Lord Elgin

by John George Bourinot

"Mr. Fillmore," he is writing in November, 1850, "stands to his congress very much in the same relation in which I stood to my assembly in Jamaica. There is the same absence of effective responsibility in the conduct of legislation, the same want of concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. The whole business of legislation in the American congress, as well as in the state legislatures, is conducted in the manner in which railway business was conducted in the House of Commons at a time when it is to be feared that, notwithstanding the high standard of honour in the British parliament, there was a good deal of jobbing. For instance, our reciprocity measure was pressed by us at Washington last session just as a railway bill in 1845 or 1846 would have been pressed in parliament There was no government to deal with. The interests of the union as a whole, distinct from local and sectional interests, had no organ in the representative bodies; it was all a question of canvassing this member of congress or the other. It is easy to perceive that, under such a system, jobbing must become not the exception but the rule,"—remarks as true in 1901 as in 1850.

It is important also to dwell on the fact that in Canada the permanency of the tenure of public officials and the introduction of the secret ballot have been among the results of responsible government. Through the influence and agency of the same system, valuable reforms have been made in Canada in the election laws, and the trial of controverted elections has been taken away from partisan election committees and given to a judiciary independent of political influences. In these matters the irresponsible system of the United States has not been able to effect any needful reforms. Such measures can be best carried by ministers having the initiation and direction of legislation and must necessarily be retarded when power is divided among several authorities having no unity of policy on any question.

Party government undoubtedly has its dangers arising from personal ambition and unscrupulous partisanship, but as long as men must range themselves in opposing camps on every subject, there is no other system practicable by which great questions can be carried and the working of representative government efficiently conducted. The framers of the constitution of the United States no doubt thought they had succeeded in placing the president and his officers above party when they instituted the method of electing the former by a body of select electors chosen for that purpose in each state, who were expected to act irrespective of all political considerations. A president so selected would probably choose his officers also on the same basis. The practical results, however, have been to prove that in every country of popular and representative institutions party government must prevail. Party elects men to the presidency and to the floor of the Senate and House of Representatives, and the election to those important positions is directed and controlled by a political machinery far exceeding in its completeness any party organization in England or in Canada. The party convention is now the all important portion of the machinery for the election of the president, and the safeguard provided by the constitution for the choice of the best man is a mere nullity. One thing is quite certain, that party government under the direction of a responsible ministry, responsible to parliament and the people for every act of administration and legislation, can have far less dangerous tendencies than a party system which elects an executive not amenable to public opinion for four years, divides the responsibilities of government among several authorities, prevents harmony among party leaders, does not give the executive that control over legislation necessary to efficient administration of public affairs, and in short offers a direct premium to conflict among all the authorities of the state—a conflict, not so much avoided by the checks and balances of the constitution as by the patience, common sense, prudence, and respect for law which presidents and their cabinets have as a rule shown at national crises. But we can clearly see that, while the executive has lost in influence, congress has gained steadily to an extent never contemplated by the founders of the constitution, and there are thoughtful men who say that the true interests of the country have not always been promoted by the change. Party government in Canada ensures unity of policy, since the premier of the cabinet becomes the controlling part of the political machinery of the state; no such thing as unity of policy is possible under a system which gives the president neither the dignity of a governor-general, nor the strength of a premier, and splits up political power among any number of would-be party leaders, who adopt or defeat measures by private intrigues, make irresponsible recommendations, and form political combinations for purely selfish ends.[39]

It seems quite clear then that the system of responsible ministers makes the people more immediately responsible for the efficient administration of public affairs than is possible in the United States. The fact of having the president and the members of congress elected for different terms, and of dividing the responsibilities of government among these authorities does not allow the people to exercise that direct influence which is ensured, as the experience of Canada and of England proves, by making one body of men immediately responsible to the electors for the conduct of public affairs at frequently recurring periods, arranged by well understood rules, so as to ensure a correct expression of public opinion on all important issues. The committees which assist in governing this country are the choice of the people's representatives assembled in parliament, and every four or five years and sometimes even sooner in case of a crisis, the people have to decide on the wisdom of the choice.

The system has assuredly its drawbacks like all systems of government that have been devised and worked out by the brain of man. In all frankness I confess that this review would be incomplete were I not to refer to certain features of the Canadian system of government which seem to me on the surface fraught with inherent danger at some time or other to independent legislative judgment. Any one who has closely watched the evolution of this system for years past must admit that there is a dangerous tendency in the Dominion to give the executive—I mean the ministry as a body—too superior a control over the legislative authority. When a ministry has in its gift the appointment not only of the heads of the executive government in the provinces, that is to say, of the lieutenant-governors, who can be dismissed by the same power at any moment, but also of the members of the Upper House of Parliament itself, besides the judiciary and numerous collectorships and other valuable offices, it is quite obvious that the element of human ambition and selfishness has abundant room for operation on the floor of the legislature, and a bold and skilful cabinet is also able to wield a machinery very potent under a system of party government. In this respect the House of Representatives may be less liable to insidious influences than a House of Commons at critical junctures when individual conscience or independent judgment appears on the point of asserting itself. The House of Commons may be made by skilful party management a mere recording or registering body of an able and determined cabinet. I see less liability to such silent though potent influences in a system which makes the president and a house of representatives to a large degree independent of each other, and leaves his important nominations to office under the control of the senate, a body which has no analogy whatever with the relatively weak branch of the Canadian parliament, essentially weak while its membership depends on the government itself. I admit at once that in the financial dependence of the provinces on the central federal authority, in the tenure of the office of the chief magistrates of the provinces, in the control exercised by the ministry over the highest legislative body of Canada, that is, highest in point of dignity and precedence, there are elements of weakness; but at the same time it must be remembered that, while the influence and power of the Canadian government may be largely increased by the exercise of its great patronage in the hypothetical cases I have suggested, its action is always open to the approval or disapproval of parliament and it has to meet an opposition face to face. Its acts are open to legislative criticism, and it may at any moment be forced to retire by public opinion operating upon the House of Commons.

