Life and Times of Washington, Volume 2 / Revised, Enlarged, and Enriched

by John Frederick Schroeder; Benson John Lossing

The heads of these departments, in addition to the duties specially assigned them, were intended to constitute a council, to be consulted by the President whenever he thought proper, and the Executive was authorized by the constitution to require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officers in the executive departments, on subjects relating to the duties of their offices. In framing the acts constituting these offices and defining their duties, it became an important subject of inquiry in what manner or by whom these important officers could be removed from office. This was a question as new as it was momentous and was applicable to all officers of executive appointment. In the long and learned debates on the subject in Congress, there arose a very animated opposition to such a construction of the constitution as to give this power to any one individual. Whatever confidence might be placed in the chief magistrate then at the head of the government, equal confidence could not be expected in his successors, and it was contended that a concurrence of the Senate was as necessary and proper in the removal of a person from office as in his appointment. Some of the members of the House of Representatives were of opinion that they could not be removed without impeachment. The principal question, however, on which Congress was divided, was, whether they were removable by the President alone, or by the President in concurrence with the Senate. A majority, however, in both houses, decided that this power was in the President alone. In the House, the majority in favor of this construction was twelve. This decision of a great constitutional question has been acquiesced in, and in its consequences has been of greater importance than almost any other since the establishment of the new government. From the manner in which this power has been exercised, it has given a tone and character to the executive branch of the government not contemplated, it is believed, by the framers of the constitution or by those who constituted the first Congress under it. It has greatly increased the influence and patronage of the President and in no small degree made him the center around which the other branches of the government revolve. {4}

In a free country, where the private citizen has both the right and the inclination to take an interest in the public concerns, it is natural that political parties and civil contentions should arise. These will be more or less violent, angry, and hostile, according as a sense of common security from external dangers leaves no cause for united action, and little anxiety for the common peace. A natural consequence of this strife of parties is the exercise of the passions—pride, interest, vanity, resentment, gratitude—each contributing its share in irritating and prolonging the controversy. In the beginning of the Revolution, the people of the United States divided themselves into the two great classes of Whigs and Tories; then they again separated upon the question of absolute independence. Other questions arose during the war, relative to its conduct, and the qualifications of the leaders of the army. Independence achieved, the minds of the people were agitated about the nature of the government, which all saw to be necessary for their own happiness, and for the better enabling them to prosecute with foreign countries peaceful negotiations or the operations of war. Many saw, in too close a union, dangers as great and consequences as distasteful as in their entire separation. It was believed by many that the extent of the country, the great diversity of character, habits, and pursuits among the several States, presented insuperable obstacles to a closer union than that afforded by the articles of confederation. Some were almost exclusively commercial, others agricultural; some were disposed to engage in manufacturing pursuits; some had domestic slavery firmly connected with their domestic relations and were disposed to look favorably on the extension of the institution; others regarded involuntary servitude as a curse, and desired its abolition.

It was not to be wondered at, that with such points of diversity, many should suppose that a single government could not administer the affairs of all, except by a greater delegation of power than would be submitted to by the American people. While some looked wholly to these apprehended consequences of a close union and a single government, others chiefly regarded the dangers arising from disunion, domestic dissensions, and even war. One party dreaded consolidation; the other, anarchy and separation. Each saw, in the object of its dread, the destruction of good government, though one party looked too exclusively to its characteristic of order, the other to that of civil liberty. These were the thoughts of the people, widely different, but all equally honest. But the politicians addressed themselves to these prejudices, often with unworthy motives. Local prejudices, self-interest, fears, in some cases from an anticipated loss of consequence, in the event of a transfer of sovereignty from the individual States to the general government, all combined to make many violent in their expressions of opposition to the plan. Apprehensions of violence and disorder, and fears from individual popularity in a circumscribed sphere, led others to desire consolidation. With these, ranked others who were fond of the pomp and show of authority which would attend a powerful government; and still others, who, having claims upon the country, supposed that they would have much stronger hopes of being paid themselves and of seeing the debts due abroad liquidated if a system of government were established which could be certain to raise a revenue for these objects. On the formation of the constitution, the community settled down into two great parties, Federalists and Anti-Federalists, or Democrats; the first believing that the most imminent danger to our peace and prosperity was in disunion, and that popular jealousy, always active, would withhold the power which was essential to good order and national safety; the other party believing that the danger most to be apprehended was in too close a union, and that their most powerful opponents wished a consolidated and even a monarchial government.

