If the Colonial Office and the Missionary Societies, acting either independently or in unison with each other, can devise any satisfactory solution of this very important and also extremely difficult problem, they will earn the gratitude of all who are interested in the well-being of our Asiatic and African dominions. Palliatives for the evils which most assuredly arise under the existing system have been tried by the Governments of India and Egypt, but so far as I know the success of these efforts has not been very marked. I may mention that, so convinced was I that the harm done by sending young Egyptians to England for purposes of education more than counterbalanced the advantages which were obtained that at the cost of a good deal of misrepresentation—which was quite natural under the circumstances—I persistently discouraged the practice, and urged that a preferable system was so to improve higher and technical education on the spot as to render the despatch of students to Europe no longer necessary. I fear, however, my efforts in this respect were not altogether successful, for although higher education in Egypt has unquestionably been much improved, the idea that European attainments can best be cultivated in Europe itself has taken so strong a hold both on Egyptian parents and on the Egyptian governing classes, that it is well-nigh impossible to eradicate it.
By far, however, the most interesting and also the most important part of Mr. Harris’ work is that in which he deals with the future of the African possessions of Belgium and Portugal respectively. Even if I had at my disposal all the information necessary to a thorough treatment of these questions, it would not be possible to deal adequately with the grave issues raised by Mr. Harris within the limits of the present introduction. I confine myself, therefore, to a very few observations.
As regards the Congo, if I understand Mr. Harris’ view correctly, the situation, broadly speaking, is somewhat as follows. Reforms have been executed, and a serious effort, the sincerity of which he does not call in question, has been made to rectify abuses for which neither the Belgian Parliament nor the Belgian nation are in any degree responsible. But although abuses have been checked, the main cause from which they originally sprung has not yet been entirely removed. That cause is that the Government, whose functions should be mainly confined to administration, is still largely interested in commercial enterprises. The State has not yet completely divorced itself from the production of rubber for sale in the European markets. Moreover, the old officials, who are tainted with Leopoldian practices, are still employed. Mr. Harris even goes so far ([p. 221]) as to state that their presence acts as a deterrent to the employment of Belgian officials of a higher type.[6] Mr. Harris thinks—and, for my own part, I do not doubt rightly thinks—that so long as this defective system[7] exists, radical reform of the Congo administration will remain incomplete. But radical reform can only be carried out at a very heavy cost, which the Belgian taxpayers, more especially after the assurances which have been given to them, will be unwilling to bear, and possibly incapable of bearing. Mn Harris, therefore, thinks that the Belgian people will be unable to perform the heavy task which, from no fault of their own, has been thrust upon them. “There are reasons,” he says ([p. 298]), “for believing that the extensive Congo territories are too heavy a responsibility for Belgium.”
It is very possible that Mr. Harris’ diagnosis is correct. But what is to be the remedy? The remedy which he suggests is that Germany should take over the greater part of the Belgian and a portion of the French Congo, and ([p. 302]) should concede “an adequate quid pro quo” to France. I will not attempt to discuss fully this suggestion which, to the diplomatic mind, is somewhat startling. I will only say that I very greatly doubt the feasibility of arranging any such “adequate quid pro quo” for France as Mr. Harris seems to contemplate. The British attitude in connection with any transfer of the Congo State from its present rulers to Germany appears to me, however, to be abundantly clear. If any amicable arrangement could be made by which Germany should enter into possession of the Congo, we may regard it, from the point of view of British interests, without the least shadow of disfavour or jealousy, but—and this point appears to me to be essential—it must be of such a nature as will not in any degree impair the very friendly relations which now fortunately exist between our own country and France. The well-being of the Congo State, however deserving of consideration, must be rated second in importance to the steadfast maintenance of an arrangement fraught with the utmost benefit not merely to France and England, but to the world in general.
Failing any such rather heroic measures as those proposed by Mr. Harris, the only alternative would appear to be to rely on Belgian action, and to exercise continuous but steady and very friendly pressure in the direction of crowning the work of the Congo reformers. It would be unjust not to recognize the great difficulties which a series of untoward events has created for Belgium. It may well be that if this course is adopted the progress of reform will be relatively slow, and that in the end it will be less effective than that which would be secured by an immediate and radical change of system. But I rise from a perusal of Mr. Harris’ pages with a feeling that Congo reformers have no cause for despair, albeit their ideals may be impossible of realization in the immediate future.
The case of Portugal is, from the British point of view, if not less difficult, certainly far more simple than that of the Congo. If one-half of what Mr. Harris says is correct—and I see no reason whatever to doubt the accuracy of his facts—two points are abundantly clear. The first is that however it may be disguised by an euphemistic nomenclature, slavery virtually exists in the African possessions of Portugal. The second is that the methods adopted in the repatriation of the slaves are open to very strong and very legitimate criticism. The process of dumping down a number of starving blacks on the coast of the mainland and leaving them to find their own way to their distant homes in Central Africa can scarcely be justified.
Portugal is justly proud of her historical connection with Africa and wishes to retain her African possessions. We may heartily sympathize with this honourable wish. I know of no adequate reasons for supposing that the present political status of those possessions is threatened. But, I venture to think, it would be a mistaken kindness to leave the Portuguese under any delusion on one point. There are some things which no British Government, however powerful otherwise, can undertake to perform. First and foremost amongst those things is the use of the warlike strength of the British Empire to maintain a slave State. In spite of the long-standing friendship between the two countries, in spite of historical associations which are endeared to all Englishmen, and in spite of the apparently unequivocal nature of treaty engagements, it would, I feel assured, be quite impossible, should the African possessions of Portugal be seriously menaced, for British arms to be employed in order to retain them under the uncontrolled possession of Portugal, so long as slavery is permitted. It is earnestly to be hoped that, before any such contingency can arise, the Portuguese Government will have removed the barrier which now exists by totally abolishing a system which is worthy of condemnation alike on economic and on moral grounds.
One further incident in connection with the general question is worthy of notice. Mr. Harris says ([p. 200]) that a small number of the slaves now employed at San Thomé are British subjects. There ought surely to be no great difficulty in dealing with this class. African experts would probably be able to say whether the claim to British nationality was justified or the reverse. If justified, it seems to me that the British Government should send a ship to San Thomé, embark the men, and, after having landed them at the most convenient ports on the mainland, make suitable arrangements for despatching them to their respective homes.
CROMER.
36, Wimpole Street,
October, 1912.