On the other hand the executive in the United States for four years may be dominant over congress by skilful management. A strong executive by means of party wields a power which may be used for purposes of mere personal ambition, and may by clever management of the party machine and with the aid of an unscrupulous majority retain power for a time even when it is not in accord with the true sentiment of the country; but under a system like that of Canada, where every defect in the body politic is probed to the bottom in the debates of parliament, which are given by the public press more fully than is the practice in the neighbouring republic, the people have a better opportunity of forming a correct judgment on every matter and giving an immediate verdict when the proper time comes for an appeal to them, the sovereign power. Sometimes this judgment is too often influenced by party prejudices and the real issue is too often obscured by skilful party management, but this is inevitable under every system of popular government; and happily, should it come to the worst, there is always in the country that saving remnant of intelligent, independent men of whom Matthew Arnold has written, who can come forward and by their fearless and bold criticism help the people in any crisis when truth, honour and justice are at stake and the great mass of electors fail to appreciate the true situation of affairs. But we may have confidence in the good sense and judgment of the people as a whole when time is given them to consider the situation of affairs. Should men in power be unfaithful to their public obligations, they will eventually be forced by the conditions of public life to yield their positions to those who merit public confidence. If it should ever happen in Canada that public opinion has become so low that public men feel that they can, whenever they choose, divert it to their own selfish ends by the unscrupulous use of partisan agencies and corrupt methods, and that the highest motives of public life are forgotten in a mere scramble for office and power, then thoughtful Canadians might well despair of the future of their country; but, whatever may be the blots at times on the surface of the body politic, there is yet no reason to believe that the public conscience of Canada is weak or indifferent to character and integrity in active politics. The instincts of an English people are always in the direction of the pure administration of justice and the efficient and honest government of the country, and though it may sometimes happen that unscrupulous politicians and demagogues will for a while dominate in the party arena, the time of retribution and purification must come sooner or later. English methods must prevail in countries governed by an English people and English institutions.

It is sometimes said that it is vain to expect a high ideal in public life, that the same principles that apply to social and private life cannot always be applied to the political arena if party government is to succeed; but this is the doctrine of the mere party manager, who is already too influential in Canada as in the United States, and not of a true patriotic statesman. It is wiser to believe that the nobler the object the greater the inspiration, and at all events, it is better to aim high than to sink low. It is all important that the body politic should be kept pure and that public life should be considered a public trust. Canada is still young in her political development, and the fact that her population has been as a rule a steady, fixed population, free from those dangerous elements which have come into the United States with such rapidity of late years, has kept her relatively free from any serious social and political dangers which have afflicted her neighbours, and to which I believe they themselves, having inherited English institutions and being imbued with the spirit of English law, will always in the end rise superior. Great responsibility, therefore, rests in the first instance upon the people of Canada, who must select the best and purest among them to serve the country, and, secondly, upon the men whom the legislature chooses to discharge the trust of carrying on the government. No system of government or of laws can of itself make a people virtuous and happy unless their rulers recognize in the fullest sense their obligations to the state and exercise their powers with prudence and unselfishness, and endeavour to elevate and not degrade public opinion by the insidious acts and methods of the lowest political ethics. A constitution may be as perfect as human agencies can make it, and yet be relatively worthless while the large responsibilities and powers entrusted to the governing body—responsibilities and powers not embodied in acts of parliament—are forgotten in view of party triumph, personal ambition, or pecuniary gain. "The laws," says Burke, "reach but a very little way. Constitute government how you please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of ministers of state. Even all the use and potency of the laws depend upon them. Without them your commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper, and not a living, active, effective organization."

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

For accounts of the whole career of Lord Elgin see Letters and Journals of James, Eighth, Earl of Elgin, etc., edited by Theodore Walrond, C.B., with a preface by his brother-in-law, Dean Stanley (London 2nd. ed., 1873); for China mission, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan by Lawrence Oliphant, his private secretary (Edinburgh, 1869); for the brief Indian administration, The Friend of India for 1862-63. Consult also article in vol. 8 of Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th ed.; John Charles Dent's Canadian Portrait Gallery (Toronto, 1880), vol. 2, which also contains a portrait; W.J. Rattray's The Scot in British North America (Toronto, 1880) vol. 2, pp. 608-641.

For an historical review of Lord Elgin's administration in Canada, see
J.C. Dent's The Last Forty Years, or Canada since the Union of 1841
(Toronto, 1881), chapters XXIII-XXXIV inclusive, with a portrait;
Louis P. Turcotte's Le Canada Sous l'Union (Quebec, 1871), chapters
I-IV, inclusive; Sir Francis Hincks's Reminiscences of His Public
Life (Montreal, 1884) with a portrait of the author; Joseph Pope's
Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir John A. Macdonald, G.C.B. (Ottawa and
London, 1894), with portraits of the great statesman, vol. 1, chapters
IV-VI inclusive; Lord Grey's Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's
Administration (London, 2nd ed., 1853), vol. 1; Sir C.B. Adderley's
Review of the Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration,
by Earl Grey, and Subsequent Colonial History (London, 1869).