The Irish loss in killed and wounded was about four hundred. Many lives, on both sides, were lost by sickness—dysentery and enteric fever chiefly—during this siege. A conservative estimate places William’s loss, by wounds and sickness, at 5,000, and the Irish at 3,000.
The day after his bloody repulse, King William sent a flag of truce to De Boisseleau asking the privilege of burying his dead. After consultation with Berwick and Sarsfield, the French governor refused the request, as he suspected a ruse of some kind behind it. All the dead were buried by the Irish as quickly as possible, because the heat was intense, and, aside from feelings of humanity, they dreaded a plague from the decomposition of the corpses left above ground. We are informed by the late Mr. A. M. Sullivan, M.P., in his admirable “Story of Ireland,” that, during the pursuit by the Irish of King William’s men from the breach to their trenches, the temporary hospital established by the king for his wounded caught fire. The Irish troops immediately paused in their fierce pursuit, and devoted themselves to saving their helpless foes in the hospital, who, otherwise, must have perished miserably in the flames.
King William, after carefully considering the situation, and taking counsel with his chief officers, decided that there was no hope of capturing Limerick that year. Therefore, he declared the siege raised—that is, abandoned—and, on August 30th, the entire Williamite army drew off from before Limerick, posting strong rear-guards at points of vantage, so as to baffle pursuit. The king, leaving Baron De Ginkel in command, retired to Waterford. There he embarked for England, bidding Ireland what proved to be an eternal farewell. Although this gloomy monarch was not quite as ferocious as some of his contemporaries, and was a marked improvement on Cromwell, Ireton, and Ludlow in Ireland, he is charged by careful Irish historians—like McGee, O’Callaghan, and Sullivan—with having, like his lieutenant, General Douglas, permitted many outrages on the people, both in person and property, on his march from Dublin to Limerick. Making due allowance for the difficulty of restraining a mercenary army, filled with hatred of the people they moved among, from committing excesses, it is regrettable that the martial renown of William of Orange is sullied by this charge of cruelty in Ireland, as, afterward, in connection with the foul massacre of the Macdonalds of Glencoe in Scotland. Brave men are rarely cruel, but we fear, in these instances, William was an exception to the rule.
The story of the first defence of Limerick, in the Williamite war, reads like a chapter from a military romance, and yet it was, indeed, a stern and bloody reality. It was, in truth, a magnificent defence against a powerful foe, not surpassed even by that of Saragossa against the French. Limerick, like Saragossa, was defended by the citizens, men and women, quite as much as by the soldiery. All took equal risks, as in the case of Londonderry. The latter was also a brilliant defence—more, however, in the matter of splendid endurance than in hand-to-hand conflict. Londonderry wears the crown for fortitude and tenacity—Limerick and Saragossa for heroic prowess and matchless courage.
CHAPTER VIII
Fall of Cork and Kinsale—Lauzun, the French General, Accused by Irish Writers—Sarsfield’s Popularity—Tyrconnel Returns to Ireland—Berwick Departs
THE successful defence of Limerick by the Irish was somewhat offset in the following month of September by the victorious expedition from England, against Cork and Kinsale, led by John Churchill, afterward Duke of Marlborough, the greatest general of that age. Cork, under the military governor, McEligott, defended itself vigorously during a siege of five days, but the defences and garrison were both weak, and, eventually, the city capitulated on honorable conditions. These were subsequently violated by some soldiers and camp-followers of the English army, but Marlborough suppressed, in as far as he could, the disorders as soon as he heard of them. The English lost the Duke of Grafton—natural son of Charles II—and many other officers and private men during the siege. Marlborough, with characteristic promptitude, moved at once on Kinsale. The old town and fort, not being defensible, were, after some show of resistance, abandoned by the Irish troops, who took post in the new fort, commanding the harbor, which they held with creditable tenacity, during fourteen days. They, at last, capitulated, their ammunition having run low, and were allowed, in recognition of their valor, to retire to Limerick, the garrison in that city being thus augmented by 1,200 tried warriors. Marlborough accomplished his task within five weeks, and returned to England a popular idol. The loss of Cork and Kinsale, particularly the latter, was a severe blow to the Irish army, as it was, thereby, deprived of the most favorable seaports by which supplies from France could reach it. It should have been stated that Marlborough, in the capture of those towns, was materially assisted by the English fleet. His army was a very formidable one, consisting of 9,000 picked men from England, and a detachment, nearly equal in numbers, which joined him, under the Duke of Wurtemburg and General Scravenmore. The latter body consisted of troops who had fought at the Boyne and Limerick. Wurtemburg, on account of his connection with royalty, claimed the command in chief. Marlborough, who was as great a diplomat as he was a general, agreed to command alternately, but he was, all through the operations, the real commander. Students of history will remember that, in after wars on the Continent, Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy commanded on alternate days. But there was a great difference in this case, Eugene having been regarded as nearly as good a general as Marlborough himself.