There were many who had been accustomed to reflect upon government and political relations previously to the war of independence, when the constitution of Great Britain being by far the best that had ever existed, they may naturally be supposed to have conceived for it a degree of homage and respect which it could not now inspire. The speculations on political rights, to which the contest with Great Britain and the debates on the question of independence gave rise, greatly favored the doctrines of political equality and the hatred of power in any form that could control the public will. There are, in the heart of every man, principles which readily prepare him for republican doctrines, and after a few years some of the speculative politicians began to think that the free, simple, and equal government which was suited to the tastes and habits of our people, was also the best in theory. The great body of the people were partial to the form of government to which they had been accustomed and wished for none other, though the leading statesmen differed upon this point. Some preferred the republican form in theory and believed that no other would be tolerated in practice, and others regretted that they were obliged to yield so far to popular prejudice as to forego the form they deemed best, but determined to avail themselves of every opportunity of improving the existing government into that form. Nor were they without hopes that by siding with the general government in every question of power between that and the separate States, and with the Executive in all questions between that and the Legislature, and by continually increasing the patronage of the executive by means of an army, a navy, and the multiplication of civil officers, they would ultimately obtain their object. {5}

It was in the midst of this society, so agitated and disturbed, that Washington, without ambition, without any false show, from a sense of duty rather than inclination and rather trusting in truth than confident of success, undertook actually to found the government decreed by the new-born constitution. He rose to his high office invested with an immense influence, which was acknowledged and received even by his enemies.

Washington's natural inclination, says Guizot, {7} was rather to a democratic social state than to any other. Of a mind just rather than expansive, of a temper wise and calm, full of dignity, but free from all selfish and arrogant pretensions—coveting rather respect than power—the impartiality of democratic principles and the simplicity of democratic manners, far from offending or annoying him, suited his tastes and satisfied his judgment. He did not trouble himself with inquiring whether more elaborate combinations, a division into ranks, privileges, and artificial barriers, were necessary to the preservation of society. He lived tranquilly in the midst of an equal and sovereign people, finding its authority to be lawful and submitting to it without effort.

But when the question was one of political and not social order, when the discussion turned upon the organization of the government, he was strongly federal, opposed to local and popular pretensions and the declared advocate of the unity and force of the central power.

He placed himself under this standard and did so to insure its triumph. But still his elevation was not the victory of a party and awakened in no one either exultation or regret. In the eyes, not only of the public, but of his enemies, he was not included in any party and was above them all: "the only man in the United States," said Jefferson, "who possessed the confidence of all;—there was no other one who was considered as anything more than a party leader."

It was his constant effort to maintain this honorable privilege. "It is really my wish to have my mind and my actions, which are the result of reflection, as free and independent as the air. If it should be my inevitable fate to administer the government, I will go to chair under no pre-engagement of any kind or nature whatsoever. Should anything tending to give me anxiety present itself in this or any other publication, I shall never undertake the painful task of recrimination, nor do I know that I should ever enter upon my justification. All else is but food for declamation. Men's minds are as various as their faces, and, where the motives of their actions are pure, the operations of the former are no more to be imputed to them as a crime than the appearance of the latter. Differences in political opinions are as unavoidable, as, to a certain point, they may, perhaps, be necessary." {8}

A stranger also to all personal disputes, to the passions and prejudices of his friends, as well as his enemies, the purpose of his whole policy was to maintain this position and to this policy he gave the true name, "the just medium!"