The following are examples:—
{ A 1 { A 1 { B 2 { B 2 (1) { C 3 (2) { C 3 { D 3 { D 5 { E 4 { E 6 { F -
In case (1) the preferences for A and B would be valid. If the third preference were reached the paper would be treated as exhausted, as it would be impossible to say for which candidate the voter really intended to give his third preference. In case (2) the preferences for A, B and C would be valid, but not the later ones, whether D had been elected or excluded or was still a continuing candidate. It is possible that the voter meant to give a fourth preference for some other candidate, e.g. F, but omitted to do so. It would not be possible to treat 5 as being meant to be 4.]
[Footnote 2: In small elections certain difficulties arise which are not present in the case of large elections.
(a) The quota becomes too large if calculated in the ordinary way. Assume that 27 electors are to elect 8 candidates. Then the quota is 27/(8+1) + 1 = 4. But 8 x 4 = 32.
There are not enough quotas to go round and difficulties would arise. The addition of 1 in the case of so small a number makes the quota disproportionately big. For this reason it is advisable to treat each paper as of the value of one hundred. In the case of the Transvaal the quota instead of being 84/(8+1) + 1 = 10 will be 8400/(8+1) + 1 = 934.
(b) The disregard of fractions in the case of small numbers may mean the waste of several votes. Take the following example:—
Seat to be filled, 8
Electors 25
Quota = 25/(8+1) + 1 = 3
First Count
A 10
B 3
C 3
D
E 2
F 1
G 1
H 1
I 1
J 1
A having 10 has a surplus of 7, which has to be distributed. According to the usual rule A's 10 votes are examined and the surplus is distributed in proportion to the next preferences. The preferences are as follows:—