Panachage.
The practice of voting for candidates belonging to different lists—panachage, as it is called—has evoked considerable discussion, and still gives rise to differences of opinion among the advocates of proportional representation on the Continent. At first sight there would appear to be nothing to discuss, and that there was no possible reason why the elector should not be allowed to exercise his choice in the freest manner. It has, however, been found that this privilege can be used in an unfair way. When each elector has as many votes as there are candidates, and is not permitted to cumulate his votes on any one, it usually happens that the votes obtained by individual candidates in any given list vary but little in number. When in some elections it was realized that the party could only obtain a certain number of seats, but that it had a few hundred votes to spare, some extreme partisans used these votes for the purpose of voting for the least competent men of their opponents' list, and their action sometimes resulted in the election of those men in preference to the more competent men of the party. The danger from this cause would appear to be exaggerated, but although success has seldom attended the abuse of panachage, the fear of a successful attempt has a disturbing influence. The later Swiss laws allow electors to cumulate three votes, but not more, upon any one candidate, so that the success of popular candidates is assured.
The single vote and the case de tête.
The Belgian parliamentary system suppresses panachage, and that in a most effective way. In this system each elector has but one vote, and therefore can only vote for one candidate. In addition, the Belgian system confers upon the organization presenting a list the right to arrange the order in which the candidates shall appear upon the list, and, further, it provides that the voter may approve of this arrangement by voting at the head of the list in the space provided for that purpose and which is known as the case de tête. Party organizations naturally advise their supporters to vote in this way. Public opinion is divided on this feature of the Belgian system, but M. Van den Heuvel, formerly Minister of Justice, who took a responsible part in the passing of the law, and with whom the author discussed this provision, defended it most vigorously, on the ground that the party as a whole had a right to determine which of its members should be elected. In the absence of the provision referred to it might happen that some candidate would be elected in preference to one who was more generally approved of by the party. This may be made clear by an example given by M. Van den Heuvel himself. A, B, C and D are candidates. Suppose that the party is strong enough to return three candidates, but no more, and that five-sixths of the party are in favour of candidates A, B and C, whilst the minority, one-sixth, are ardently in favour of candidate D. It will be necessary that the majority of the party (the five-sixths) should cleverly divide their votes equally between the candidates A, B and C in order to prevent the possibility of candidate D being elected by a small minority of the party. A little reflection will show that in the absence of any such provision the popular candidate of the majority, say A, might attract too large a proportion of the votes, thereby allowing D to pass B or C. Each provision of the Belgian system has been most carefully thought out, and, if it strengthens the hands of party organizations, it does so in order to secure the representation of the party by the candidates most generally approved. It may, however, be pointed out that had the single transferable vote been used, the candidates A, B and C, who, in M. Van den Heuvel's example, were supported by five-sixths of the party, would have been sure of election; there would have been no need to have conferred a special privilege upon the party organizations.
The limited and cumulative vote.
The French Proportional Representation League, which, impressed with the simplicity of the Belgian system, desired to introduce it into France, refrained from advocating the adoption of the case de tête, and suggested that the order in which candidates should be declared elected on each list should be determined by the votes of the electors. The French League in its first proposal recommended that each elector should, as in Belgium, have but one vote. It was soon realized that the popular candidate of the party might attract a large majority of the votes, and that, in consequence, candidates might be elected who were the nominees of only a small section of the party. The League in its second proposal recommended the use of the limited vote, each elector having two votes when six deputies were to be elected, and three in larger constituencies. The League, however, followed the Belgian practice in confining the choice of the elector to candidates on one list. This proposition was examined in 1905 by the Commission du Suffrage Universel, which, in the Report, declared that it was impossible to approve of such a limitation of the elector's freedom. "Nous ne pouvons," runs the Report, "laisser si étroitment enchainer, garrotter, ligotter l'electeur proclamé souverain et qui doit en tout cas être libre." The Committee recommended the use of the limited vote without the restriction recommended by the League. In a further Report, issued in 1907, this Committee again emphasized the necessity of leaving the elector quite free in the choice of candidates, and a new Bill, drafted by the Committee, provided that each elector should have as many votes as there were deputies to be elected, and that he should be allowed to cumulate the whole, or several of his votes, upon any one candidate. Where, however, the cumulative vote has been introduced into recent Swiss laws, as in that of the Canton of Bâle City, the elector is not permitted to cumulate more than three votes upon any one candidate. It will thus be seen that the single vote, the multiple vote without the privilege of cumulating, the limited vote, and the cumulative vote, have all been proposed or adopted as methods of determining which candidates shall be declared elected.
Special characteristics of Swedish and Finnish systems.
This summary of the different methods used in solving the double problem of a list system—the allotment of seats to parties and the selection of successful candidates—is not fully complete.[10] Special features have been incorporated in the Swedish and Finnish systems for the purpose of securing as much freedom of action as possible to electors, and these systems are described in Appendices Nos. III. and IV. The differences between the various list systems are, however, not so great as those between a list system and the single transferable vote, but the consideration of these must be reserved for the next chapter.
[Footnote 1: The text of the Belgian law (Art. 263 of the Electoral Code) runs as follows: "Le bureau principal divise successivement par 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. le chiftre électoral de chacune des listes et range les quotients dans l'ordre de leur importance jusqu'à concurrence d'un nombre total de quotients égal à celui des membres à élire. Le dernier quotient sert de diviseur électoral.
"La répartition entre les listes s'opère en attribuant à chacune d'elles autant de sièges que son chiffre électoral comprend de fois ce diviseur.">[