(p. 8.)
Similarly clear are Gwynn's adaptations of such commonplaces as the need to subordinate parts to the whole (p. 8) or for consistency of style (p. 15). Again, Horace asks whether a good poem is the product of nature or art—of native talent or of training—and denies that either is adequate alone (11. 408-418). Gwynn raises the same question about the architect, although in the first person, and answers,
If Art, or Nature, form'd me what I am;
If one or both, assisted in the Plan,
It is beyond, my utmost Power to say:
Whether I Art, or Nature' s Laws obey.
(p. 31.)
Since such ambivalence as this is not appropriate to his purpose, he, unlike Horace, begins almost immediately to stress a course of study that will result in mastery of the rules.
This last rhetorical tactic points to one serious problem which Horace poses for Gwynn—that of assuming an appropriate stance for defending the rules. The tone of Horace's epistle to the Pisos is familiar without being condescending. He writes as an experienced poet and critic to fellow writers, delivering his pronouncements freely and confidently, but without dogmatism. Gwynn is neither an equal writing to equals nor an experienced architect, confident of his qualifications to instruct the world. At one moment he acknowledges the "Judgment's Height" of the addressee (p. 28), the next he holds himself up as possessing a skill worthy of emulation, and proceeds to deliver a lesson in the tone of a schoolmaster: "Those Things which seem of little Consequence,/ And slight and trivial ..." (p. 32). Horace's wit, his reliance upon his audience to grasp the implications of his many examples, and his avoidance of positiveness subvert Gwynn's purpose, as he reveals frequently in contradictory outbursts and in shifts in tone. Yet in one important passage Horace provides him with a stance and a theme which help him prop up the rules. After discussing pardonable faults (11. 347-365) Horace addresses Piso's elder son, compliments him for his wisdom and training, and reminds him of the activities in which mediocrity may be tolerated. This serves as a contrast to poetry: "mediocribus esse poetis/ non homines, non di, non concessere columnae" (11. 372-373). For once Horace is almost uncompromising enough for Gwynn's purposes. He adopts a similarly magisterial tone, but reorders Horace's materials so that the emphasis is more fully on this principle:
But yet, my Lord, this one important Truth,