The War of Independence

by John Fiske

Battle of Princeton, Jan. 3, 1777.

Washington meanwhile was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging and entrenching, and made a fine show with his campfires. Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek, and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown.

There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a position. But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that the British had taken the city of New York—which from the start was almost a foregone conclusion—they were no better off than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In nine days the tables had been completely turned. The attack upon an outpost had developed into a campaign which quite retrieved the situation. The ill-timed interference of Congress, which had begun the series of disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated; and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so much been done with such slender means.

Effects of the campaign, in Europe.

The American war had begun to awaken interest in Europe, especially in France, whither Franklin, with Silas Deane and Arthur Lee, had been sent to seek for military aid. The French government was not yet ready to make an alliance with the United States, but money and arms were secretly sent over to Congress. Several young French nobles had asked the king's permission to go to America, but it was refused, and for the sake of keeping up appearances the refusal had something of the air of a reprimand. The king did not wish to offend Great Britain prematurely. One of these nobles was Lafayette, then eighteen years of age, who fitted up a ship at his own expense, and sailed from Bordeaux in April, 1777, in spite of the royal prohibition, taking with him Kalb and other officers. Lafayette and Kalb, with the Poles, Kosciuszko and Pulaski, who had come some time before, and the German Steuben, who came in the following December, were the five most eminent foreigners who received commissions in the Continental army.

Difficulty in raising an army.

During the winter season at Morristown the efforts of Washington were directed toward the establishment of a regular army to be kept together for three years or so long as the war should last. Hitherto the military preparations of Congress had been absurdly weak. Squads of militia had been enlisted for terms of three or six months, as if there were any likelihood of the war being ended within such a period. While the men thus kept coming and going, it was difficult either to maintain discipline or to carry out any series of military operations. Accordingly Congress now proceeded to call upon the states for an army of 80,000 men to serve during the war. The enlisting was to be done by the states, but the money was to be furnished by Congress. Not half that number of men were actually obtained. The Continental army was larger in 1777 than in any other year, but the highest number it reached was only 34,820. In addition to these about 34,000 militia turned out in the course of the year. An army of 80,000 would have taken about the same proportion of all the fighting men in the country as an army of 1,000,000 in our great Civil War. Now in our Civil War the Union army grew with the occasion until it numbered more than 1,000,000. But in the Revolutionary War the Continental army was not only never equal to the occasion, but it kept diminishing till in 1781 it numbered only 13,292. This was because the Continental Congress had no power to enforce its decrees. It could only ask for troops and it could only ask for money. It found just the same difficulty in getting anything that the British ministry and the royal governors used to find,—the very same difficulty that led Grenville to devise the Stamp Act. Everything had to be talked over in thirteen different legislatures, one state would wait to see what another was going to do, and meanwhile Washington was expected to fight battles before his army was fit to take the field. Something was gained, no doubt, by Congress furnishing the money. But as Congress could not tax anybody, it had no means of raising a revenue, except to beg, borrow, or issue its promissory notes, the so-called Continental paper currency.

While Congress was trying to raise an adequate army, the British ministry laid its plans for the summer campaign. The conquest of the state of New York must be completed at all hazards; and to this end a threefold system of movements was devised:—

The British plan for conquering New York in 1777.

First, the army in Canada was to advance upon Ticonderoga, capture it, and descend the Hudson as far as Albany. This work was now entrusted to General Burgoyne.