O’Callaghan attributes the failure of the main Irish army to succor the Cork and Kinsale garrisons to the misconduct of Lauzun in deserting Ireland, with his remaining 5,000 French troops, at this critical period. He quotes King James’s and Berwick’s memoirs, the Rawdon papers, and other authorities, to show that the Duke of Berwick had advanced with 7,000 men as far as Kilmallock, in Limerick County, to raise the siege of Cork, when he found himself destitute of cannon, which had been carried off by the French general, and could not expose his inferior force, destitute of artillery, to the formidable force under his uncle, Marlborough. He was, therefore, most reluctantly compelled to abandon the enterprise. Lauzun, it is further claimed, carried off most of the powder stored in Limerick, and, had it not been for Sarsfield’s exploit at Ballyneety, that city must have fallen if a second assault had been delivered by William, as only fifty barrels of powder remained after the fight of August 27th.
The autumn and winter of 1690-91 were marked by constant bloody skirmishes between the cavalry and infantry outposts of the two armies. Hardly a day passed without bloodshed. Considerable ferocity was exhibited by both parties, and neither seemed to have much the advantage of the other. Story’s narrative of this period is one unbroken tale of disorder and strife. His narration, if taken without a grain of salt, would lead us to believe that nearly all the able-bodied Celtic-Irish were put to the sword, at sight, by his formidable countrymen and their allies, although he does admit, occasionally, that the Irish succeeded in killing a few, at least, of their enemies. The most considerable of these lesser engagements occurred between Sarsfield and the Duke of Berwick on the Irish side and General Douglas and Sir John Lanier on the side of the Williamites. The Irish leaders made an attack on Birr Castle in September, and were engaged in battering it, when the English, under Lanier, Douglas, and Kirk, marched to relieve it. They were too many for Berwick and Sarsfield, who retired on Banagher, where there is a bridge over the Shannon. The English pursued and made a resolute attempt to take the bridge, but the Irish defended it so steadily, and with such loss to the enemy, that the latter abandoned the attempt at capture and retired to Birr. Sarsfield possessed one great advantage over all the higher officers of King James’s army. He could speak the Irish (Gaelic) language fluently, having learned it from the lips of his mother, Anna O’More. This gave him vast control over the Celtic peasantry, who fully trusted him, as he did them, and they kept him informed of all that was passing in their several localities. The winter was exceptionally severe—so much so that, at some points, the deep and rapid Shannon was all but frozen across. Besides, there were several bridges that, if carelessly guarded, could be easily surprised and taken by the invaders. Sarsfield’s Celtic scouts, in December, observed several parties of British cavalry moving along the banks of the river. Their suspicions were excited, and they, at once, communicated with their general. The latter had no sooner taken the alarm than one English force, under Douglas, showed itself at Jamestown, and another, under Kirk and Lanier, at Jonesboro. The English commanders were astonished at finding the Irish army prepared to receive them warmly at both points. After severe skirmishing, they withdrew. The cold had become so severe that foreign troops were almost useless, while the Irish became, if possible, more alert. Sarsfield, at the head of his formidable cavalry, harassed the retreat of the Williamites to their winter quarters.