But Dr. Channing continues—“The highest intelligences recognise their own nature, their own rights, in the humblest human being. By that priceless, immortal spirit which dwells in him, by that likeness of God which he wears, tread him not in the dust, confound him not with the brute.” And he then gravely adds—“We have thus seen that a human being cannot rightfully be held and used as property. No legislation, not that of all countries or worlds, could make him so. Let this be laid down as a first, fundamental truth.”
Such were his opinions. We view them, if not the ravings, at least the impressions, of fanaticism. When counsellor Quibble saw his client Stultus going to the stocks, he cried out, “It is contrary to my sense of justice; to the laws of God and man; no power can make it right!” Yet Stultus is in the stocks!
But what shall we say of him who makes the sanction of his own feelings the foundation of his creed, of his standard of right? What of him, who, in his search for truth, scarcely or never alludes to the Bible as the voice of God, as the Divine basis of his reasons, as the pillar on which argument may find rest? Has some new revelation inspired him? Has he heard a voice louder and more clear than the thunder, the trumpet from the mount of God? Has he beheld truth by a light more lucid than the flaming garments of Jehovah? Or has he only seen a cloud, not from the top of Sinai, but from the dismal pit of human frailty?
LESSON V.
Dr. Channing’s second proposition is: “Man has sacred rights, the gifts of God, and inseparable from human nature, of which slavery is the infraction;” in proof of which he says, vol. ii. p. 23—“Man’s rights belong to him as a moral being, as capable of perceiving moral distinctions, a subject of moral obligation. As soon as he becomes conscious of a duty, a kindred consciousness springs up, that he has a right to do what the sense of duty enjoins, and that no foreign will or power can obstruct his moral action without crime.”
Suppose man has rights as described; suppose he feels conscious, as he says; does that give him a right to do wrong, because his sense of duty enjoins him to do so? And may he not be prevented from so doing? Was it indeed a crime in God to turn the counsels of Ahithophel into foolishness?
Page 33. “That some inward principle which teaches a man what he is bound to do to others, teaches equally, and at the same instant, what others are bound to do to him!” Suppose a few Africans, on an excursion to capture slaves, find that this “inward principle” teaches them that they are bound to make a slave of Dr. Channing, if they can; does he mean that, therefore, he is bound to make slaves of them?
Idem, p. 33. “The sense of duty is the fountain of human rights. In other words, the same inward principle which teaches the former, bears witness to the latter.”
If the African’s sense of duty gives the right to make Dr. Channing a slave, we do not see why he should complain; since, by his own rule, the African’s sense of duty proves him to possess the right which his sense of duty covets.