There is a lesson to be learned from these experiences, and it is this: The commanding officer of any army organization should not be hampered in the matter of supplies by having to obtain the approval or disapproval of a junior in rank, in a distant bureau, who knows nothing about the circumstances. In other words, the system which causes the staff departments of the United States Army to regard a civilian as their head, and makes them virtually independent of their line commanders, is an utterly vicious system. If an officer is competent to command an organization, he should be considered competent to look after the details of its administration, and should be held responsible, not only for its serviceable condition at all times, but for the care of its property and for all the other details connected with its service.

The quartermaster, or commissary, or other officer of a supply department should not know any authority on earth higher or other than the officer in command of the force he is to serve, except those in the line above such chief, and then only when such orders come through his chief.

The commanding officer having ordered supplies to be procured, there should be no question whatever in regard to their being furnished. They should come at once and without fail. If they were not necessary, hold him responsible.

This theory of administration eliminates the bureaucracy which has insidiously crept upon the Army, and relegates to their proper position the supply departments.

The General Staff proper has a higher field of usefulness than the mere problems of supply. Its business is to care for the organization, mobilization, and strategic disposition of all the forces, both naval and military, of the United States. Its head should be the President, and the two divisions should be under the general commanding the Army and the admiral commanding the Navy. The remainder of this staff should be composed of a small but select personnel, and should limit its duties exclusively to those set forth above.

CHAPTER XII.
THE VOYAGE HOME AND THE END OF THE GATLING GUN DETACHMENT.

The detachment received permission on the 10th of August to use any standing tentage which it could find, and it was thoroughly under shelter an hour after this permission was received. The climate of Cuba was not so disagreeable when one could look at it through the door of a tent, but we were not destined to enjoy our tentage very long. On the 15th, at two o’clock, orders were received to go on board the Leona at Santiago, bound for Montauk Point, and at half-past five o’clock men, guns, and equipment were duly stowed for the voyage home.

It was much more agreeable than the one to Cuba, The transport was not crowded, the men had excellent hammocks, which could be rolled up during the day, thus leaving the whole berth deck for exercise and ventilation, and the Leona was a much better vessel than the Cherokee.

The detachment finally disembarked at Montauk Point on the 23d, passed through the usual detention camp, and was assigned a camping-place. It was disbanded per instructions from headquarters, Montauk Point, on the 5th of September, the members of the detachment returning to their respective regiments, well satisfied with the work they had done and with each other.

In concluding this memoir the author desires to pay a personal tribute of admiration and respect to the brave men composing the detachment, both individually and collectively. Some of them have figured more prominently in these pages than others, but there was not a man in the detachment who was not worthy to be called the highest term that can be applied to any man—a brave American soldier.