratulating you on your elegant discoveries in confirmation of the truth, I shall only add a promise to peruse your book dispassionately, and with a conviction that I shall find in it much to admire. This I shall do the more willingly because many years ago I became a convert to the opinions of Copernicus,[24] and by that theory have succeeded in fully explaining many phenomena, which on the contrary hypothesis are altogether inexplicable. I have arranged many arguments and confutations of the opposite opinions, which however I have not yet dared to publish, fearing the fate of our master Copernicus, who, although he has earned immortal fame among a few, yet by an infinite number (for so only can the number of fools be measured) is exploded and derided. If there were many such as you, I would venture to publish my speculations; but, since that is not so, I shall take time to consider of it." This interesting letter was the beginning of the friendship of these two great men, which lasted uninterruptedly till 1632, the date of Kepler's death. That extraordinary genius never omitted an opportunity of testifying his admiration of Galileo, although there were not wanting persons envious of their good understanding, who exerted themselves to provoke coolness and quarrel between them. Thus Brutius writes to Kepler in 1602:[25] "Galileo tells me he has written to you, and has got your book, which however he denied to Magini, and I abused him for praising you with too many qualifications. I know it to be a fact that, both in his lectures, and elsewhere, he is publishing your inventions as his own; but I have taken care, and shall continue to do so, that all this shall redound not to his credit but to yours." The only notice which Kepler took of these repeated insinuations, which appear to have been utterly groundless, was, by renewed expressions of respect and admiration, to testify the value he set upon his friend and fellow-labourer in philosophy.
FOOTNOTES:
[17] Dion Cassius, lib. 37.
[18] The pretended translation by Roberval of an Arabic version of Aristarchus, "De Systemate Mundi," in which the Copernican system is fully developed, is spurious. Menage asserts this in his observations on Diogen. Laert. lib. 8, sec. 85, tom. ii., p. 389. (Ed. Amst. 1692.) The commentary contains many authorities well worth consulting. Delambre, Histoire de l'Astronomie, infers it from its not containing some opinions which Archimedes tells us were held by Aristarchus. A more direct proof may be gathered from the following blunder of the supposed translator. Astronomers had been long aware that the earth in different parts of her orbit is at different distances from the sun. Roberval wished to claim for Aristarchus the credit of having known this, and introduced into his book, not only the mention of the fact, but an explanation of its cause. Accordingly he makes Aristarchus give a reason "why the sun's apogee (or place of greatest distance from the earth) must always be at the north summer solstice." In fact, it was there, or nearly so, in Roberval's time, and he knew not but that it had always been there. It is however moveable, and, when Aristarchus lived, was nearly half way between the solstices and equinoxes. He therefore would hardly have given a reason for the necessity of a phenomenon of which, if he observed anything on the subject, he must have observed the contrary. The change in the obliquity of the earth's axis to the ecliptic was known in the time of Roberval, and he accordingly has introduced the proper value which it had in Aristarchus's time.
[19] De Cœlo. lib. 2.
[20] Paradise Lost, b. viii. v. 83.
[21] Itaque tam circulos primi motus quam orbes secundorum mobilium reverâ in cœlesti corpore esse concludimus, &c. Non ergo sunt mera figmenta, quibus extra mentem nihil correspondeat. M. Maestlini, De Astronomiæ Hypothesibus disputatio. Heidelbergæ, 1582.
[22] Opuscula Philosophica, Thema Cœli.