Dawn in darkest Africa

by John H. Harris

The foregoing ethical argument cannot fail to find an echo in the breast of every Britisher, but there are Imperial reasons which reinforce that argument. The Gambia river possesses a draught of 30 feet right up the river to a position of twenty miles beyond Bathurst, providing altogether forty miles of deep waterway. I am told this is the only safe anchorage for a British fleet in West Africa, safe, that is, from attack. This little colony of 4000 square miles is contentedly following on in the path of progress, its inhabitants are loyally and affectionately attached to the British Crown. Only one thing troubles the population of Gambia and that is the periodic rumours of a transfer to another Power. A categorical and clear statement from a Minister of the Crown that no such transference is contemplated or would be entertained is the least the native has a right to expect, and the Empire to demand.

Next in order of discussion has been the question of Portuguese colonies, and it has been mooted more than once that these should, either as a whole or in part, be transferred by Portugal to Germany for a financial consideration. The territories in question comprise Portuguese East and West Africa together with the islands of the Gulf of Guinea; the area of the mainland possessions being 778,000 square miles and that of the islands 460 square miles, making a total area of 778,460 square miles.

No experienced Power would be prepared to purchase, even if Portugal would be prepared to sell, a portion only of the Portuguese possessions, because the several colonies properly managed dovetail into each others’ requirements in such a manner that a separation of either would in all probability spell ruin to all. The richest of the colonies is that small island of San Thomé, but it cannot maintain its financial prosperity unless fed by labour from the mainland colonies of East and West Africa. Then the Angola finances are nearly balanced by the financial position of the cocoa islands.

Another argument is put forth, to the effect that the Portuguese treatment of natives demands a transfer of the territory to some more progressive Power, such as, for instance, Germany. Are those who advocate this policy quite sure that the “Progressive Power” would treat the natives better than the Portuguese? if so, where is the evidence? Does East Africa provide it? Does the treatment of the Herreros and the shooting of British Kaffirs demonstrate it? Those who support a transfer on this ground should not lightly pass over these and similar incidents. They can be absolutely certain of this one thing, that Germany would be “progressive” enough to see to it that the cocoa plantations of San Thomé had an abundant supply of labour—no matter what the consequences to such a subordinate issue as labour conditions.

Then I am told that “in any case the condition of the natives as a whole could not be so bad under Germany as under the Portuguese.” To this I cannot agree, for though I admit that a number of colonial Portuguese are slave traders, and that slavery is prevalent on the mainland and on the islands, I must, in fairness to the Portuguese, point out first that the Portuguese have a kindly nature to which one can appeal, and secondly that signs are not wanting of an awakening of the conscience of the Portuguese nation in a manner which may lead to a thorough cleansing of the colonial possessions of the Republic. Thirdly, there is no colour-bar in the Portuguese dominions.

To this argument I get the reply, “Public opinion in Germany would insist on the abolition of existing slavery,” but this is an argument which has no shred of foundation in fact; Germany is, in many respects, a progressive Power, but she has no philanthropic soul for the well-being of native races. A single word from Germany indicating a willingness to co-operate with Great Britain during the Congo agitation would have saved thousands, if not millions, of lives. That word was never spoken, the Congo tribes were left to perish, and German public opinion maintained a cynical attitude until the end. A merchant or two rendered yeoman service, but they were as voices crying in the wilderness.

Let Portugal retain her colonies, and resolutely begin to purify their administration and abolish slavery, but she must do it quickly if she is to retain the goodwill of those—and they are still many—who would deplore her disappearance from the map of Africa. She has said with an intensity demanding appreciation that she will not dispose of her ancient colonies, and this courageous reply evoked a warm response from all her colonists who to a man are intensely patriotic, but if Portugal should refuse to abolish slavery, she cannot expect that her most powerful Ally will be allowed to maintain an Alliance valued to-day by many of us, yet viewed with increasing uneasiness by a large section of the British Public. No one wishes to utter a word which can be construed as a threat, but every one knows that there are paths along which no British Foreign Minister can lead, much less force the nation.

BELGIAN CONGO

Belgian Congo figures largely in every proposal for a rearrangement of the map of Africa. It is claimed that Belgium has annexed more territory than she can safely administer; certain it is that in annexing the Congo she did not take over an ordinary colony. When Great Britain assumed responsibility for her African colonies their virgin wealth was practically untapped; the people inhabiting the colonies, as a whole, welcomed the advent of her rule, and moreover Great Britain had in all her territories, with the exception of Egypt, a free hand. To a greater or less extent this applies to all African Powers, other than Belgium. When Belgian annexation took place, the Congo was in every respect a “squeezed orange”; not only so, but the administration of that territory must remain subject to the paternal control of the European Powers. There is another feature which should not be overlooked, and which may yet cause difficulty. In the event of a general insurrection in French or British colonies, or in the event of invasion, these Powers can at once bring in an outside coloured army, which can, if necessary, be reinforced with white troops. Belgium can do neither. Let any material section of the native army revolt, which, by the way, is the ever present fear of its officers, and the Europeans must run for their lives. They would call in vain for troops from the Mother Country, for by the Belgian Constitution the army may not be ordered abroad, and for other reasons European forces could hardly be used in the Congo. With the unification of language amongst the native troops which is rapidly taking place, with the ever increasing spread of knowledge as to the use of arms, this peril has been gravely accentuated within recent years.

Apart from these general—and some of them, remote—difficulties, there are existing reasons for believing that the extensive Congo territories are too heavy a responsibility for Belgium. The country is over eighty times the size of Belgium, a proportion to the Mother Country not by any means without parallel, but circumstances differ so widely that they remove the question from all comparison with any other incident of colonial expansion. The only countries which at all compare with the Congo are Uganda and Southern Nigeria, but these have not suffered as the Congo has done from thirty years of the maddest form of exploitation since Pizarro plundered Peru.