The War of Independence

by John Fiske

As England was thus fighting single-handed against France, Spain, Holland, and the United States, while the attitude of all the neutral powers was unfriendly, we can find no difficulty in understanding the weakness of her military operations in some quarters. The United States, on the other hand, found it hard to carry on the war for very different reasons. In the first place the country was really weak. The military strength of the American Union in 1780 was inferior to that of Holland, and about on a level with that of Denmark or Portugal. But furthermore the want of union made it hard to bring out such strength as there was. In the autumn of 1777 the Articles of Confederation were submitted to the several states for adoption; but the spring of 1781 had arrived before all the thirteen states had ratified them. These articles left the Continental Congress just what it was before, a mere advisory body, without power to enlist soldiers or levy taxes, without federal courts or federal officials, and with no executive head to the government. As we have already seen, the only way in which Congress could get money from the people was by requisitions upon the states, by asking the state-governments for it. This was always a very slow way to get money, and now the states were unusually poor. There was very little accumulated capital. Farming, fishing, ship-building, and foreign trade were the chief occupations. Farms and plantations suffered considerably from the absence of their owners in the army, and many were kept from enlisting, because it was out of the question to go and leave their families to starve. As for ship-building, fishing, and foreign trade, these occupations were almost annihilated by British cruisers. No doubt the heaviest blows that we received were thus dealt us on the water.

Fall of the Continental currency:—"Not worth a Continental."

The people were so poor that the states found it hard to collect enough revenue for their own purposes, and most of them had a way of issuing paper money of their own, which made things still worse. Under such circumstances they had very little money to give to Congress. It was necessary to borrow of France, or Spain, or Holland, and by the time these nations were all at war, that became very difficult. From the beginning of the war Congress had issued paper notes, and in 1778 the depreciation in their value was already alarming. But as soon as the exultation over Burgoyne's surrender had subsided, as soon as the hope of speedily driving out the British had been disappointed, people soon lost all confidence in the power of Congress to pay its notes, and in 1779 their value began falling with frightful rapidity. In 1780 they became worthless. It took $150 in Continental currency to buy a bushel of corn, and an ordinary suit of clothes cost $2000. Then people refused to take it, and resorted to barter, taking their pay in sheep or ploughs, in jugs of rum or kegs of salt pork, or whatever they could get. It thus became almost impossible either to pay soldiers, or to clothe and feed them properly and supply them with powder and ball. We thus see why the Americans, as well as the British conducted the war so languidly that for two years after the storming of Stony Point their main armies sat and faced each other by the Hudson river, without any movements of importance.

The British conquer Georgia, 1779.

In one quarter, however, the British began to make rapid progress. They possessed the Floridas, having got them from Spain by the treaty of 1763. Next them lay Georgia, the weakest of the thirteen states, and then came the Carolinas, with a strong Tory element in the population. For such reasons, after the great invasion of New York had failed, the British tried the plan of starting at the southern extremity of the Union and lopping off one state after another. In the autumn of 1778 General Prevost advanced from East Florida, and in a brief campaign succeeded in capturing Savannah, Sunbury, and Augusta. General Lincoln, who had won distinction in the Saratoga campaign, was appointed to command the American forces in the South. He sent General Ashe, with 1500 men, to threaten Augusta. At Ashe's approach, the British abandoned the town and retreated toward Savannah. Ashe pursued too closely and at Briar Creek, March 3, 1779, the enemy turned upon him and routed him. The Americans lost nearly 1000 men killed, wounded, and captured, besides their cannon and small arms; and this victory cost the British only 16 men killed and wounded. Augusta was reoccupied, the royal governor, Sir James Wright, was reinstated in office, and the machinery of government which had been in operation previous to 1776 was restored. Lincoln now advanced upon Augusta, but Prevost foiled him by returning the offensive and marching upon Charleston. In order to protect that city, Lincoln was obliged to retrace his steps. It was now the middle of May, and little more was done till September, when D'Estaing returned from the West Indies. On the 23d Savannah was invested by the combined forces of Lincoln and D'Estaing, and the siege was vigorously carried on for a fortnight. Then the French admiral grew impatient. On the 9th of October a fierce assault was made, in which the allies were defeated with the loss of 1000 men, including the gallant Pulaski. The French fleet then departed, and the British could look upon Georgia as recovered.

And capture Charleston, with Lincoln's army, May 12, 1780.

It was South Carolina's turn next. Washington was obliged to weaken his own force by sending most of the southern troops to Lincoln's assistance. Sir Henry Clinton then withdrew the garrisons from his advanced posts on the Hudson, and also from Rhode Island, and was thus able to leave an adequate force in New York, while he himself set sail for Savannah, December 26, 1779, with a considerable army. After the British forces were united in Georgia, they amounted to more than 13,000 men, against whom Lincoln could bring but 7000. The fate of the American army shows us what would probably have happened in New York in 1776 if an ordinary general instead of Washington had been in command. Lincoln allowed himself to be cooped up in Charleston, and after a siege of two months was obliged to surrender the city and his whole army on the 12th of May, 1780. This was the most serious disaster the Americans had suffered since the loss of Fort Washington. The dashing cavalry leader, Tarleton, soon cut to pieces whatever remnants of their army were left in South Carolina. Sir Henry Clinton returned in June to New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis with 5000 men to carry on the work. The Tories, thus supported, got the upperhand in the interior of the state, which suffered from all the horrors of civil war. The American cause was sustained only by partisan leaders, of whom the most famous were Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter.

Battle of Camden, Aug. 16, 1780.

When the news of Lincoln's surrender reached the North, the emergency was felt to be desperate. A fresh army was raised, consisting of about 2000 superbly trained veterans of the Maryland and Delaware lines, under the Baron de Kalb, and such militia as could be raised in Virginia and North Carolina. The chief command was given to Gates, whose conduct from the start was a series of blunders. The most important strategic point in South Carolina was Camden, at the intersection of the principal roads from the coast to the mountains and from north to south. In marching upon this point Gates was met by Lord Cornwallis on the 16th of August and utterly routed. Kalb was mortally wounded at the head of the Maryland troops, who held their ground nobly till overwhelmed by numbers; the Delaware men were cut to pieces; the militia were swept away in flight, and Gates with them. His northern laurels, as it was said, had changed into southern willows; and for the second time within three months an American army at the South had been annihilated.

This was, on the whole, the darkest moment of the war. For a moment in July there had been a glimmer of hopefulness when the Count de Rochambeau arrived with 6000 men who were landed on Rhode Island. The British fleet, however, soon came and blockaded them there, and again the hearts of the people were sickened with hope deferred. It seemed as if Lord George Germaine's policy of "tiring the Americans out" might be going to succeed after all. When the value of the Continental paper money now fell to zero, it was a fair indication that the people had pretty much lost all faith in Congress. In the army the cases of desertion to the British lines averaged about a hundred per month.