It had now become necessary for Burgoyne to recur to the slow and toilsome mode of obtaining supplies from Fort George. Having, with persevering labor, collected provision for thirty days in advance he crossed the Hudson on the 13th and 14th of September (1777) and encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga, with a determination to decide the fate of the expedition in a general engagement.
Gates, having been joined by all the Continental troops destined for the northern department and reinforced by large bodies of militia, had moved from his camp in the islands, and advanced to the neighborhood of Stillwater.
The bridges between the two armies having been broken down by General Schuyler, the roads being excessively bad and the country covered with wood, the progress of the British army down the river was slow. On the night of the 17th of September, Burgoyne encamped within four miles of the American army and the next day was employed in repairing the bridges between the two camps. In the morning of the 19th he advanced in full force toward the American left. Morgan was immediately detached with his rifle corps to observe the enemy and to harass his front and flanks. He fell in with a picket in front of the right wing which he attacked with vivacity and drove in upon the main body. Pursuing with too much ardor he was met in considerable force, and after a severe encounter was compelled in turn to retire in some disorder. Two regiments led by Arnold being advanced to his assistance his corps was rallied, and the action became more general. The Americans were formed in a wood, with an open field in front, and invariably repulsed the British corps which attacked them, but when they pursued those corps to the main body they were in turn driven back to their first ground. Reinforcements were continually brought up, and about 4 in the afternoon upward of 3,000 American troops were closely engaged with the whole right wing of the British army commanded by General Burgoyne in person. The conflict was extremely severe and only terminated with the day. At dark the Americans retired to their camp, and the British, who had found great difficulty in maintaining their ground, lay all night on their arms near the field of battle.
In this action the killed and wounded on the part of the Americans were between three and four hundred. Among the former were Colonels Colburn and Adams and several other valuable officers. The British loss has been estimated at rather more than 500 men.
Each army claimed the victory and each believed itself to have beaten near the whole of the hostile army with only a part of its own force. The advantage, however, taking all circumstances into consideration, was decidedly with the Americans. In a conflict which nearly consumed the day, they found themselves at least equal to their antagonists. In every quarter they had acted on the offensive, and after an encounter for several hours had not lost an inch of ground. They had not been driven from the field, but had retired from it at the close of day to the camp from which they had marched to battle. Their object, which was to check the advancing enemy, had been obtained, while that of the British general had failed. In the actual state of things to fight without being beaten was on their part victory, while on the part of the British to fight without a decisive victory was defeat. The Indians who found themselves beaten in the woods by Morgan, {6} and restrained from scalping and plundering the unarmed by Burgoyne, saw before them the prospect of hard fighting without profit, grew tired of the service and deserted in great numbers. The Canadians and Provincials were not much more faithful, and Burgoyne soon perceived that his hopes must rest almost entirely on his European troops.
With reason, therefore, this action was celebrated throughout the United States as a victory and considered as the precursor of the total ruin of the invading army. The utmost exultation was displayed and the militia were stimulated to fly to arms and complete the work so happily begun.
General Lincoln, in conformity with directions which have been stated, had assembled a considerable body of New England militia in the rear of Burgoyne, from which he drew three parties of about 500 men each. One of these was detached under the command of Colonel Brown to the north end of Lake George, principally to relieve a number of prisoners who were confined there, but with orders to push his success, should he be fortunate, as far as prudence would admit. Colonel Johnson, at the head of another party, marched towards Mount Independence, and Colonel Woodbury with a third was detached to Skeenesborough to cover the retreat of both the others. With the residue, Lincoln proceeded to the camp of Gates.
Colonel Brown, after marching all night, arrived at the break of day on the north end of the lake where he found a small post which he carried without opposition. The surprise was complete, and he took possession of Mount Defiance, Mount Hope, the landing place, and about 200 batteaux. With the loss of only three killed and five wounded, he liberated 100 American prisoners and captured 293 of the enemy. This success was joyfully proclaimed through the northern States. It was believed confidently that Ticonderoga and Mount Independence were recovered, and the militia were exhorted, by joining their brethren in the army, to insure that event if it had not already happened.
The attempt on those places, however, failed. The garrison repulsed the assailants, who, after a few days abandoned the siege. On their return through Lake George in the vessels they had captured the militia made an attack on Diamond Island, the depot of all the stores collected at the north end of the lake. Being again repulsed they destroyed the vessels they had taken and returned to their former station.
The day after the battle of Stillwater General Burgoyne took a position almost within cannon-shot of the American camp, fortified his right, and extended his left to the river. Directly after taking this ground he received a letter from Sir Henry Clinton informing him that he should attack Fort Montgomery about the 20th of September (1777). The messenger returned with information that Burgoyne was in extreme difficulty and would endeavor to wait for aid until the 12th of October. {7}